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This thesis is a study of the effects of the Third Reform Act and Irish Home 
Rule on the politics of late-Victorian Edinburgh focussing on the general elections of 
1885 and 1886. Although the impact on British politics of both the Third Reform Act 
and the debate on Irish Home Rule have been the subjects of many studies, 
Edinburgh has hardly featured in this historiography. During this short time, 
Edinburgh was transformed from a Liberal dominated dual-member constituency to a 
city represented by four single-member MPs, one of whom was not a Liberal, thus 
altering the long-standing liberal political tradition of the city. Both the Third Reform 
Act and the debate over Irish Home Rule created separate and distinct splits in the 
local Liberal Party of Edinburgh. The Liberal split over Irish Home Rule has 
attracted some attention, but the split created by the Third Reform Act has been 
ignored. This thesis helps bridge a gap in nineteenth-century Scottish political history 
by focussing on Edinburgh; however, it also seeks to highlight the Liberal infighting 
that took place after the Third Reform Act, but prior to the split over Irish Home 
Rule. 
 This study draws heavily on the local press, campaign pamphlets and 
manuscripts of political elites to offer an analysis of the changes that took place upon 
passage of the Third Reform Act and introduction of the issue of Irish Home Rule. 
The political rhetoric that emerged during this period focussed on themes within the 
political tradition of the constituency, questioning the legitimacy of the local Party, 
and defining Liberalism. These were not unique to Edinburgh and the case study 
presented here is connected to wider themes within the study of late-Victorian 
politics.
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British politics underwent a major transformation during the late-Victorian 
era, which revolutionised the British political system. Politics changed from an 
extremely limited activity that centred on local campaigns and often local concerns to 
embracing mass national politics by enfranchising a majority of the male population 
and campaigning on a national scale with celebrity politicians. At the birth of this 
new modern political age two events, the enactment of the Third Reform Act and the 
introduction of Irish Home Rule, account for great shifts in the traditional politics. 
These two events took place in a span of a little more than a year during which time 
more than two million people were added to the electorate, a large percentage of the 
parliamentary seats were redrawn to create modern single-member districts, two 
general elections were held and the Liberal party, one of the two dominant political 
parties at the time, split. This thesis is a case study of Edinburgh politics during that 
tumultuous year. The study seeks to determine the effects of the Third Reform Act 
and Irish Home Rule on the politics of late-Victorian Edinburgh. The two general 
elections that immediately followed the passage of the Third Reform Act in 1885 and 
1886 provide the time frame of the study. The main issues that it is concerned with 
are local party politics, the caucus, and the role of local political traditions as well as 
questions regarding the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland, and Irish Home 
Rule. Other historians have studied these issues, but Edinburgh has been largely left 
out of the discussion. Edinburgh was a stronghold for Liberal politics at the time 
because it, like the majority of Scotland, was dominated by Liberal politics. 
Additionally, Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone, one of the most famous 
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politicians at the time, was the MP for Midlothian, the county surrounding the burgh. 
Gladstone used Edinburgh to deliver many of his campaign speeches during his 
‘Midlothian campaign’ in the 1880 election. This high-profile location enabled his 
speeches to be transmitted quicker and easier by the press. Gladstone used Edinburgh 
again in both of his 1885 and 1886 elections, but his motive changed during the 1886 
election. In the 1886 election Edinburgh became more important than just a 
convenient location to get maximum coverage from the press. The Liberal party split 
over Gladstone’s introduction of Irish Home Rule and he desperately needed to 
portray to the Liberal constituents throughout the country that he still represented the 
official Liberal party. Edinburgh, as the capital of Liberal Scotland, was essential for 
either side of the Liberal split to hold on to. Gladstone not only held speeches in 
Edinburgh during 1886 election, but he also personally interjected in elections within 
the burgh. This makes the elections in Edinburgh during this time extremely 
important to the overall split of the Liberal party. 
 
Historiography 
The historiography of late-Victorian Scottish politics is somewhat limited, 
especially when compared to its English counterpart. Nevertheless, the existing 
Scottish studies have had a profound impact on this thesis. The general political 
history of late-Victorian Scotland is covered in the works of I. G. C. Hutchison and 
Michael Fry.1 Donald Savage’s study of Scottish politics focussed on the issues of 
the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland and Irish Home Rule during the 1885 
and 1886 general elections through a national perspective.2 James G. Kellas 
produced two studies – one surveyed the issue of the disestablishment question 
through a national analysis, while the other covered the internal struggle of the 
Liberal party in Scotland focussing on the national Liberal organisations.3 The works 
of Catriona Burness, John F. McCaffrey and Derek W. Urwin focussed on the 
                                                      
1 I. G. C. Hutchison, A Political History of Scotland, 1832–1924: Parties, Elections and Issues 
(Edinburgh, 1986); Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland 
(Aberdeen, 1987). 
2 Donald Savage, ‘Scottish politics, 1885–6,’ SHR, 40 (1961), 118–35. 
3 James G. Kellas, ‘The Liberal party and the Scottish Church disestablishment crisis’, EHR, 79 
(1964), 31–46; James G. Kellas, ‘The Liberal party in Scotland, 1867–1895,’ SHR, 44 (1965), 1–16. 
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successes of the Liberal Unionists in the west of Scotland, especially in Glasgow.4 
Finally, Catriona Macdonald’s case study of Paisley politics has made a great 
contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of local politics, particularly the 
significance of traditions.5  
Savage’s study of Scottish politics in 1885 and 1886 identified many of the 
major themes that dominated the period and has since influenced the debate amongst 
historians. He defiantly stated in his opening line, ‘Two issues dominated Scottish 
politics in the years 1885 and 1886 – disestablishment of the Church of Scotland and 
home rule for Ireland’.6 This view remained unchallenged for years and, in a strictly 
national sense, is still valid. Along with the questions of disestablishment and Irish 
Home Rule, Savage pointed out the bitter in-fighting that took place within the 
Scottish Liberal Association. Most of his focus, however, was on the national 
organisations.7 Savage’s most profound impact on the historiography of late-
Victorian Scottish politics has been the focus on Glasgow and the west of Scotland. 
Savage concluded that, through the course of events during 1885 and 1886, the 
Liberal Unionists and Conservatives broke the Liberals’ ‘near monopoly’ in 
Scotland, which continued ‘for the next twenty years’.8 This finding has led to a 
preoccupation by subsequent historians on understanding how this breakthrough 
happened.9 
 Historians who have examined the 1885 election in Scotland have followed 
Savage’s lead and placed their focus on the disestablishment and disendowment of 
the Church of Scotland and the internal conflict for control of the Liberal party. The 
majority of these historians conclude, as Savage concluded, that disestablishment 
was the main question and the cause of the conflict amongst the Liberals during the 
                                                      
4 Catriona Burness, Strange Associations: The Irish Question and the Making of Scottish Unionism, 
1886–1918 (East Linton, 2003); John F. McCaffrey, ‘The origins of Liberal Unionism in the West 
of Scotland,’ SHR, 50 (1971), 47–71; Derek W. Urwin, ‘The development of the Conservative party 
organisation in Scotland until 1912’, SHR, 44 (1965), 89–111. 
5 Catriona M. M. Macdonald, ‘Locality, tradition and language in the evolution of Scottish Unionism: 
a case study, Paisley 1886–1910’, in Catriona M. M. Macdonald (ed.), Unionist Scotland 1800–
1997 (Edinburgh, 1998), 52–72; Catriona M. M. Macdonald, The Radical Thread: Political Change 
in Scotland. Paisley Politics, 1885–1924 (East Linton, 2000). 
6 Savage, ‘Scottish politics’, 118. 
7 Savage focuses on the meetings of both the Scottish Liberal Association and the National Liberal 
Federation of Scotland.  
8 Savage, ‘Scottish politics’, 118. 
9 Urwin ‘The development of the Conservative party organisation’, 89–111; McCaffrey, ‘The origins 
of Liberal Unionism’, 47–71; Burness Strange Associations; Fry, Patronage and Principle. 
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1885 election.10 Kellas cited disestablishment as the root cause of the Liberal party’s 
dispute in Scotland, but he noted that of the twenty-seven races between rival 
Liberals in Scotland during the 1885 election, only thirteen were ‘divided mainly on 
the Church question’.11 However, the view that disestablishment was the cause of 
tensions between Liberals remained unchallenged for years. Most studies focussed 
on the national Liberal organisations and, as a result of this focus, concluded that the 
in-fighting was a result of disestablishment.12 Two studies in particular shifted the 
debate by changing the focus from national institutions to local constituencies. In 
Burness’ study of Unionists in the west of Scotland, much emphasis was placed on 
Glasgow. The local constituencies’ struggle for control of the local party machinery 
is briefly discussed thus helping shape the Scottish Liberal party’s struggle locally 
instead of only from the national viewpoint. Disestablishment was still alluded to as 
the main cause of the Liberal party’s struggle, though she pointed to other issues as 
having importance as well.13 In her study of local Paisley politics, Macdonald 
challenged the dominance of the Church question by citing other issues, many of 
which were localised, as the root of the struggle in Paisley.14 
 The historiography of the 1886 election in Scotland, much like the 1885 
election, has followed Savage’s template and focussed on Irish Home Rule. 
McCaffrey’s important study on Liberal Unionists in the west of Scotland helps in 
understanding the success of the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives in the west. 
McCaffrey primarily focussed on Glasgow where the strength of Liberal Unionists 
and Conservatives was very evident. His study is more centred on local conflict 
resulting in more detail of the cause of the split and opposition to Irish Home Rule. 
He concluded that Liberal Unionists in the west of Scotland mainly drew their 
support from business and professional men who were concerned about the ‘break up 
of Imperial unity’ because they depended on foreign markets.15 Besides McCaffrey’s 
emphasis on the middle class leaving the Liberal party over opposition to Irish Home 
                                                      
10 Kellas, ‘The Liberal party and the Scottish Church disestablishment crisis’, 31–46; Kellas, ‘The 
Liberal party in Scotland’, 1–16; McCaffrey, ‘The origins of Liberal Unionism’, 47–71; Hutchison, 
A Political History, 154–62; Fry, Patronage and Principle, 95; Burness Strange Associations, 37. 
11 Kellas, ‘The Liberal party and the Scottish Church disestablishment crisis’, 36. 
12 Kellas, ‘The Liberal party in Scotland’, 1–16; McCaffrey, ‘The origins of Liberal Unionism’, 47–
71; Hutchison, A Political History; Fry, Patronage and Principle. 
13 Burness, Strange Associations, 37. 
14 Macdonald, The Radical Thread. 
15 McCaffrey, ‘The origins of Liberal Unionism’, 47–71. 
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Rule, he generally viewed the split, as both Savage and Kellas had, as being between 
Radicals, on the one hand, and Moderates and Whigs, on the other. Both Hutchison 
and Fry questioned this view of the Liberal party’s split and pointed out many 
Scottish political figures who were Whigs and stayed supportive of Gladstone and 
the Liberal party and, conversely, many Radicals who left the Liberal party to join 
the Liberal Unionists.16 However, Fry concluded with the old view that it was still 
basically a split between left and right.17 
  The view of both Hutchison and Fry that the split was not a clean break 
between Radicals and Whigs is also shared by Burness and Macdonald.18 Their 
respective studies over Glasgow and Paisley shed light on these local elections. They 
both emphasise the importance of the candidates’ fight to be viewed as 
representatives of liberalism by the constituents. Burness remarked that Liberal 
Unionists in Scotland differed from their counterparts in England because ‘the 
Scottish political situation required the Liberal Unionists to emphasise their 
Liberalism’.19 Macdonald placed more importance on the issue, noting that the 
opposing candidates fought not only to be seen as legitimately representing 
Liberalism, but also to be viewed as the true Liberals in opposition to their 
opponents.20 
 This case study of Edinburgh politics during the 1885 and 1886 elections 
follows this historiography and the themes of disestablishment, Irish Home Rule and 
the conflict within the Liberal party are central to this study as well. However, other 
Scottish studies have played a role in developing the historiography of this study on 
Edinburgh politics. As previously mentioned, the history of late-Victorian Scottish 
politics has been almost entirely focussed on the west of Scotland. This is due to the 
success of the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives in the west after the Liberal party 
split in 1886. There has been some study of Edinburgh, most notably by Hutchison 
whose work on Scottish politics was an attempt to ‘broaden the geographical spread 
of evidence’.21 While Hutchison’s study did broaden the scope of the political 
                                                      
16 Hutchison, A Political History, 162–3; Fry, Patronage and Principle, 97–8. 
17 Fry, Patronage and Principle, 107. 
18 Burness, Strange Associations 46–8; Macdonald, The Radical Thread, 88–90. 
19 Burness, Strange Associations, 3. 
20 Macdonald, ‘Locality, tradition and language’, 52–72; Macdonald, The Radical Thread, 84–91.  
21 Hutchison, A Political History, v. 
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discussion, particularly pertaining to the Irish Home Rule debate, his coverage of 
Edinburgh was limited and pertained mostly to Edinburgh MPs. Similarly, Michael 
Dyer discussed the 1885 elections in Edinburgh in relation to the rise of independent 
Liberals standing during that election. He gives a very brief account of the 
controversy amongst the local Liberals pertaining to the standing of rival Liberal 
candidates.22 With the exception of the limited discussions of the city in these 
studies, Edinburgh, and the east of Scotland in general, have been largely left out of 
the historical discussion. Alistair Cooke’s article on Gladstone’s election for Leith is 
one example of a study on late-Victorian Scottish politics outside of the west of 
Scotland. Though its scope and purpose was limited, pertaining only to a single 
election in one burgh district, it contains insight into the political situation within the 
politics of Scottish Liberalism. Cooke presented a compelling case that explained 
why Gladstone chose to stand for the Leith constituency when he was unopposed in 
Midlothian. He discussed the split within the Liberal party and maintained that it was 
Gladstone’s ‘deep personal commitment’ to Irish Home Rule that prompted him to 
intervene in the election. The result of the withdrawal of Gladstone’s opponent in 
Leith sheds light on Gladstone’s command and popularity within Scottish politics as 
well and has helped shape the understanding of his role within the Edinburgh 
elections discussed in this thesis.23  
 Jeffery Charles Williams’ thesis on Edinburgh politics and Graeme Morton’s 
study of Unionist-nationalism have helped shape the historical understanding of mid-
Victorian Edinburgh politics.24 Williams’ study focussed on politics while Morton’s 
focussed on the makeup of Edinburgh’s society and interest groups. Their studies 
reveal the struggle of advanced liberalism in Edinburgh. Advanced Liberals were 
able to break the Whig monopoly on the city’s politics in the 1860s. These two works 
provide this study with historical and political background, which helps to shape the 
understanding of the political traditions of Edinburgh. 
                                                      
22 Michael Dyer, Capable Citizens and Improvident Democrats: The Scottish Electoral System 1884–
1929 (Aberdeen, 1996), 38–9. 
23 Alistair B. Cooke, ‘Gladstone’s election for the Leith district of burghs’, SHR, 49 (1970), 172–94. 
24 Jeffrey Charles Williams, ‘Edinburgh politics: 1832–1852’ Thesis (Ph.D.) University of Edinburgh 
(Edinburgh, 1972); Graeme Morton, Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860 
(East Linton, 1999), 64–132. 
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   This thesis not only seeks to bring late-Victorian Edinburgh into the 
discussion of Scottish politics, but also to contribute to the overall understanding of 
party politics in late-Victorian Britain and the dynamics of the Liberal party after the 
Third Reform Act, but prior to the split on Irish Home Rule. The work of two 
historians, Eugenio Biagini and Jon Lawrence, has contributed significantly to the 
approach taken in this thesis. Biagini’s studies, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform 
and British Democracy and Irish Nationalism, emphasised popular politics, 
Liberalism and democracy.25 In both of these studies, Biagini focussed on the 
impacts that the ideas of liberty and democracy had on popular politics. Throughout 
the mid- and late-Victorian period, he viewed these ideas as the motivation behind 
reform within British popular politics. In Speaking for the People, Lawrence 
focussed on the dynamics of local politics and how its traditions engaged with 
national politics.26 He challenged the ‘triumph of party’ in late-Victorian Britain and 
concluded that the local constituents often distrusted the political parties and resented 
the party machinery. Furthermore, he points to the importance of local traditions and 
found them to be very influential amongst the local populace. The work of both of 
these historians has led this thesis to question the relationship between Liberalism, 
democracy and party politics, as well as the relationship between those who sought to 
represent and those who were represented.  
  
Sources 
 The sources used in this thesis are much the same as any found in other 
studies of late-Victorian political history. They comprise mainly the papers of 
politicians and other politically active individuals, papers of political parties and 
organisations, government publications, pamphlets, biographies and contemporary 
autobiographies, as well as newspapers. The use of political papers provides insight 
into the private discussions the individuals had about a particular bill, other 
politicians or their own chance of successfully being returned to Parliament. They 
allow a researcher to penetrate the surface of what was displayed to the public and 
                                                      
25 Eugenio F. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age of 
Gladstone, 1860–1880 (Cambridge, 1992); Eugenio F. Biagini, British Democracy and Irish 
Nationalism, 1876–1906 (Cambridge, 2007).  
26 Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867–
1914 (Cambridge, 1998). 
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reveal a more complete picture of the political environment. While these papers are 
valuable to researchers, the drawback of these sources, in addition to government 
papers, pamphlets, biographies and contemporary autobiographies, is that they point 
the researcher towards ‘high politics’ which focuses on the political elite and their 
perceptions and actions towards the contemporary issues. This makes it a challenge 
to gain an understanding of the complete political picture because the majority of 
society is left out of the political discourse.27 The exception to this is newspapers, 
which contain a variety of different sources of political information including 
campaign speeches, political association meetings, editorials and letters to the editor. 
Through these sources, the voices of the constituents can be heard in addition to the 
voices of the politicians. Newspapers have often been criticized by historians who 
cite them as being biased and unreliable sources. Nevertheless, Biagini has rightly 
pointed out that ‘it is through these reports that the rank-and-file participants 
demonstrations were occasionally allowed a public voice’.28 
 Edinburgh’s leading newspaper at this time was The Scotsman, which was 
also a leading newspaper in Scotland. The Scotsman, a Liberal, Whiggish newspaper, 
openly supported Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign and opposed the 
disestablishment of the Church of Scotland. The editor of The Scotsman during this 
time was Charles Cooper, who was a confidant of Lord Rosebery until 1886. During 
the breakup of the Liberal party in 1886 over the Irish Home Rule debate, Cooper 
came out against the Bill and, subsequently, The Scotsman became a Unionist 
paper.29 The Scotsman was heavily used in this thesis in an attempt to ascertain the 
issues that were important to the local constituents of Edinburgh. The Scotsman was 
not used because it was a national newspaper for Scotland, but because of the high 
priority given to the coverage of the Edinburgh elections. Other newspapers that 
were based in Edinburgh were also consulted. The main function of the newspaper 
reports within the research for this thesis was to provide coverage of the 
parliamentary candidates’ campaign speeches and the meetings of the local ward and 
district political associations. The Scotsman’s coverage of these events was far 
superior to that of the newly established Edinburgh Evening News. Through the 
                                                      
27 Hutchison, A Political History, v. 
28 Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform, 25. 
29 H. C. G. Matthew, ‘Cooper, Charles Alfred (1829–1916)’, ODNB (Oxford, 2007), 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53257, accessed 5 Feb 2012]. 
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coverage of the local political associations, one is able to assess the concerns and 
wants of the local constituents as they emphasized the issues that were of particular 
importance to them. The local associations also provide insight into the political 
differences amongst the local Liberal constituents through the discourse which took 
place regarding both the endorsement of parliamentary candidates and the support of 
questions and issues. The coverage of the campaign speeches also contributes to this, 
as it provides an idea of the concerns of both the candidates and the constituents. 
There was a complex relationship between the candidates and the constituents in 
which they had to negotiate not only what issues were of concern, but also what 
position should be taken on these issues. The campaign rhetoric of the candidates 
was supposed to convince the constituents to vote for them. There were two 
approaches to achieve this: first, the candidates could have tried to persuade the 
constituents that the issues they were concerned with were vital, or, second, they 
could have focussed on the questions that they believed were the most important to 
the constituents themselves. Likewise, as the audience at the political campaign 
speeches, the constituents voiced their positions on the issues through their shouts of 
approval or outright hostility towards the issue. Moreover, some constituents were 
able to directly engage with the candidates by asking specific questions. These 
questions often entailed where the candidates stood on a particular question. This not 
only provides the candidate’s position or sometimes his unwillingness to take a stand 
on the issue, but it also reveals what issues the constituents were most concerned 
with. In addition to the benefit of expanding the historical discussion outside of ‘high 
politics’, the newspapers’ coverage is invaluable for a local study such as this one. 
For example, without the coverage of the newspapers it would not have been possible 
to research the local Liberal associations in Edinburgh. Of the four local Liberal 
associations and thirteen local ward Liberal associations in Edinburgh, records for 
only one of the wards during the time covered in this thesis survive. 
 
Politics in the 1880s 
This case study of Edinburgh politics focuses on the mid-1880s, which was 
an important decade in the history of British politics. The 1880s were also a 
tumultuous time for the Liberal party which found itself out of favour and out of 
10 
 
power in the previous decade. During the 1880s there were a few changes that altered 
the way in which campaigns were run throughout the country and which helped the 
Liberals to remedy their problems. One important aspect was the development of 
national campaigning. With the advances of the telegraph and the abundance of local 
papers, speeches could be distributed around the country in a matter of days, thus 
opening the whole country up to individual politicians and their message. This new 
style of campaigning was exemplified in Gladstone’s 1880 Midlothian campaign as 
he used to essentially campaign nationally for Liberals throughout the country. 
Newly established national political associations were also coming into form which 
served the purpose of organising the party vote and spreading its influence. In 
addition to these new strategies was a campaign for further enfranchisement by 
arguing for county franchise. These three new strategies helped the Liberals regain 
political power, but also had the effect of shifting parliamentary politics from a local 
focus to a national one. These strategies did not cause the shift in parliamentary 
politics, but they helped to create the environment in which the events of 1885 and 
1886 unfolded. The events of these years, specifically the implementation of the 
Third Reform Act and Gladstone’s support of Irish Home Rule, split the Liberal 
party and ultimately forced the constituents to choose their representative based on 
their stance for or against Irish Home Rule. Additionally, in the 1880s there were 
important debates and policy changes on the role of the Empire, laws concerning 
domestic politics and the relationship of Ireland to the rest of the UK. These changes 
and issues created a watershed in British politics transforming it into the modern 
era.30 
Political campaigning was already moving toward a defined platform before 
the Third Reform Act was passed. Through the invention of new technologies and 
the restructuring of party politics, the parties were focussing on a narrowing of issues 
presented in the party platform.31 The modes in which candidates interacted with the 
constituents changed with technological advances in the 1880s such as the steam 
engine, newspapers and the telegraph, all of which helped to spread the candidates’ 
                                                      
30 Jonathan Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (New Haven, 1993), 
274–303. This analysis of the changing politics of the 1880s is heavily influenced by Parry’s 
explanation of the changes in the Liberal party in the late-Victorian period. 
31 Matthew Fforde, Conservatism and Collectivism: 1886–1914 (Edinburgh, 1990), 14–7. 
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messages throughout the country. Gladstone was the first candidate to integrate the 
use of the technology during his ‘Midlothian campaign’ in 1879–80 through the use 
of whistle-stops during his travel to Edinburgh. Gladstone was able to speak to a 
large number of voters en route and reach an even wider audience through print. His 
speeches were transmitted throughout the country by the telegraph and then printed 
in newspapers and pamphlets thus creating a national interest in his local campaign.32 
By the next election in 1885 there were numerous candidates using Gladstone’s tactic 
to attract as much attention as they could, not only for themselves, but also for their 
causes.33 
Another change that came about in the 1880s was the emergence of national 
party associations. The associations of both the Conservatives and the Liberals 
became a more dominant feature in politics during the late-Victorian era and, as 
such, the parties’ platforms became more important as well.34 The goal of these 
national associations was to promote a cohesive coalition from the numerous local 
associations throughout the country. The influence that these associations had in 
England was quickly emulated in Scotland. Both parties established national 
association branches in Scotland by the mid-1880s.35 The nature of the association 
and politics in general changed with the formation of the National Liberal Federation 
in 1877. The NLF established a separate national liberal association mainly 
comprised of Radicals, but, more importantly, it was organised in a power structure 
that came to be known as a caucus. The caucus was supposed to bring a new element 
of democracy to politics by involving more people in the nominating process and 
providing them with a platform to express the issues they were concerned with.36 By 
the 1880s the caucus had taken control of many local associations throughout the 
United Kingdom, but some constituents began to criticise the caucus and question 
                                                      
32 Ewen A. Cameron, Impaled upon a Thistle: Scotland since 1880 (Edinburgh, 2010), 56–9; T. A. 
Jenkins, The Liberal Ascendancy, 1830–1886 (Basingstoke, 1994), 162; Fry, Patronage and 
Principle, 92. 
33 Jon Lawrence, Electing our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair 
(Oxford, 2009), 54–7. 
34 E. H. H. Greene, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British 
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whether or not it was truly democratic. The controversy surrounding the caucus and 
its role in Edinburgh politics are discussed in detail in this study. 
Three of the principal issues of the late-Victorian period were the Empire, 
democracy and Irish Home Rule. Imperial affairs were an important factor in 
influencing election outcomes in the 1880s. At the start of the decade the role of 
protector of the empire was still up for grabs between the Liberals and Conservatives. 
Gladstone used imperial issues as a cornerstone in his 1880 Midlothian campaign 
when he was ushering in the new form of campaigning. He attacked the 
Conservatives’ foreign policy as being too costly and unnecessary. Gladstone also 
highlighted the fact that the Conservative government had supported the Turkish 
Empire who had slaughtered Christians in Bulgaria, which he argued was against the 
role of the empire.37 The Liberal government of 1880–5 under Gladstone had trouble 
with foreign policy as well. It suffered disasters in South Africa, Egypt and Sudan. 
The loss in Sudan was intensified by the death of the popular General Charles 
Gordon. Gordon’s death caused an outcry of anguish in the country.38 His death, 
coupled with the other foreign policy failures, upset both Conservatives and 
Liberals.39 Despite the setback of the unsuccessful foreign policy of the Liberal 
Government, the Conservatives were unable to turn the Liberal misfortune into a 
gain in Scotland during the 1885 election.40 Edinburgh reflected the same blasé 
attitude as the rest of Scotland with the subject of foreign policy rarely showing up in 
the campaign, which instead focussed on domestic issues. 
 In the first half of the 1880s there were four acts of Parliament passed that 
altered politics in the UK. The first act, the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, 
focussed on campaign finance and regulated the amount of money a candidate could 
spend during the campaign. The other three Acts are the Representation of the People 
Act of 1884, Registration Amendment Act of 1885 and the Redistribution of the 
Seats Act of 1885. Together these three acts are known as the Third Reform Act and 
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are discussed in detail in chapter one of this study. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices 
Act of 1883 limited candidates to one election agent, forbid the payment of 
canvassers and restricted the number of other campaign workers. It also criminalised 
the payment or the exchange of gifts, such as beer, to constituents for their vote. 
Most importantly, it limited the overall expenditure allotted to a campaign.41 Of 
course, this act did not completely eradicate all corruption within British politics, but 
it helped curb the undesired actions. Since candidates could no longer rely on paying 
workers to campaign for them or bribing constituents for their vote, they had to adapt 
to seeking volunteers and to persuading constituents to vote for them. This new style 
of campaigning encouraged more people to get involved in the political process and 
allowed constituents to vote according to their own personal preference, not based on 
a financial incentive.42  
The Third Reform Act equalised the voting requirements, addressed some 
issues of restructuring the new voters and redrew the parliamentary districts. The 
Representation of the People Act of 1884 altered the voting requirements of the 
counties to match those of the cities, which had been altered in 1867 through the 
Second Reform Act. This greatly increased the amount of eligible voters in the UK. 
To aid in registering these new voters the Registration Amendment Act of 1885 was 
passed. In practise, it worked to disenfranchise men by placing obstacles, in the form 
of restrictions, in their way causing an otherwise eligible man to become ineligible. 
Nevertheless, there were over two million new voters franchised by the Third 
Reform Act. Matthew Fforde views the increase in the number of voters as the 
central cause to the change in national politics during the late-Victorian period. The 
expansion of the franchise encouraged more people to participate and to use 
government as the vehicle for social change.43  
The final act of the Third Reform Act, the Registration Amendment Act of 
1885, brought the size of the parliamentary districts closer together based on 
population. It also introduced single-member seats to Parliament and further 
separated urban voters from rural voters. With this change to single-member seats, 
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the traditional conception of the ideal MP changed. Before the introduction of the 
single-member seat, MPs were expected to embody a wide range of opinion due to 
the varying opinions from the large number of constituents he was supposed to 
represent. After this shift, the opinions of the constituents were more defined leading 
to the desire for more rigid candidates. The new single-seat parliamentary districts 
were also stretched to incorporate constituents who shared similar economic 
conditions into the same districts. According to Jonathan Parry, this alteration within 
British politics made it possible for party machines to take over the political process 
within the new districts.44 The change also eliminated a longstanding tradition of the 
Whigs and Radicals running in cooperation with one another in the same burgh as 
they now faced one another for the same seat. This restricted the ability of local elites 
being able to negotiate the desired outcome of the election without a contest as 
well.45 Therefore, the shift to single-member districts led to both the elimination of 
cooperation between the two wings of the Liberal party and the constituents’ want of 
an MP that shared their specific political goals. This led Liberal candidates to 
advocate a specific platform that separated them from their Liberal rival.  
In the last half of the 1880s the debate over Irish Home Rule shook up and 
rearranged parliamentary politics more than any other single issue during the late-
Victorian era. The Irish National League was seeking more autonomy from 
Westminster for Ireland. The Irish Nationalists used their position as a minority party 
to disrupt Parliament by obstructing proceedings with unnecessary parliamentary 
procedures. The goal of this tactic was to become a large enough nuisance that the 
Liberals and Conservatives would have to address their concerns. The Irish 
Nationalists also hoped to influence the Liberals or Conservatives to support Irish 
Home Rule in return for their backing either party. During the 1885 election Charles 
Stewart Parnell, the leader of the Irish Nationalists, urged Irish voters in Britain to 
support the Conservatives over the Liberals. The weight of the Irish vote in Britain 
was a concern for both the Liberals and the Conservatives with the passage of the 
Third Reform Act as it was estimated that there were up to two million Irish living in 
Britain. The impact of Parnell’s direction has been questioned as the Irish voters 
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could have influenced as many as forty elections, although this number has been 
disputed. Regardless, it was minimal in Scotland where the Liberals enjoyed a great 
victory and the Irish constituents were firmly Liberal. The Liberals, under 
Gladstone’s leadership, won a majority of eighty-six MPs, the exact number of Irish 
Nationalist MPs retuned; therefore, Gladstone needed their support to form an 
outright majority Government. This enabled Parnell to play the role of ‘king maker’. 
In order to secure the support of the Irish Nationalists and Parnell, Gladstone 
presented an Irish Home Rule Bill. There is evidence that Gladstone was already 
moving toward supporting Irish Home Rule, but, whatever his motivation, it caused a 
great divide amongst Liberal MPs and Liberal constituents. There were numerous 
reasons for various MPs to support or oppose the bill, which are discussed within this 
thesis. The Irish Home Rule debate not only caused the split of the Liberal party, but 
it also led to the creation of a new party in opposition over the bill.46 
The Liberal Unionist Party was established in 1886 after the breakup of the 
Liberal party over Gladstone’s proposal for Irish Home Rule. Some of the members 
of the Liberal party who opposed Irish Home Rule could not resolve their 
differences. These Liberals broke away from the Liberal party and formed a new 
party calling themselves Liberal Unionists because they saw themselves as keeping 
the countries of the UK united. Owing to their members already being established 
politicians at the founding of the party, they had great early success. Their success 
can also be attributed to the election pact with the Conservatives to not run 
politicians for the same seat thus uniting the vote of constituents who opposed 
Liberals and Irish Home Rule. The united opposition against the Liberal party led to 
the consolidation of the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives in the Edwardian era.47 
The formation of the Liberal Unionist party caused by the breakup of the Liberal 
party and the impact it had on the local politics of Edinburgh are a key feature in this 
thesis. 
 The Liberal Unionists differed from Labour, the other political movement 
that emerged in the late-Victorian era, in that it formed from members of the Liberal 
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Party; therefore, it did not have the same difficulties in establishing a foothold in 
mainstream politics. The Labour movement had a difficult time breaking into 
mainstream politics, which was already dominated by Liberals and Conservatives at 
that time. The Labour party has strong roots in Scotland originating from this period, 
most notably Keir Hardie who lost the 1888 Mid-Lanark by-election and founded the 
Scottish Labour party.48  By the end of the Great War, Labour had passed the 
Liberals and became an important political party nationally. Due to this success, 
there is no doubt that supporters of a working-class party were not already hard at 
work labouring for political success. Nevertheless, in the 1880s, especially in 
Edinburgh, there is little evidence of the movement having any impact on 
parliamentary elections. There was a desire to elect a workingman to Parliament in 
Edinburgh, but the Trades Representative Parliamentary Committee had 
organisational problems, which ended with the abandonment of this attempt.49 
 Robert Q. Gray attributes the lack of a vital working-class movement in 
Edinburgh during the 1880s to the workers themselves: 
Workers themselves [...] showed little tendency to link their experience of 
industrial struggle to the present inequalities of political power. Both kinds of 
oppression were recognized as such, and vigorously opposed, but they were 
never connected with any total social critique. Disillusionment with 
Liberalism led to political passivity, rather than to any attempt to construct an 
alternative.50 
 
However, constituents raised work-related questions such as shortening the workday 
or payment for workingmen who were elected to Parliament. These questions were 
directed toward the candidates in Edinburgh during the 1885 election, they were just 
very limited compared to the questions that dominated the election.51 
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 Other historians of Scottish politics cite the dominance of the Liberal party in 
Scotland for the minimal support of a working-class party in the 1880s. Speaking of 
the newly enfranchised voters of both 1868 and 1885, Cameron links their support of 
liberalism to Gladstone and shared values: ‘Gladstone was revered and the values of 
order and respectability underpinned by craft skill, literacy and sobriety brought 
many working men into the Liberal community in Scotland’.52 Fry comes to the same 
conclusion of Liberal dominance: 
Unions could not persuade many that class interests were more important 
than the victory of Liberalism, especially when the horrible alternative was 
Conservatism. In any case the emergence of a strong opposition on the Left 
was for the moment made impossible by Gladstone’s triumphs in Scotland, 
which attached the workers more firmly to the Liberal party than at any time 
since 1832.53 
 
The popularity of both Gladstone and the Liberal party in Edinburgh are central 
themes in this study and support this view. The founding of both the Liberal Unionist 
and Labour parties placed pressure on the already established parties.  
Coupled with all of these changes, a new method of politics emerged during 
the 1880s that shifted the focus of politics from one concerned with local campaigns 
to national campaigns. This study of Edinburgh politics showcases this change by 
examining the parliamentary elections of 1885 and 1886 and the by-election held 
between them. These elections roughly fall in the middle of the decade, but, more 
importantly, they were held on the brink of the new political age. The 1885 election 
is the first held under the new franchise and the re-drawn electorate. It represents a 
dramatic attempt to break from the established politics, but it still held back from a 
complete break. The 1886 election, with the introduction of Irish Home Rule, was 
able to complete this major transformation.  
 
The study 
With all of the changes taking place in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century it was inevitable that there would be an impact on local politics of 
Edinburgh. The goal of this study is to identify and highlight these effects. While the 
focus of this study is on the local context of Edinburgh, it seeks to gain a broader 
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understanding of national trends throughout the UK during the 1885 and 1886 
elections. Different aspects of the political climate will be assessed in this study 
which uses an approach similar to the one used by Lawrence in Speaking for the 
People, in that it is a study of both ‘high’ and ‘popular’ politics and focuses on the 
links between the two. This thesis investigates the relationship between the 
representatives and the represented by exploring the negotiation that took place 
between the constituents and the candidates. The constituents and the candidates had 
to negotiate and try to persuade each other on what questions and issues were the 
most important and what positions were to be taken on those questions and issues 
which sometimes led to change in position during the course of the campaign. The 
constituents that were involved in the local party associations would debate the 
questions and the issues amongst themselves and try to reach a consensus on the 
position the local constituents should take on them. However, the constituents also 
negotiated with the candidates when they invited them to stand for their constituency 
and when they offered a candidate the endorsement of the association. In these 
actions, the constituents were ultimately looking for a candidate who supported their 
positions. Likewise, the candidates had to negotiate their terms as well. They had to 
find a constituency that would support their candidature. In order to appeal to the 
constituents, the candidates had to be open to the positions that the constituents 
favoured. They also had to be mindful of the local traditions that existed in the 
constituency in addition to what they perceived that the constituents wanted in a 
candidate. 
The 1880s was a decade of change for politics in the UK and, therefore, in 
Edinburgh. At the start of the 1880s Edinburgh was a double-member constituency. 
The constituents each had two votes, which they were able to cast for two separate 
parliamentary candidates. This voting system ensured cooperation between different 
ideological stances, Whigs and Radicals, within the Liberal party in most of the UK. 
However, in the Edinburgh constituency prior to the establishment of a local Liberal 
Association, there were rarely rival Liberals running for the seats. There were 
generally only two candidates that would come forward and both were usually 
aligned to the same ideological wing of the Liberal party. This was likely due to that 
wing of the party controlling the party’s nominating process at that time. If one wing 
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could exercise more control over the process, they could ensure the nominated 
candidates were aligned with their wing of the party before they stood for the general 
election. With the passage of the Third Reform Act the number of MPs in Edinburgh 
was doubled to four and they were divided into separate single-member seats. The 
change to single-member seats took place in all large burghs throughout the UK and 
caused the cooperation between the Radicals and Whigs to end because it forced the 
two groups to run against one another for the same seat. This was not much of a 
factor in Edinburgh, as the two groups had not cooperated with one another before 
the change. The change to single-member seats did still affect the local politics in 
Edinburgh. It was decided that the local Liberal Association should be replaced with 
individual associations for each new district. The establishment of these new 
associations provided an opportunity to gain outright control over the new political 
machines that were to be established for each of the new parliamentary seats. 
Whoever controlled the caucus of the new association could control the nominating 
process within them. The fight for control over the associations became a central 
theme during the 1885 election in Edinburgh and led to the legitimacy of the local 
liberal associations being questioned and consequently damaged.  
In Scotland the prominent issue during the 1885 election was the 
disestablishment of the Church of Scotland. The Church question was also a major 
point of contention between the Whigs and Radicals and contributed to the fight 
between the two groups for dominance of the local parties after the Third Reform 
Act. In Edinburgh the questions of local licensing and free education were also major 
issues during the election. They too fell largely along the same ideological split as 
the Church question. Despite these three questions dominating the Edinburgh 
elections, the main rhetoric used during the campaigns by both the candidates and 
constituents was the candidates’ qualities. This was similar to themes used in 
elections prior to the Third Reform Act. There were certain qualities that were valued 
more than others: local connection to the constituency, age of the candidate and his 
experience, and his identity as a liberal. Local connections were valued because it 
was believed that the potential MP would look out for the best interests of the city. 
Age and experience were valued for the prestige that the MP would bring to the city. 
Liberals were sought because Edinburgh, like most of Scotland, valued liberalism. 
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Prior to the Third Reform Act Edinburgh generally elected one local MP and one 
well-known MP to represent them, and both had always been Liberals. 
Contrary to the main questions of the election and the fight between the 
Radicals and Whigs, the rhetoric of the election suggests that the qualities of the 
candidates were the foremost concern of the majority of the constituents during the 
election. Candidates were praised for their experience and for their local connection 
to Edinburgh or Scotland while others were diminished for their lack of experience 
or labelled as outsiders. However, the in-fighting for control over the local party 
associations that was waged between the Whigs and Radicals during the 1885 
election caused the local liberal associations’ legitimacy to be questioned. This loss 
of legitimacy led to the establishment of opposing liberal associations primarily 
based on their alliance to the opposing wing of the Liberal party in three of the four 
parliamentary districts in Edinburgh. This essentially split the Liberal party in 
Edinburgh before Gladstone introduced Irish Home Rule. 
Due to the death of one of the newly elected MPs for Edinburgh there was a 
by-election held in January. The new local liberal associations were already in place 
during this election and were unable to come to an agreement on a candidate. 
However, only one Liberal candidate came forward to stand for the seat against a 
Conservative. The Liberals’ disagreement over the candidate was largely connected 
to the fighting over control of the associations between the Whigs and Radicals. 
Despite the disagreement the Liberal candidate easily won the by-election, but his 
return did nothing to reunite the local party. The fragmentation of the local Liberal 
party in Edinburgh was interrupted in early 1886 when Gladstone introduced plans 
for Irish Home Rule. Gladstone’s endorsement of Irish Home Rule led to a shattering 
of the Liberal party throughout the UK and to another general election. In the lead up 
to the election the liberal associations in Edinburgh were split on support of Irish 
Home Rule. Three of the associations favoured the measure, three opposed and one 
did not come to a decision. None of the associations were able to pass their 
resolutions on the question without opposition from within their associations. This 
demonstrates the strain that the Irish Home Rule debate placed on the local Liberals. 
The Irish question divided both camps of Liberals, the Radicals and the Whigs. 
Through a great effort by Gladstone and other Liberals who supported Irish Home 
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Rule, the majority of local Liberals were essentially reunited by the Irish question. 
Within a few months of the associations’ initial vote on support of Irish Home Rule, 
only one of them adopted a candidate that opposed the Irish question.  
One issue that is responsible for reuniting the majority of the Liberals in 
Edinburgh and securing their support for Irish Home Rule was the fight for 
liberalism that took place during the election. Upon the introduction of the Irish 
Home Rule question, three of the sitting MPs came out in opposition to the measure. 
Once an election was called, all of Edinburgh’s sitting MPs had an opponent come 
forward to stand against them. All four of Edinburgh’s races in 1886 were between 
two candidates that both professed to be Liberals, yet were divided on their support 
of the Irish question. This created a need for the candidates to assert that they were 
the true Liberals in the race. Throughout the election both the Liberal and Liberal 
Unionist candidates tried to present their position on the Irish question as a principle 
of liberalism. These arguments of support for the Irish question lead the election to 
become an election about liberalism. Therefore, the 1886 election, unlike the 
previous elections held in Edinburgh, was over one primary national issue and not 
about the national qualities of the candidates or local matters. This suggests that 
Edinburgh politics had been pushed into national politics by the Irish Home Rule 
question due to the debate over liberalism.  
The transition to national politics did not take place based on the Irish 
question and debate on liberalism. Edinburgh politics was influenced by the changes 
placed on it and the rest of the UK during the late-Victorian period, especially in the 
1880s. Through the analysis of Edinburgh’s politics after the Third Reform Act, this 
thesis examines the transition by looking at such subjects as disestablishment, Irish 
Home Rule, local political traditions and the local Liberal party conflict as well as 
the effects brought on by such issues by exploring the negotiation which took place 
between the candidates and the constituents. The research of both ‘high’ and 
‘popular’ politics, and the relationship between the two, allows a well-rounded 
conception of Edinburgh’s political environment in the late-Victorian period. This 
broad analysis of Edinburgh’s politics is placed within the historiography of late-
Victorian Scottish politics in this thesis to determine the effects that these changes  












Edinburgh and the Third Reform Act 
 
 Three Acts of Parliament, collectively known as the Third Reform Act, set 
into motion the political events that dominated the election cycle in 1885: the 
Representation of the People Act of 1884, Registration Amendment Act of 1885, and 
the Redistribution of the Seats Act of 1885.1 The Representation of the People Act of 
1884, the principal act, was sought to equalise the voting qualification between the 
urban and rural voters. Both the Registration Amendment and the Redistribution of 
the Seats Act supplemented the Representation of the People Act. These three Acts 
did not prove easy to pass. The House of Lords, controlled by the Conservatives, and 
the House of Commons, controlled by the Liberals, disputed the content of the Bills 
and the order in which the legislation should be introduced and voted on. Even after 
both Houses and parties came to a compromise, the Acts still had to be implemented, 
which became a source of even further controversy. The Act that took the most effort 
to enact was the Redistribution of the Seats Act. In order to apply the alterations 
called for by this Act, Parliament created a Boundary Commission to modify the 
parliamentary districts throughout the country. The modification of the parliamentary 
boundaries was of great interest to the local citizens in part due to the disputes that 
arose from the changes. This was especially true of Edinburgh, where the addition of 
two new MPs was accommodated by dividing the city into four parliamentary 
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districts, Central, East, South, and West. This was a controversial move which led to 
a heated debate over the best way to move forward with the changes. 
  Together these three Acts entirely changed the face of the electorate in the 
United Kingdom. This chapter will explore each of the three Acts and the steps taken 
to secure their passage. The implementation which followed their passage brought 
about some controversy. Edinburgh faced significant difficulty as it was changed 
from a dual-member constituency into a divided burgh with four individual districts. 
These districts had to be mapped out, which led to many discussions as to the best 
way to divide the city. Different groups came together to discuss their own plans 
before agreement was finally reached on how to divide the city and set the stage for 
the upcoming general election in 1885. 
 
The Acts 
The Representation of the People Act of 1884 (more commonly known as the 
Franchise Act) was the first reform act to legislate for the whole of the United 
Kingdom. Prior to 1884, there had been two reforms that dealt with the franchise in 
the United Kingdom: the first in 1832 followed by another in 1867–8. Both of the 
previous reforms had consisted of three separate Acts: one which addressed England 
and Wales, one focussed on Scotland, and another for Ireland. Upon passage of the 
Act in 1884 a man in Scotland was, for the first time, held to the same requirements 
as a man in any other part of the United Kingdom. The general purpose of the new 
Franchise Act was to create ‘a uniform household franchise and a uniform lodger 
franchise at elections’ throughout the United Kingdom meaning that any man, 
regardless of whether he was considered a head of household or a lodger, was 
allowed to register as a voter, so long as he met the qualification requirements.2 This 
portion of the Act primarily functioned to benefit the counties by granting the same 
form of qualification to the counties as was already in place in the burghs.  
The household franchise was given to the 'inhabitant occupier' of a dwelling, 
where ‘occupier’ was defined as either a tenant or the owner of the dwelling as long 
as he had resided within the parliamentary division for twelve months prior to 
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registration.3 Registration closed six months before it became effective, essentially 
making the qualifying period of occupancy eighteen months. Additionally, the 
household was required to be rated at a yearly value of ten pounds or more and the 
elector had to have paid all taxes and any rates owed in order to qualify for the 
household franchise. A key change from the 1868 Franchise Act was that it was no 
longer mandatory for the householder to be rated for the relief of the poor, thus 
opening the vote to small, poor occupiers. Joint occupancy of a household, however, 
still only entitled one of the occupiers to a vote, regardless of the value of the 
household.4 This restriction was meant to prevent fictitious voters from claiming on a 
house that they did not inhabit. However, this also prevented sons from claiming on 
their fathers’ houses thereby disenfranchising many middle-class and working-class 
young men who remained home until they established their own households, 
traditionally upon their marriage.5 The exclusion of young unmarried sons was based 
on the old political idea that these men could not be ‘independent’ and so were not fit 
to exercise the franchise.6 If a person was a tenant, however, even in a one room flat, 
he could still qualify given that he met all of the other requirements.7 
The lodger franchise in the 1868 Franchise Act enabled all lodgers who 
rented temporarily, such as a monthly lease, the right to vote in burghs. As with the 
householders, the lodger was required to have resided within the same parliamentary 
division for the twelve-month period prior to registration. An unfurnished lodging 
needed to have a yearly value of at least ten pounds and the lodgers were not liable to 
pay any poor rates or other rates. The 1884 Franchise Act extended these same 
requirements to the residents in the counties, thus enabling qualifying lodgers in the 
counties the right to vote under the new system.8 
There were two other types of voter qualifications in addition to the 
household and lodger franchises: the service franchise and the occupation franchise. 
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These groups of voters were also addressed in the 1884 Franchise Act increasing 
voter registration in both the burghs and counties. The service qualification was 
granted to any man who inhabited a dwelling provided by his employment, often as 
part of his wages, as long as the dwelling was not also inhabited by his employer.9 
This included such workers as railwaymen or miners living in company houses or 
farm labourers living in dwellings provided by their employer. The service 
qualification had not been enacted previously because it was believed that the 
disqualification of such men did not affect many workers in the burghs. However, 
due to the extension of the new franchise qualifications to the counties, a vast 
number of labourers would have been excluded. If the service qualification had not 
been enacted, many potential electors in the rural areas would have been in danger of 
being disqualified.10 An individual who qualified for the service franchise was not 
liable to pay any rates; instead, their employers were responsible for paying them. On 
the valuation roll ‘exempted’ was recorded in place of the amount owed by the 
elector. The elector still had to meet the twelve-month residency requirement within 
the parliamentary district to qualify, however the potential voter did not have to stay 
under the same employer or even in the same abode as long as their residency was 
consecutive in the same parliamentary division.11 
The occupation qualification was given to men who utilised a tenement or 
land, separate from his residency, for a workplace which was valued at a yearly rate 
of ten pounds or more.12 The required value in the counties prior to the 1884 
Franchise Act had been fourteen pounds and above. It was reduced to match the ten 
pound requirement already in place in the burghs; however, the assimilation stopped 
at that.  In both the burghs and the counties, the proprietor had to meet the twelve-
month residency requirement as an owner, not a resident. In the burghs, though, the 
proprietor was also required to reside in or within seven miles of the city where his 
land or tenement was located for at least six months prior to the qualifying period.  
The property value required to receive the county vote was essentially the only 
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change made; thus, the proprietor still had to be rated for the relief of the poor in 
order to qualify.13 
 The Franchise Act also included provisions to attempt to restrict the amount 
of fictitious voting. An individual could no longer receive the occupation vote based 
on feu-duties or rent charge.14 In cases where more than one man owned or operated 
from the same land or tenement, only one would qualify as a voter. This regulation 
excluded two situations. The first was cases where men inherited the land or 
tenement and the second was men who were legitimate business partners. In these 
two cases, all men were entitled to a vote as long as the mean of the total rent was 
sufficient.15    
The second major piece of legislation that preceded the 1885 election were 
the Registration Acts, which were implemented in order to register all of the newly 
entitled voters as a result of the Franchise Act. England and Wales were both 
addressed in one Act while Scotland and Ireland had their own separate Acts to deal 
with the voting registration of each of their electorates. Much of the Scottish Act was 
dedicated to the structure of the registration.16 The Act also made some changes to 
the voting qualifications in Scotland which enabled joint lodgers the right to vote in 
parliamentary elections. Under the amended law, joint lodgers whose yearly rent was 
ten pounds or higher per person when divided by all of the occupants were qualified 
to register as voters, regardless of how many occupied the lodging.17 
The final Act in the Third Reform Act was the Redistribution of the Seats Act 
of 1885, which redrew the parliamentary boundaries and implemented several more 
regulations pertaining to voting within the new divided parliamentary divisions. 
Several divisions throughout the United Kingdom that contained more than one MP 
were divided in order to create single-member districts rather than the existing 
multiple member seats. Some of the regulations of the Act addressed the new 
situation caused by dividing some of the burghs into multiple districts. One of the 
problems that stemmed from the division of the burghs was that in order to qualify 
for the occupancy franchise, a voter had to have resided in the parliamentary burgh 
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for the past twelve months.18 This restriction put a great strain on the working- and 
middle-class electors in divided burghs. If they wanted to vote, they were limited in 
their movement to just a portion of the burgh. Instead, the Redistribution Act set up 
the divided burghs to function as one parliamentary district with regards to 
registration even though it was actually comprised of multiple seats.19 A voter could 
then move about the city with no fear of being disqualified as long as they 
continually met the requirements for a voting qualification. A man who claimed a 
vote by the occupation franchise could live in any district or within seven miles of 
any district of the burgh.20 This protected all of the voter qualification categories 
except for lodgers who were left out of this new scheme. Lodgers had to stay within 
whatever district they were lodging for twelve months to qualify making it an 
extremely difficult qualification to achieve.21    
Treating a divided burgh as a single parliamentary district for registration 
clearly benefited some voters, as noted above; however, it had a negative effect on 
others. Due to these new regulations, a man was allowed only one vote in any district 
regardless of how many qualifications he met. A shop owner in Newington living in 
St. George’s, for instance, could not vote in the South district based on the 
occupation franchise and also vote in the West district based on the household 
franchise. If he qualified for more than one vote in a divided burgh and one of his 
qualifications was his household, he was only allowed to use his household 
qualification. The occupation franchise was somewhat limited in divided burghs. It 
could still be used if a man qualified by the occupation franchise in the burgh but did 
not meet the requirements for the household franchise. Additionally, if a man lived 
outside the burgh, but within seven miles of it, he was still able to use the occupation 
qualification to vote in the burgh while he could also claim a household vote as long 
as he met all of the requirements in the county where he lived. Divided burghs being 
treated as one seat for registration purposes also had adverse affects on election 
agents or anyone who received a monetary payment in exchange for their 
contribution to a candidate. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 prohibited 
any such person from voting in an election in which they had worked for a candidate. 
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However, the Redistribution Act expanded the restriction to apply to all districts in a 
divided burgh, thus applying the conditions of the Act to any person working on a 
campaign in any district of a divided burgh, even if they worked in a district where 
they were not already entitled to vote.22 
The restrictions that came from the Redistribution Act were countered by the 
aforementioned ability of the working- and middle-class residents of a divided burgh 
to move around the city without being disqualified. Oddly, none of the measures that 
applied to the divided burghs were extended to the divided counties, thus restricting 
tenants to stay in a portion of the county in order to retain their voting qualification 
for the entire registration period. On the other hand, this benefited owners in the 
counties by allowing them to have two votes if they could: one for ownership and 
another for their household as long as they were in a separate district.23 The burghs 
were seemingly set up to benefit the working class and appease the Radicals while 
the laws in the counties benefited the more affluent and pacified the Whigs and 
Conservatives who may have been distraught over the new regulations that were 
passed in the burghs had they been applied also to the counties. 
 
The passage of the Acts 
The addition of eighteen new parliamentary seats, the admission of two 
million new voters, and all of the other reforms that comprised the Third Reform Act 
proved difficult to pass through Parliament.24 The Government first encountered 
problems when it introduced the Franchise Bill in 1884. The Conservatives feared 
that if the Franchise Act passed on its own, the Liberals, who held the majority in 
Parliament, could then dictate the structure of the Redistribution Act or, worse, the 
Radical wing of the Liberal party might force an election in which the newly 
enfranchised would almost certainly vote overwhelmingly for Radical Liberals which 
was a concern of Whig MPs as well. This would oust the Conservative MPs from the 
countryside while retaining the Liberal majority in the burghs, thus, throwing off the 
                                                      
22 Nicolson, Analysis of Recent Statutes, 44. 
23 Nicolson, Analysis of Recent Statutes, 44. 
24 For a detailed account of the ‘high politics’ regarding the passage of the Third Reform Act, see 
Andrew Jones, The Politics of Reform 1884 (Cambridge, 1972). 
 30 
balance of power in Parliament.25 For this reason, the Conservatives withheld their 
support of the Franchise Extension until a compromise was made and the 
Redistribution of the Seats Act of 1885 was introduced to the House of Commons. 
The hope of the Conservatives was to redistribute the seats with the proposed new 
electors in mind so that the Conservative party would still be favoured in parts of the 
country, although it has been debated amongst historians on which parts of the 
country.26 
The Conservatives’ reservations about passing the Franchise Act created 
similar worries for the Liberals. The Liberals’ concern was that if they combined 
both measures, those opposed to the Franchise Extension could use the redistribution 
proposal to stop both measures.27 However, if they proposed a bill for redistribution 
before they secured the extension, the House of Lords could reshape the 
redistribution as they wished. If the Liberals opposed any of the new changes, the 
Lords could then kill that redistribution bill and, in the course of this action, crush 
any hope of the Franchise Act being passed as well.28 These reservations from both 
parties led to a compromise and the passage of Representation of the People Act of 
1884 and the Redistribution of the Seats Act of 1885.  
In early July 1884 the House of Lords rejected the House of Commons’ Bill 
for franchise extension. The Conservative leader, Lord Salisbury, hoped that this 
rejection would cause the Prime Minister, William Gladstone, to end the Parliament 
and call for an election.29 Gladstone did not call for the Government to be dissolved  
over the Lords’ veto of the Franchise Extension Bill; if he had, it might have led to 
difficulties in the Liberal party due to the ripples through the ranks amongst the 
Radicals and the Whigs. Gladstone therefore left the question to the public in hopes 
that they could apply enough pressure on the Lords to force them to pass the Bill.30 
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Subsequently, the Lords’ veto created a great stir among many of the Liberals and 
disenfranchised citizens throughout the United Kingdom resulting in demonstrations 
to protest against the actions of the House of Lords.  
There were many demonstrations throughout the country including protests in 
London, Birmingham, and elsewhere. The first of these events was held on 12 July in 
Edinburgh, demonstrating the progressive nature of the Edinburgh Liberals as well as 
their desire to be a force on the national stage. The group of demonstrators was made 
up of members of the Edinburgh Trades’ Council and the Edinburgh Liberal 
Association as well as the surrounding communities’ workingmen and Liberals. The 
Times estimated that the demonstrators numbered ten thousand with an additional 
fifty to sixty thousand people in attendance.31 The demonstrators held a procession 
that started at Oddfellows’ Hall, continued through Princes Street, and ended in the 
Queen’s Park. Once at the Queen’s Park, the demonstrators dispersed to listen to 
speakers at one of four different platforms. One of the speakers was a local 
University of Edinburgh Professor, Henry Calderwood, who proposed a resolution:    
That this meeting of representative Liberals of Scotland heartily approves of 
the Government measure for equalising the county franchise with that of the 
burghs, thanks the Liberal representatives for their united support of the bill, 
and gratefully acknowledges the effective vindication of the measure by the 
minority of the House of Lords; but this meeting strongly disapproves, as 
unwise and unconstitutional, the action of the majority of the Upper House in 
resisting legislation approved of by the great majority of the people, and 
formally opposed by few, and laments greatly the most vexatious restraint on 
legislation occasioned by the action of the House of Lords.32 
 
The primary goal of the demonstrators was to express their opinion in favour of the 
Government and the franchise extension, but the tone of the resolution went beyond 
that and called into question the legitimacy of the House of Lords.  
A grand demonstration was on the Liberals’ minds at the previous month’s 
meeting of the Liberal Association in Edinburgh. This is illustrated in a speech by 
Roxburghshire MP Arthur Elliot, in which he asserted that the House of Lords would 
use the argument that the country had not demonstrated its desire for franchise 
reform. Speaking of Lord Randolph Churchill, Elliot said that Churchill ‘told a 
meeting of Edinburgh citizens that if the country had shown its wish for reform, as it 
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did in 1866 and 1867, by tearing down the railings of Hyde Park, he would have 
believed that they want this bill’. Elliot went on to inform the crowd that ‘he was not 
there to advise them to tear down the railings of Princes’ Street Gardens [...] but to 
support by fair argument, which was constitutional method adopted by Scotsmen and 
Englishmen, their views on the great question of reform’.33 The Liberals were 
searching for a means to illustrate their support for the franchise extension without 
resorting to violence, which had manifested itself in previous protests on similar 
matters of franchise reform. Speaking in relation to the success of the Edinburgh 
demonstration, Gladstone remarked, ‘Her Majesty’s Government rely on the 
efficiency of calm reasoning, addressed to the awakened mind of the nation to the 
great question now at issue, to prevent the renewal hereafter of serious difficulty in 
the way of passing the Franchise Bill’.34 The support for the Government enabled 
Gladstone and the Liberals to push forward with the Franchise Bill in hopes of 
generating a compromise with the House of Lords on the redistribution bill. 
Gladstone delivered his position on the growing controversy over franchise 
and redistribution in a speech to the House of Commons on 17 November 1884 in 
which Gladstone declared, ‘With respect to the Bill that has recently been before us, 
and with respect to the settlement of the question of representation of the people, our 
object—the object of the Government—is to secure the passing of the Franchise 
Bill’.35 This remark made it clear that he was using the redistribution question to 
garner support for the passage of the Franchise Bill. On 22 November Gladstone, 
accompanied by two cabinet members, leading Radical Sir Charles Dilke and Whig 
leader Lord Hartington, entered into negotiations regarding the Redistribution Act 
with Sir Stafford Northcote, the Conservative leader in the House of Commons, and 
Conservative leader Lord Salisbury.36   
The fundamentals of redistribution were complex because the process was not 
a negotiation between Liberals and Conservatives; rather, it was a three-way 
negotiation between Whigs and Radicals (the two opposing wings of the Liberal 
party) and the Conservatives. Dilke led the meetings in which he played the Whigs 
and Conservatives against one another, siding with either one at opportune times. 
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Single-member districts were desired by both the Radicals and the Conservatives 
because it was thought that single-member districts would help both of them return 
MPs. Radicals especially desired single-member seats due to the shift towards more 
equalised voting constituencies, which was a Radical principle.37 Hartington was 
troubled by the introduction of single-member districts because it brought about the 
end of both wings of the Liberal party running candidates together, a long-standing 
strength for the Whigs in urban areas.38 Dilke knew that this would probably hurt the 
Liberal party initially, but would ultimately strengthen the Radicals’ chances of 
increasing their numbers and taking control of the party.39 The division this caused 
within the Liberal party will be discussed further in the following chapter.  
Historians have generally viewed the Conservatives’ strategy during the 
negotiation on redistribution as trying to further separate the rural and urban voting 
areas and to separate the new burgh districts by economic conditions in hopes that 
losses in the counties due to the increase of working-class voters could be picked up 
in the new high class burgh districts.40 The expansion of the franchise in the counties 
also made it expensive for a candidate to run in them because it created the need for 
more travel in order to interact with all of the constituents thus making it difficult for 
the ‘country-gentlemen class’ who were better suited for a smaller area.41 Recently 
the idea has been challenged that the Conservatives were looking towards ‘Villa 
Toryism’ to win in burgh districts. Instead, it is argued that their main goal was to 
further separate the urban and rural voters in hopes of retaining the counties.42 
A Boundary Commission was created by Parliament to facilitate the 
redistribution process. The Commission was instructed to separate the rural and 
urban populations as far as possible in order to appease the Conservatives.43 The 
Whigs’ main achievement came from Gladstone’s wish to keep double-member 
constituencies. A compromise was achieved by allowing all of the existing double-
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member burghs that did not gain additional MPs to remain unchanged.44 To make 
matters more confusing, the burghs that would increase from one MP to two MPs 
would still be divided. The meetings closed five days later on 26 November with a 
successful compromise on the makeup of redistribution. This agreement secured 
Salisbury’s support for the Franchise Extension in the process.45 On 1 December 
1884 the Government introduced the Redistribution of Seats Act to the House of 
Commons and five days later the Representation of the People Act of 1884 was 
passed. 
The Registration Amendment Acts were passed in order to implement all of 
the changes called for in the Representation of the People Act of 1884. In the initial 
drafts, all of the nations in the United Kingdom were going to be included in a single 
Act as was done in both the Franchise and Redistribution Acts. However, the 
Government decided to introduce three separate Acts instead in order to address each 
nation’s registration processes separately. In a parliamentary debate on the 
Registration Act for England and Wales, Edinburgh MP Thomas Rayburn Buchanan 
claimed that ‘they had been told that the Scottish registration would be dealt with by 
clauses inserted into the English Bill’.46 Buchanan thought that the Bill needed to be 
postponed so the inclusion of Scotland in the English Bill could be rethought.47 In 
replying to Buchanan, MP John Blair Balfour, Lord Advocate of Scotland, concluded 
that ‘the Scottish Bill was very much simpler than any of the others, because in 
Scotland they had the valuation rolls, which formed the basis of their voters’.48  
It was due to this diversity that each of the nations of the United Kingdom 
ended up with its own Registration Act with the exception of Wales, which was 
again dealt with alongside England. The finished Bills demonstrated the complex 
differences between the nations. England’s Bill was eighty pages in length, Ireland’s 
Bill was forty-two pages, and Scotland’s Bill was the least complex with only six 
pages of material. During the second reading of the Registration Bill for Scotland, 
Buchanan remarked that they owed thanks to the Lord Advocate for his presentation 
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of the Bill.49 Buchanan displayed his satisfaction with Scotland receiving its own 
Registration Bill without regards to the English system: ‘They had the advantage at 
present: of a more simple system of registration than either England or Ireland, and 
the bill would further simplify that system’.50 
Redistribution was more complicated than the franchise extension to 
implement since the Franchise Act already had a foundation to work from as it just 
extended the election qualifications throughout the counties. The constituencies had 
been left stagnant after the previous franchise increase from 1868 meaning that the 
electorate needed to be restructured throughout the entire country, particularly in 
Scotland, which had been under-represented previously based on the number of MPs 
per population. Scotland, as mentioned before, gained twelve additional seats, 
increasing from fifty-eight to seventy. Glasgow gained four seats raising its total to 
seven while Edinburgh and Aberdeen both doubled their number of seats to four and 
two, respectively. All three burghs split their seats in order to create seven divisions 
in Glasgow, four in Edinburgh, and two in Aberdeen. The only other multiple-seat 
burgh was Dundee which kept the two MPs it had prior to redistribution and 
remained a double-member constituency.  
 
Result of the Acts 
The existing parliamentary districts were significantly altered as a result of 
the passage of these three Acts. The electorate increased in the United Kingdom from 
three million voters to well over five million. Approximately sixty-four per cent of 
the male population aged twenty-one and older was eligible to vote.51 Over one-third 
of the adult males were left out of the electorate in addition to all of the adult 
females. Nevertheless, the Third Reform Act made a great stride toward equality in 
voting. The number of parliamentary seats increased by eighteen throughout the 
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country and several existing parliamentary districts were restructured in the counties 
and burghs in order to more equally divide the seats based on the population within 
each district. In Scotland alone the number of eligible voters nearly doubled to over 
half a million. Additionally, Scotland received twelve of the new parliamentary seats 
increasing its total number of seats to seventy.52 The remaining six of the added 
parliamentary seats were all allotted to England while the number of seats in Ireland 
and Wales remained the same.  
 
Table 1.1: Representation Before and After the Third Reform Act53 
 Edinburgh Scotland England Wales Ireland 
Population 228,357 3,728,124 24,618,926 1,360,513 5,174,836 
1884 Seats 2 58 454 30 101 
Population per MP 114,178 64,278 54,215 45,350 51,236 
1885 Seats 4 70 460 30 101 
Population per MP 59,008 53,258 53,519 45,350 51,236 
 
With the passage of the Third Reform Act, the four nations of the United 
Kingdom were brought much closer to being equally represented based on the ratio 
of MPs to the electorate they represented. There were three separate Redistribution 
Acts that dealt with different regions of the United Kingdom: one for Ireland, one for 
Scotland, and another for England and Wales. There is some discussion among 
historians which suggests that Ireland was over-represented by this measure of 
population and should have had its MPs reduced in the 1885 Redistribution Act.54 
Likewise, Hartington wanted Ireland’s representation decreased, but Gladstone 
insisted that it remain the same in hopes of tightening the union.55 The combined 
population per MP ratio for England and Wales is 53,019 which placed Ireland about 
two thousand people per MP better than England and Wales as well as Scotland. 
Even though Wales is often placed within England when dealing with parliamentary 
legislation, it should still be treated as an individual nation when discussing 
parliamentary representation as the MPs for Wales were representatives of Wales just 
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as the MPs for Ireland and Scotland were representatives of their respective nations. 
When all of the nations are looked to in this manner, Ireland was still better 
represented than England and Scotland, but Wales was clearly the best-represented 
nation within the United Kingdom.  
With the addition of twelve new parliamentary seats, Scotland as a whole saw 
a slight shift in the number of constituencies represented by a single MP. This 
brought the traditionally underrepresented nation closer to an equal footing with the 
rest of the nations of the United Kingdom based on population in relation to the 
number of MPs granted to represent that nation.56 The large burghs in Scotland saw a 
dramatic shift in their representation, yet they were still underrepresented with 
regards to the population per MP ratio in each nation. The two additional 
parliamentary seats allotted to Edinburgh as a result of the Third Reform Act nearly 
halved the number of constituencies in Edinburgh represented by a single MP from 
114,000 to 59,000 constituents per MP. Glasgow, which had a population of more 
than half a million, had only three MPs prior to redistribution in 1885.57 The number 
of MPs in Glasgow more than doubled to seven bringing its population per MP down 
by almost one hundred thousand. Nevertheless, the newly enacted redistribution still 
left Glasgow severely underrepresented with an average of more than 72,500 people 
being represented by each MP.58 By 1891 Glasgow had almost twenty per cent of 
Scotland’s population but held only ten per cent of its MPs.59 
The Third Reform Act had many shortfalls as mentioned above, but the 
United Kingdom still made a great stride in modern democracy with its passage by 
allowing the franchise to a majority of the male population for the first time. It also 
brought the population per MP ratio to a more equal standing between the nations. In 
order to accommodate the new voters added to the electorate, the existing 
parliamentary boundaries had to be altered. Additionally, it was necessary to 
accommodate the new seats called for in the Act. In order to achieve this, Parliament 
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tasked a Boundary Commission with the job of determining the boundaries of the 
new parliamentary divisions.    
 
Boundary Commission 
 Four men were chosen to form a non-partisan Boundary Commission to 
determine the new parliamentary divisions. Sir John Lambert was chosen to chair the 
commission. He was experienced in redistribution affairs, as he had served on the 
1867 Redistribution Boundary Commission. Sir Francis Sandford, the vice-chairman, 
was chosen mainly because he was a Conservative, owing to the fact that Lambert 
was a Liberal. These two men formed the core of the commission and served in the 
leadership roles in all three Boundary Commissions called for in 1885 to deal with 
each of the three regions.60 The other two members in the Scotland Boundary 
Commission were John Bayly and Donald Crawford.61 The Conservatives raised 
some questions over the appointment of Crawford because, according to Northcote, 
he ‘was not only a distant relative of Dilke’s but also the lord advocate’s political 
secretary, and “a keen Liberal”’.62 Northcote added that the Conservatives had not 
approved of his appointment to the commission. Nevertheless, he was allowed to 
retain his position and there was no appointment to balance Crawford’s placement on 
the commission.63 This criticism shows the importance placed on the redistribution of 
the seats, especially with regards to political affiliations. Both parties knew that 
boundaries drawn along political lines could drastically affect the makeup of 
Parliament. 
The Boundary Commission was given strict instructions by Parliament on the 
protocol to be used in determining the new parliamentary seats called for in the 
Redistribution Act. The instructions were broken down between the counties and the 
burghs.64 In the burghs, the Boundary Commission first needed to determine whether 
or not the present parliamentary boundary was still efficient. For example, if the 
occupiers beyond the current boundary shared in the interest of the city or part of the 
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city’s population, then the boundary needed to be redrawn to include them in the 
burgh. Additionally, if the municipal boundary had outgrown the parliamentary one, 
as was the case in Edinburgh, the commissioners needed to consider extending the 
parliamentary boundary to meet the municipal bounds. This was especially important 
if the local population wanted the two boundaries to be the same.65 The reason for 
extending the boundaries was to further detach the rural and urban voters which was 
a particular interest to the Conservatives.66 
 When the Boundary Commission found reason to alter the burghs’ 
boundaries, they were to look for ‘well established limits’ to form the new 
boundaries. In the cases of the three burghs in Scotland that were divided into 
parliamentary districts, it was found that the ‘established limits’ were the boundaries 
of the local wards. This was discussed in the Boundary Commission’s report on 
Scotland: 
There was a strong desire in every burgh that informing the divisions the 
wards should, if possible, be preserved intact; and, while we have been 
unable wholly to avoid the intersection of wards, we have in order to 
accomplish this important object, allowed a larger disparity in the population 
of several of the divisions than we should otherwise have recommended.67 
  
In Edinburgh the disparity of the population among the divisions caused a 
disagreement among the local inhabitants and the members of the Boundary 
Commission regarding the proper arrangement of the parliamentary divisions. 
  
Redistribution in Edinburgh 
 Arguments ensued amongst a variety of different factions in Edinburgh 
regarding the redistribution process and how it was to be carried out. There was 
considerable confusion as to whether or not to divide municipal wards in order to 
keep populations as equal as possible throughout the new parliamentary divisions or 
to strictly maintain the existing wards by placing them in groupings to achieve the 
parliamentary divisions. At least four separate schemes for the redistribution of the 
city’s parliamentary districts were proposed by different groups: the Edinburgh Town 
                                                      
65 PP, 1884–5, xix (C. 4288): Parliamentary Boundary Coms. for Scotland, 1885, Report, 3–4. 
66 Roberts, ‘Resisting “Arithmocracy”’, 385–6.  
67 PP, 1884–5, xix (C. 4288): Parliamentary Boundary Coms. for Scotland, 1885, Report, 5. 
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Council, the Boundary Commission, the municipal ward of St. Leonard’s, and the 
Edinburgh Trades’ Council. 
 The Town Council’s proposal divided Edinburgh into four districts by using 
the thirteen municipal wards that were already in existence at the time. It extended 
the parliamentary boundary to that of the municipal one. Each of the wards was left 
intact and each of the groupings was made up of neighbouring wards. The Provost 
said that the Town Council made its proposal with the ‘understanding that there 
should be no unnecessary alterations made, and that they should adhere as far as 
possible to existing arrangements’.68 The table below shows the groupings of the 
wards under the Town Council’s proposal along with the number of voters per ward 
as well as per division. 
 
Table 1.2: Redistribution Proposal of the Town Council69 
Northwest Division Southwest Division Northeast Division Southeast Division 
Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters 
St. Bernard’s 1,521 St. George’s 1,825 Calton 2,354 St. Giles 2,553 
St. Stephen’s 1,440 St. Cuthbert’s 2,915 Broughton 1,387 George Square 3,328 
St. Luke’s 1,792 Newington 2,813 Canongate 2,536 St. Leonard’s 2,760 
St. Andrew’s 1,940       
Voters:  6,693 Voters: 7,553 Voters: 6,277 Voters: 8,641 
Population:        55,919 Population:         65,405 Population:    47,007 Population:           67,846 
  
 The proposal issued by the Boundary Commission used the proposal put forth 
by the Town Council as a base from which to work. The commission determined that 
the Northeast district of the Town Council’s proposal was the weakest of the four 
districts because it had a population of just forty-seven thousand. They suggested that 
part of the population of the Southeast district, the largest of the four groupings, 
should be placed into the Northeast district making all four districts more equal in 
terms of population. This was achieved by splitting the St. Leonard’s ward at the 
centre of East and West Richmond Street and placing everything north of that line 
into the Northeast district.70 This change and the equalisation of the proposed 
parliamentary district is seen through the following table. 
 
                                                      
68 The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
69 This table was derived from information given in The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 




Table 1.3: Redistribution Proposal of the Boundary Commission71 
Northwest Division Southwest Division Northeast Division Southeast Division 
Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters 
St. Bernard’s 1,521 St. George’s 1,825 Calton 2,354 St. Giles 2,553 
St. Stephen’s 1,440 St. Cuthbert’s 2,915 Broughton 1,387 George Square 3,328 
St. Luke’s 1,792 Newington 2,813 Canongate 2,536 St. Leonard’s* 1,760 
St. Andrew’s 1,940   St. Leonard’s* 1,000   
Voters:  6,693 Voters: 7,553 Voters: 7,277 Voters: 7,641 
Population:        55,919 Population:         65,405 Population:         53,167 Population:         61,541 
 
In response to the proposal of the Boundary Commission, the electors of St. 
Leonard’s ward introduced their own scheme because they were strongly opposed to 
their ward being divided.  The representatives of St. Leonard’s believed that dividing 
it among parliamentary districts would weaken their standing as a ward. The 
proposal they put forth was similar to that of the Town Council. It utilised the 
thirteen wards to divide the city into four districts and the wards were all left intact in 
neighbouring groupings. Their four proposed districts were more evenly divided by 
population and voters than the divisions proposed by the Town Council. They hoped 
that their proposal would be adopted since it adhered to all of the Boundary 
Commission requirements and fixed the population problem while still keeping all of 
the wards intact.72 The alterations they made to the proposed boundaries are laid out 
in the table below.  
 
Table 1.4: Redistribution Proposal of St. Leonard’s Ward73 
1st Division 2nd Division 3rd Division 4th Division 
Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters 
St. Giles 2,553 Newington 2,813 St. Leonard’s 2,760 St. Bernard’s 1,521 
St. Andrew’s 1,940 St. Cuthbert’s 2,915 Canongate 2,536 Broughton 1,387 
George Square 3,328 St. George’s 1,825 Calton 2,354 St. Stephen’s 1,440 
      St. Luke’s 1,792 
Voters:  7,821 Voters: 7,553 Voters: 7,650 Voters: 6,140 
Population:        Population:         65,405 Population:          Population:        
 
                                                      
71 This table was derived from information given in The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
72 The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
73 This table was derived from information given in The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
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 The Trades’ Council’s proposal disregarded the municipal wards that were 
already in place because the members felt that the city could not be divided evenly 
enough by using the existing wards. Instead, they wanted to divide the city into East 
and West sections with the dividing line beginning at Parliament Square. The 
boundary to the North was Bank Street, the Mound, Hanover Street, Pitt Street, and 
Inverleith Row. The South boundary was George IV Bridge, Bristo Place, Bristo 
Street, Buccleuch Street, and Causewayside. The East half of Edinburgh was then to 
be divided into North and South sections by High Street to Canongate and continuing 
through Holyrood Park. The West half of Edinburgh was also divided into North and 
South regions by a combination of the following streets: Grassmarket, Westport, 
Bread Street, Anthey Place and then continuing by following the Caledonian 
Railway. The Trades’ Council, like the Town Council, also proposed the extension of 
the parliamentary boundaries to equal the municipal ones. This somewhat more 
complex proposal is charted in the following table. 
 
Table 1.5: Redistribution Proposal of the Trades’ Council74 
Northwest Division Southwest Division Northeast Division Southeast Division 
Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters Ward Voters 
St. George’s 1,827 Newington 1,868 Broughton 1,388 St. Leonard’s 2,759 
St. Luke’s 1,804 St. Cuthbert’s 2,921 Calton 2,356 George Square 1,219 
St. Bernard’s 1,519 George Square 2,114 St. Stephen’s 507 Newington 952 
St. Stephen’s 901 St. Giles 296 St. Andrew’s 1,657 St. Giles 1,003 
St. Andrew’s 293   St. Giles 483 Canongate 1,943 
St. Giles 776   Canongate 594   
Voters:  7,120 Voters: 7,199 Voters: 6,985 Voters: 7,876 
Population:       n/a Population:          n/a Population:         n/a        Population:           n/a 
 
Both the Conservative and Liberal associations in Edinburgh also weighed in 
on the redistribution of the city. The Conservatives were not opposed to either of the 
proposals by the Town Council or the Boundary Commission. They felt that both 
proposals were equally fair with regards to the political parties. They made no 
comment on the proposals of the Trades’ Council or St. Leonard’s ward. As for the 
desire of St. Leonard’s ward to remain intact, the Conservatives understood and did 
not object to this position.75 The Liberal Association felt that ‘the divisions of 
                                                      
74 This table was derived from information given in The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
75 The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
 43 
Edinburgh should be effected by grouping contiguous wards, and that the 
parliamentary boundaries of the city should be extended to the municipal limits’.76 
The Liberals supported the Town Council’s proposal because it adhered to the wishes 
of their Association. The Liberal Association found both the Boundary 
Commission’s and the Trades’ Council’s proposals to be undesirable due to the 
division of the wards. The Liberal Association did not comment on the St. Leonard’s 
ward proposal, but supported its position to stay together.   
 The electors from St. Leonard’s ward believed that if the Boundary 
Commission’s proposal was adopted, ‘it would cause much confusion and 
inconvenience’ for the constituents within the ward.77 Approximately one thousand 
electors from St. Leonard’s ward would be forced to vote with electors from the 
Broughton, Calton, and Canongate wards while the rest of St. Leonard’s would vote 
with George Square and St. Giles. In meetings regarding St. Leonard’s ward and 
redistribution, one Town Councillor from St. Leonard’s, Mr. Bryden, told attendees 
‘that if they agreed to the proposed breaking up of the ward it would ultimately 
develop itself into a re-arrangement of the wards in order to make the parliamentary 
and the municipal divisions identical’ and that this ‘would ultimately destroy their 
political influence’.78 The main reason for the protest against the division of the ward 
was that the political influence of the ward, and therefore, its constituents, would be 
diminished. 
 St. Leonard’s ward would have made up a third or more of the parliamentary 
district with either the Town Council’s or the ward’s own proposal. Having control 
of that much of the district, the ward would have been in a good position with 
regards to electing an MP. Being in Edinburgh, it was very likely that a Liberal 
would be returned; therefore, it was at the time more important, especially to the 
Liberals, who was nominated by the Liberal party as the candidate because they were 
very likely go on to be elected. The Liberal Associations were to nominate the 
Liberal candidates for each of their respective parliamentary divisions and were also 
to decide which Liberal to endorse in cases where there was more than one in the 
field. Under the Boundary Commission’s proposal, the percentage of members 
                                                      
76 The Scotsman, 30 Dec. 1884, 6. 
77 The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
78 The Scotsman, 17 Jan. 1885, 7; 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
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making up the Liberal Association in St. Leonard’s ward district was the same as the 
percentage of the ward’s voters in the district: twenty-three per cent in the Central 
division and fourteen per cent in the East. This made it difficult for St. Leonard’s to 
have a large enough vote to determine or elect the candidate thus seriously 
diminishing the political power of the ward. St. Leonard’s was the fourth largest of 
the thirteen city wards in terms of voting, but when it was split, it became two of the 
smallest thus marginalising it’s political influence. The following chart shows the 
percentage that St. Leonard’s ward would have made up in the district in each of the 
proposals and thus demonstrating their potential strength or lack thereof. 
    
Table 1.6: St. Leonard’s Ward’s Electorate in Each Proposal79 
Proposal Town Council St. Leonard’s Boundary Commission 
Division Northeast Southeast Southeast Northeast 
Ward Voters 2,760 2,760 1,760 1,000 
Division Voters  8,641 7,650 7,641 7,277 
Per cent of Division 32 36 23 14 
 
 The President of the Trades’ Council, Mr. A. G. Telfer, gave the reasons for 
the council’s objection to all of the other proposed redistribution schemes. ‘First,’ he 
said, ‘because by holding on by the municipal boundaries as at the present existing, 
they got extremely erratic and, controlled boundaries for the four new divisions; and, 
second, they could not get so equal a division of the population as the scheme of re-
distribution demanded’.80 None of the other schemes took into account the possible 
population increases of the city in the future. Mr Telfer believed that if adopted there 
would have to be a future redistribution due to the inadequacy that would arise from 
the increase in population in the divisions. He also pointed out that the division of the 
wards was originally introduced in the Boundary Commission’s proposal and 
therefore this issue should not be a deciding factor to dismiss the proposal of the 
Trades’ Council.81 
 A meeting was organised by the Boundary Commission to discuss the 
different redistribution schemes of the burgh with the citizens of Edinburgh. General 
Bayly, representing the Boundary Commission, invited the parties that were present 
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The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
80 The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
81 The Scotsman, 22 Jan. 1885, 7. 
 45 
to commit to the proposal put forth by the Boundary Commission. Bailie Anderson 
did not believe that the changes made to the Town Council’s proposal by the 
Boundary Commission were needed; however, he thought that it may jeopardise 
Edinburgh’s claim to four members of Parliament if a proposed district was to 
contain less than fifty thousand people which was the required population for a burgh 
or group of burghs to have a MP by themselves.82 Bailie Turnbull countered this 
claim by asserting that it did not matter whether ‘one division had 47,000 or 50,000, 
that it would not affect the city’s total population’.83 
   The Lord Provost said that the Town Council did not object to the 
alterations that the Boundary Commission made to its proposal. As for the Trades’ 
Council’s proposal, the Lord Provost believed that if in the future the city needed to 
redistribute its seats, the Town Council could look to its suggestions, but for now he 
felt that it was not possible to consider due to the arrangement of the wards. He went 
on to say that he did not understand St. Leonard’s ward’s complaint. Instead, he felt 
that it was the other wards which were entitled to complain about the scheme of the 
Boundary Commission as St. Leonard’s ward was, under this plan, going to be able 
to influence two separate MPs while the other twelve wards would be represented by 
only one. If the splitting of the ward remained to be seen as a problem in St. 
Leonard’s, the Lord Provost suggested that the municipal boundary could be changed 
to match the proposed parliamentary boundaries.84 This was one of the concerns 
brought up during the St. Leonard’s ward’s meeting on the proposed parliamentary 
division. The surrogates from that ward may have interpreted it as a warning to agree 
to one of the other plans, even if that meant that their ward would be split.  
  Edinburgh was ultimately divided into four parliamentary districts by the 
scheme proposed by the Boundary Commission. This is a questionable choice when 
considering that the local factions, with the exception of the Trades’ Council, were 
all favourable to the Town Council’s proposal. Of course, there were concerns with 
the scheme proposed by the Town Council which led to these other proposals. One 
concern was that the Northeast district had a population of only forty-seven 
thousand. This was a reasonable concern; however, in the other burghs which were 
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divided into parliamentary districts there was an example of a burgh with a 
population below fifty thousand in Scotland. Aberdeen had its number of MPs 
extended from one to two which meant that the burgh was divided into two divisions. 
The North district of Aberdeen had almost fifty-six thousand people while the South 
district had a population of just slightly above forty-nine thousand.85 If a population 
of at least fifty-thousand was a major requirement for a single division in a burgh, a 
remedy could have been found among the six thousand extra inhabitants in the North 
district. This stipulation was not a factor in Glasgow, as previously discussed, 
because it had a population of more than five hundred thousand. Glasgow could have 
been entitled to three more MPs under the guidelines of a population of fifty 
thousand citizens per MP.86  
Additionally, as the Trades’ Council indicated, one of its biggest concerns 
with the Boundary Commission’s proposal, as well as the other proposals that were 
based on the boundaries of the wards, was the inequality that would arise with the 
future expansion of the city. As it turned out, their assumption was correct. The 
growth of the population was disproportionate throughout the four parliamentary 
districts of the city, as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 1.7: Population Changes from 1885 to 190187 
 1885 1901 
 Population Votes Population Votes 
West 55,919 6,693 55,464 8,925 
South 65,405 7,553 107,206 15,267 
East  53,167 7,277 73,181 11,312 
Central 61,541 7,641 62,262 7,484 
 
The inhabitants in the Central and West divisions fluctuated by less than one 
thousand between the enactment of the Third Reform Act in 1885 and the 1901 
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census. However, in the East district the population grew by some twenty thousand 
while the South saw the most dramatic increase with over forty thousand constituents 
being added to the already largest district in the burgh. Of course, the population did 
not exactly correlate to the voters in each district. For example, in the West, the only 
district to see a decrease in population, had a thirty-three per cent increase in voters. 
The opposite is true in the Central district, which had a slight increase in population 
yet a two per cent decrease in the number of voters. The East and South districts saw 
the largest expansion with the East increasing its voters by over fifty per cent and the 
South more than doubled its number of voters. The outcome was, as feared by the 
Trades Council, four misshaped districts, in terms of both population and voters, 
grouped together to represent one burgh. It is unknown how far the Trades Council’s 
proposal would have gone to correct the inequality of the districts; nevertheless, they 
were correct in predicting the inequality that arose from the Boundary Commission’s 
proposal.   
Figure 1.1: New Parliamentary Boundaries of Edinburgh88 
 
  
                                                      
88 PP, 1884–5, xix (C. 4288): Parliamentary Boundary Coms. for Scotland, 1885, Report), 33. The 
map shows Edinburgh’s four parliamentary divisions. The names of the division are changed from 
the proposal. Northeast and Northwest became East and West, respectively. Southwest was changed 
to South and Southeast became Central. The square-like intrusion from the East division into the 
Central is the portion of St. Leonard’s that was debated over. The burgh had expanded its municipal 
boundary to the south east and south west as can be noted by the thick black line just inside the line 
marking the new divisions. 
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According to the Boundary Commission’s report pertaining to Edinburgh, 
‘they have formed the divisions by a combination of the municipal wards, except that 
one ward only has been slightly broken owing to the necessity for more nearly 
equalising the population of the divisions’.89 The proposal of St. Leonard’s ward 
dealt with the population concerns of the Town Council’s scheme, but kept all of the 
wards intact as the Town Council’s proposal had done. The controversy of dividing 
municipal wards for the parliamentary districts was not confined to Edinburgh as 
Glasgow also had one ward divided in the redistribution.90 
The part of St. Leonard’s ward in the East district’s Liberal Association 
passed a censure, purely symbolic in nature, on General Bayly for his position in 
support of the division of the ward. The censure came about while they were electing 
members to represent them in the new Liberal Association, which would work within 
the East district. In the other twelve municipal wards of the city, the constituents 
formed new Associations to organise their vote for parliamentary purposes as well as 
tending to the school, municipal, and parochial boards. In St. Leonard’s that could 
not be done due to the ward having been split. The constituents of St. Leonard’s had 
to get both halves of the ward to come together for such local matters but meet apart 
for parliamentary purposes, thus placing a strain on the ward which, like the other 
wards, elected a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer to lead their 
ward, even though it was split.91 In St. Leonards’ situation the leadership elected by 
their committees would have to share the ward’s responsibility with the leadership of 
the other half. This could cause disagreement between the two parties and ultimately 
create gridlock. 
 Both the Liberal and Conservative parties supported the Town Council’s 
proposal, which shows that there was no favouritism in the scheme and neither party 
would have been able to complain about the divisions in the future since they both 
supported it. The Conservatives gave their consent to the Boundary Commission’s 
scheme, but the Liberals opposed it. In going with this scheme, the political unity 
that had existed under the Town Council’s proposal ceased. The proposal of St. 
                                                      
89 PP, 1884–5, xix (C. 4288): Parliamentary Boundary Coms. for Scotland, 1885, Report, 34. 
90 PP, 1884–5, xix (C. 4288): Parliamentary Boundary Coms. for Scotland, 1885, Report, 39–41. The 
Third ward of Glasgow was split between the Camlachie and St. Rollox divisions. 
91 The Scotsman, 20 Feb. 1885, 3. The East division had been called the Northeast division in the 
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Leonard’s ward was the best put forth with regards to the instructions given to the 
Boundary Commission dealing with equalising the population while keeping the 
wards intact. The Lord Provost ultimately chose to support the Boundary 
Commission’s proposal. Although he later ran for Parliament as a candidate in the 
South district of Edinburgh in 1885, this district was the only one to be left the same 
in the three proposals of the Boundary Commission, Town Council, and St. 
Leonard’s ward, hence there was no political motivation for the Lord Provost to 
choose one proposal over another. However, if the proposal put forth by a municipal 
ward was endorsed and carried through over one proposed by the Town Council, it 
may have diminished the Lord Provost’s political influence. He made sure that did 
not happen by supporting the scheme drawn up from his own proposal.  
The effect of the 1885 redistribution throughout United Kingdom equalised, 
to an extent, the constituencies’ populations. The population of the largest to the 
smallest constituencies was modified to be a ratio of only eight to one, a massive 
reduction from the two hundred fifty-two to one that it had been prior to 
redistribution.92 The parliamentary divisions set forth in the Third Reform Act 
remained the same until the Fourth Reform Act in 1918 with only slight changes 
being made even then. In his biography of Dilke, David Nicholls notes that ‘today’s 
constituency pattern is recognizably based on that of 1884–5, and on no earlier 
arrangement. The modern single member county constituency and the modern 
divided borough are both creations of Dilke under Gladstone’.93 
The Third Reform Act enfranchised nearly two-thirds of the adult male 
population and put in place a cohesive voting regulation that applied equally to the 
whole population regardless of the nation or the location, urban or rural, of the man. 
These achievements of the Act, like its predecessors, were outdone by the next round 
of franchise reforms in 1918. However, the Third Reform Act’s legacy comes from 
its redistribution scheme with the introduction of dividing multiple member seats to 
single-member seats. These single-member seats along with the newly enfranchised 
emboldened the Radicals led by Joseph Chamberlain to take their agenda to the 
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country in an attempt to swing the party in their favour. The redistribution created a 
situation in which, for the first time, the two wings of the Liberal party had to fight 
amongst one another in the burghs rather than continuing the practice of running a 
Whig and a Radical together in the district. The opposing wings of the Liberal party 











Edinburgh Liberal Associations and the 1885 Election 
 
Some historians have argued that late-Victorian politics were dominated by 
the emergence of party politics which was carried out through the caucus.1 This 
issue, framed differently over time, has been one which has concerned historians 
from H. J. Hanham in the 1960s to more recent political historians such as Jon 
Lawrence. Hanham, for example, argued that ‘The caucus opened the way to the 
practice of modern electorates, which vote more or less automatically for the 
candidate of the party association, and against independents of any sort,’ while 
another historian, Lawrence, questions the actual ‘triumph of party’.2 This chapter 
examines the extent of the power of party in Edinburgh and discusses the rise of the 
caucus and its public perception in Edinburgh politics. By 1885 the practice of the 
caucus was already in use in several cities in Britain and had even been used in 
Edinburgh since the 1880 general election. The constituents’ attitude toward the 
caucus was one of general acceptance up to the 1885 general election when a large 
portion of the constituency changed their attitude from acceptance to outright 
hostility. This shift in the public perception concerning the caucus and the reason this 
shift took place is a primary concern of this chapter. In the 1880 general election and 
the three by-elections held between 1880 and the 1885 general election, the caucus 
had legitimate power in the city. Upon the split of the burgh into four separate 
parliamentary districts, the power of the caucus evaporated and its legitimacy came 
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into question. With the division of the city into parliamentary districts and the 
subsequent creation of district-centred Liberal Associations, a power-struggle 
emerged between the different wings of the Liberal party. The Liberal Associations 
were powerful in the 1885 Edinburgh elections, but were also a source of controversy 
because of this division within the Liberal party. 
 
The caucus 
The caucus was introduced into British politics soon after the Second Reform 
Act passed in 1867. Once this Act was passed, the Liberals in Birmingham devised a 
plan to organise all of the Liberal voters in the constituency. There were two reasons 
the Liberals needed to organise their voters. First, there were many new voters 
brought in due to the franchise extension and it was important to get these voters 
registered. Second, and perhaps more crucial, the newly enacted minority clause 
required an active coordinated electorate to ensure complete Liberal victory in the 
burgh. The plan that was implemented became known as the caucus.3 A small group 
of Radicals within Birmingham politics led by Birmingham MP Joseph Chamberlain 
soon gained control of this new organisation.4  
The caucus refers to a particular way that the local political associations set 
up the power structure of their organisation. There are different ways to organise a 
caucus, but the basic structure was built like a pyramid consisting of constituents, 
ward members, parliamentary district members, and the executive. 
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At the base were the constituents, who were able to join the second tier and become 
members of their local ward association. The ward association members were 
entitled to vote for members from their ward to represent them at their local 
parliamentary association, the third tier of the pyramid. These representatives were 
then able to elect the executive committee of the local parliamentary associations, 
which tops the pyramid. 
The purpose of the caucus was to unite all of the constituents of a particular 
party in order to focus their combined power in an attempt to secure the election of 
their party’s candidate to Parliament. The caucus can be seen by some as a good way 
to achieve such a goal, however, it also has its flaws. Historian Moisei Ostrogorski 
points out the negatives of the caucus, mainly the abuse of power by some who used 
the caucus as a means of implementing their political will upon a constituency in a 
seemingly legitimate way, thus hindering the freedom of the voters.5 Others 
historians such as Biagini and Adelman call attention to that fact that some 
contemporaries saw the caucus as an ‘anti-democratic institution’ which ‘gave power 
to a ruthless (and probably corrupt) faction’.6 
After the Liberal victories of 1880, Chamberlain expressed his favourable 
view of the caucus: 
This remarkable success is a proof that the new organization has succeeded in 
uniting all sections of the party, and it is a conclusive answer to the fears 
which some timid Liberals entertained that the system would be manipulated 
in the interest of a particular cohorts. It has, on the contrary, deepened and 
extended the interest felt in contest; it has fastened a sense of personal 
responsibility on the electors; and it has secured the active support, for the 
most part voluntary and unpaid, of thousands and tens of thousands of voters, 
who have been willing to work hard for the candidates in whose selection 
they have for the first time had an influential voice.7 
 
Certainly one can agree that if a group of party members join an organisation with 
the primary purpose of assuring that their party’s nominee be elected to Parliament, it 
did not matter the means to which this goal was to be achieved. Only the end results 
mattered, especially in a parliamentary system where the majority rules. In this 
situation, a caucus, even if it is being misused by someone, is a good thing so long as 
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it returns the party’s candidate. Furthermore, the caucus’ pyramid structure is 
comparable to that of a representative government. The power lies in the people who 
then delegate their authority by voting for members who represent them in an 
organised governmental body. These members then have the ability to use the power 
given to them as they see fit. If the people disagree with the elected individual’s 
actions, they have the option to vote him out at the next election. 
   
Liberal political alliance   
The 1885 general election is unique not only because it was the first election 
held after the reforms of the Representation of the People Act of 1884 and the 
Redistribution of the Seats Act of 1885, but also because it was the only election held 
after these new reforms and prior to the Liberal party’s spilt over Irish Home Rule 
during the following year.8 Due to the new laws in place, the parliamentary elections 
of 1885 were considerably different from those held in previous years. First, Scotland 
gained twelve seats taking their total to seventy thus greatly increasing their 
representation. Second, and perhaps the biggest change for the burgh’s came from 
dividing the multiple-member constituencies into separate single-member 
constituencies.9   
The Liberal party was made up from a vast political alliance between the 
different groups. In 1885 Lord Rosebery discussed the nature of the Liberal party 
during a Midlothian campaign speech posing the question ‘What is a Liberal?’ He 
went on to describe the Liberal party as an umbrella which was wide enough to cover 
all Liberals.10 Members of this party identified themselves as being aligned to other 
political distinctions than just Liberal. There were three identifications within the 
Party: the Whig, which was the more conservative Liberal, the moderate who was 
simply referred to as such, and the Radical which was the advanced Liberal. The 
1885 election saw a dramatic shift in the political alliance of the Liberals as the 
elections in Scotland involved several races in which Liberals ran against each other. 
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There were twenty-one total races where Liberals ran against each other in the three 
elections prior to 1885 while in the 1885 general election alone there were twenty-
eight such contests.11 Nineteen of the double candidacies were in the burghs and nine 
were in the counties. The Liberals only lost two of the contests: Lanarkshire-Govan, 
which would have been lost regardless of its double candidature status, and 
Kilmarnock. Of the twenty-six Liberals that won, only ten were independent Liberals 
who were not backed by the association. Edinburgh had three of these making up 
thirty per cent of the total independent Liberal winners.12 
The change to single-member constituencies helped to facilitate the 
breakdown of the cooperation between the Whigs and Radicals within the large 
burghs because the Liberal candidates in the new single-member constituencies were 
potentially running not only against Conservatives within each of these districts, but 
also head-on against candidates from their own party who held views different from 
their own. However, as Donald Savage points out, it was the great Liberal victories 
in Scotland prior to the Third Reform Act that enabled the Liberals to fight amongst 
themselves without fear of the Tories.13 In the large burghs, there was a need to form 
Liberal Associations in each of the new constituencies created by the redistribution 
of seats. The formation of these new associations also created a fight among the 
Liberals vying for control of them. In Edinburgh this fight for the Associations led to 
a challenge on the legitimacy of the Associations themselves.  
In Scotland the large burghs of Edinburgh and Glasgow were not greatly 
affected by the franchise extension, but each was dramatically changed by the 
breakup of the large multiple-member constituencies and their conversion into 
several single-member constituencies.14 Before these laws were implemented, 
Edinburgh, like other large burghs in Scotland and throughout the United Kingdom, 
saw multiple candidates from within the Liberal party, including both Radicals and 
Whigs, run within the same parliamentary district. These candidates were not 
necessarily running against one another because there was more than one seat 
available. In large constituencies throughout the United Kingdom, two or more 
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parliamentary seats were allotted to the burgh, which entitled electors in that burgh to 
multiple votes at election time. These votes had to be cast for separate candidates as 
an elector could not vote for the same candidate more than once; however, the elector 
could choose only to vote for one candidate and not use his other votes. This type of 
voting system allowed the Liberals to frequently devise a balancing act that resulted 
in an arrangement to run both a Radical and a Whig in these dual-member 
constituencies in order to benefit both wings of the Liberal party.15 In the dual-
member constituency of Wolverhampton, for example, the Liberals ran both a Whig 
and Radical in the 1832 general election and in Glasgow the Liberals ran candidates 
representing diverse Liberal opinion in elections held after the enactment of the 
Second Reform Act.16 Hanham offers examples of similar elections in 1866 and 1867 
in Birmingham and Manchester, respectively.17 Such arrangements were devised so 
that when an elector had a candidate in the race who shared his views, whether 
advanced or not, he was more inclined to vote not only for the candidate who shared 
his views, but also for the candidate who was the next best representative. This 
second choice candidate was likely to be the other Liberal in the race. Consequently, 
the Liberal party would receive both of the elector’s votes. 
 However, this compromise between opposing Liberal ideologies was not 
practised in Edinburgh where the races usually involved two Liberals from the same 
wing of the party running together. Only four out of the twelve general elections held 
prior to the Third Reform Act involved rival Liberal candidates running against one 
another.  It is surprising that rival Liberal candidates did not run against one another 
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Table 2.1: Elections Contested by Conservatives, 1832–8018 
Election Year Candidates’ Party Votes Received 
1832 Liberal 4,035 
 Liberal 3,850 
 Conservative 1,519 
1835 Liberal 2,963 
 Liberal 2,858 
 Conservative 1,716 
 Conservative 1,608 
1847 Liberal 2,063 
 Liberal 1,854 
 Liberal 1,477 
 Conservative 980 
1852 Liberal 1,872 
 Liberal 1,754 
 Liberal 1,559 
 Conservative 1,065 
 Liberal 625 
1874 Liberal 11,431 
 Liberal 8,749 
 Liberal 6,218 
 Conservative 5,713 
1880 Liberal 17,807 
 Liberal 17,301 
 Conservative 5,651 
 
In the 1832 general election, the Conservative candidate received just over 1,500 
votes compared to the near 4,000 votes received by each of the Liberal candidates. 
The closest a Conservative candidate came to securing a seat came in 1835 although 
they were still over 1,000 votes from a second place finish. With the introduction of 
the Second Reform Act the gap had grown wider and by the 1880 general election, 
the Conservative candidate only received slightly more than 5,600 votes compared to 
the roughly 17,500 votes for each of the two Liberals. Moreover, the Conservatives 
only contested half of the general elections between 1832 and 1880.19 
 The lack of confrontation between the rival groups of Liberals was not 
facilitated by a political arrangement between the Whigs and Radicals of the city as 
was the case in other large burghs. Instead, it was due to one wing or the other 
controlling the local Liberal party enabling either group to dominate the burgh 
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politics at different times. Edinburgh was a very Liberal burgh with so few Tories 
that there was not a viable risk of a Conservative victory even with a split among the 
Liberals. This made a compromise system between the Radicals and Whigs 
irrelevant. 
The Whigs were the first of the political groups to control the nomination of 
the candidates in Edinburgh. Prior to the First Reform Act, Edinburgh was dominated 
by the influence of the Tory party and, for that reason, the voting public was satisfied 
with the transfer of power to the Whigs starting in 1832 and their subsequent 
leadership role. There were some who questioned the Whig dominance such as 
James Aytoun, a Radical who described himself as belonging to neither the Whig nor 
Tory party. He campaigned in 1832, but withdrew from the race before the election 
due to lack of support. It was believed that he had around 1,500 supporters which 
caused concern that the Liberal vote might spilt which could have led to the Tory 
candidate being elected to one of the seats. With this in mind and knowing that he 
would lose, Aytoun stood down. If he would have stayed in the race, the Liberal vote 
may have been split. However, it is very unlikely that the Tory would have been 
elected as Aytoun could only muster 480 votes in the 2 June 1834 by-election 
demonstrating that there was no serious opposition from the advanced Liberal section 
of the Party since at that time the Whig policies were enough to keep most of the 
advanced Liberals satisfied with the shift away from Tory control.20 The Whig 
leadership was thus able to handpick the Liberal candidates for Parliament in a 
similar approach to the nominating process in Wolverhampton, mentioned above.21 
In Edinburgh the dominance of the Whigs and their nomination of both of the 
Liberal candidates came to an end in the mid-1840s. According to Williams, 
opposition to the Whig candidate in the 1847 general election came about because of 
Edinburgh MP Thomas Babington Macaulay’s support for a parliamentary grant to 
the seminary college at Maynooth and this ‘common opposition to Maynooth was to 
be the bond which finally brought the Dissenters and the Free Churchmen together to 
defeat the Whigs’.22 Morton asserts this to be an important ‘mobilisation of the 
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middle classes in civil society.’23 The middle class used the societies to which they 
belonged as a platform from which to express their wishes on political issues and this 
in turn helped to shape their local communities. This new-found opposition was 
short-lived, however. During the next general election in 1852, the Disestablishers 
and the Free Churchmen both put up one candidate each against the two Whig 
candidates, but these candidates did not run together. In this election the voting 
Conservatives, who numbered approximately one thousand, cast their first vote for 
the Conservative candidate and decided to use their second to vote for the Free 
Churchman in order to block the Radical candidate and current Lord Provost Duncan 
McLaren from obtaining a seat in Parliament.24 This tactic proved to be successful 
for the Conservatives and, as a result of this defeat, the Radicals did not run another 
candidate again until 1865. In the 1865 election McLaren won a seat due to the 
Radicals’ ability to organise the ‘new’ electorate in the plebeian parts of the city.25 
Between 1865 and 1880, three more general elections were held. Only one of 
these, the 1874 election, saw multiple Liberal candidates running against one 
another. The Radicals, led by McLaren, were able to hold on to power during this 
time due to a coalition between Free Churchmen and Voluntaries. This coalition took 
shape in Edinburgh ahead of similar bodies in other constituencies because of the 
unique issue of the Annuity Tax,26 the abolition of which provided an issue around 
which both groups could rally. This in turn enabled activists and candidates to garner 
support amongst members of both groups in order to fight together against the Whigs 
who supported the tax in some form or another. 
From 1880 until the passage of the Third Reform Act in 1885, the Liberals in 
Edinburgh worked together due in large part to the Edinburgh United Liberal 
Association. It was through this organisation that the different sections of the Liberal 
party came together from all parts of the city.27 In 1877 the East and North Scotland 
Liberal Association was formed. At the inaugural meeting of this Association, it was 
decided that the Liberals in Edinburgh should form a local Association to secure the 
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return of Liberal candidates at elections.28 The new Edinburgh United Liberal 
Association was in place in time for the 1880 general election. The only two Liberals 
to offer themselves as candidates were Duncan McLaren and James Cowan, the 
sitting MPs at the time; therefore, the Association did not have to act in the 1880 
election. However, McLaren stepped down shortly after the 1880 election which led 
to a by-election in January 1881. Two Liberals ran for the open seat including 
McLaren’s son, Lord Advocate John McLaren. The members of the Association 
endorsed McLaren who then went on to win the seat by more than seven thousand 
votes.  
John McLaren almost immediately accepted an appointment as a Lord of 
Session thus creating the need for a second by-election in 1881. Three Liberal 
candidates came forward in this election: John Wilson, George Harrison, and T.R 
Buchanan. All three candidates declared that they would not stand without the 
support of the majority of the Association. Upon the first vote Wilson received 
eighty-six, Harrison forty-one, and Buchanan sixty-seven votes. Since none of the 
candidates received the majority of the votes, Harrison, who had the lowest number 
of votes, was dropped and another vote was held between the remaining two 
candidates. In the second round of voting, Buchanan received most of the votes from 
Harrison's supporters and came out on top of a very close vote one hundred to ninety-
five. After this vote both Wilson and Harrison withdrew from the race as promised 
and endorsed Buchanan who was unopposed and thus elected to the seat.29  
The final election in which the Edinburgh United Liberal Association was 
involved came the following year as Cowan, the other MP elected in the 1880 
general election, stepped down leading to another by-election. In this by-election 
there were two men that came forward as candidates. The members of the Edinburgh 
United Liberal Association decided to refrain from endorsing either candidate in this 
race because they believed both were equally qualified and supported by the 
members. However, for the sake of keeping the Liberal vote intact, they retained the 
option of endorsing one of the candidates if someone were to come forward to 
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contest the seat in the Conservatives’ interest.30 Even though the Association’s 
actions were different at each election, the general opinion of the Association was 
positive because all Liberal opinions were involved in each of the decisions made. 
The acceptance of party rule brought about by the Edinburgh United Liberal 
Association would end with its demise upon the redistribution of the seats of the city 
and the need for individual Associations to represent each newly formed district. 
 
The Liberal Associations 
The Radicals and Whigs each struggled to acquire political influence over the 
new parliamentary districts. One way in which this could be achieved was by gaining 
control of the new Liberal Associations that were formed in accordance to the new 
parliamentary districts created as a result of the redistribution of seats in 1885. In 
Edinburgh the Radical wing of the Liberal party showed itself to be better organised 
and faster to mobilise than their Whig counterparts and thus took control of the 
Liberal Associations in each of the four new parliamentary districts. Whigs 
previously kept Radicals out of leadership positions and control of most Liberal party 
politics in the country by using the ‘complex machinery’ of the caucus, even in 
constituencies with a high number of working-class citizens. The Radicals perceived 
the new constituencies created by the Third Reform Act as an opportunity to break 
into Whig-dominated party politics. The Radical Reynolds’s Newspaper supported 
Chamberlain’s control of Birmingham politics and promoted its use as a model for 
the Radicals to duplicate in the rest of the United Kingdom.31 This strategy was put 
into action in Edinburgh as the Radicals tried to legitimately take over the local 
Liberal party in Edinburgh by adhering to the rules of the Association and using the 
Associations to their tactical advantage. 
In late January 1885 the Edinburgh United Liberal Association advised the 
electors in each of the four new parliamentary districts to form their own Liberal 
Associations within each of their districts. The Edinburgh United Liberal Association 
also recommended that the new Associations should contain a membership equal to 
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about two per cent of the voting population within each parliamentary district. The 
Edinburgh United Liberal Association itself was made up of one per cent of the 
voters in Edinburgh, yet the organisation reasoned that the increased percentage was 
needed in order to include more diversity of opinion within the four smaller 
Associations. In order to reach this percentage, each ward in the district was to elect 
a number of members equal to two per cent of the voting populous from their ward. 
When combined with the other wards’ nominees, this would form the district 
committee.  
 The Edinburgh United Liberal Association issued these guidelines to the new 
Associations: ‘With respect to the constitution of the new committees, it is suggested 
that lines of the existing Liberal Association should be followed; and a strong 
opinion is expressed in favour of a federation of the four district committees into a 
central association, which should not interfere with districts in the selection of 
candidates, but should be available as a means of eliciting the general opinion of the 
city on any important question’.32 The four new district-centred Liberal Associations 
that formed in place of the Edinburgh United Liberal Association were to be self-
contained organizations that nominated their own choice of candidate for Parliament, 
thus placing a smaller number of people in control of the nominating process. Before 
the Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885, the two Liberal candidates for the city had 
been nominated by the Edinburgh United Liberal Association which was made up of 
Liberals throughout the entire city. After the redistribution of seats and the division 
of the burgh into four individual seats, only one-fourth of the city was directly 
responsible for the nomination of one MP. Not only was there more political power 
in the city with the addition of two parliamentary seats, but that power became easier 
to obtain as a potential candidate had fewer people to persuade to support their 
candidacy. 
 The wards moved quickly to set up their own Associations and to nominate 
people to represent them at their respective districts’ general committee meetings. 
The first goal for each of the new groups was to elect the members to take part in the 
Liberal Associations in each district. Each of the thirteen wards held meetings 
(fourteen ward meetings as St. Leonard’s ward was split) to establish the makeup and 
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rules of the four Liberal Associations. Those present at the ward meetings had to 
decide what percentage of the voting population they wanted to use to make up the 
Association. It had been recommended by the Edinburgh United Liberal Association 
that they use two per cent of the district populations, but the final number was at the 
discretion of each individual district’s Association. Ultimately, three per cent was 
chosen by most of the wards which was then adopted by all four Liberal 
Associations. The agendas at the ward meetings also included the nomination and 
election of officers to preside over each Association. 
In the 1885 election in Edinburgh, the formation of the new Associations 
provided the different wings of the Liberal party in the divided burghs an opportunity 
to gain political capital. Taking over a local ward Association allowed for a potential 
takeover of the new district Associations from which those might influence the 
constituency and determine who would be the Liberal candidate for that district at the 
upcoming elections. The Radicals were the first to act upon this opportunity. The 
Radicals gained control over the new Associations in three of the four districts in 
Edinburgh: the East Edinburgh Liberal Association led by Thomas Sloan, a former 
Town Councillor; the South Edinburgh Liberal Association led by Henry 
Calderwood, a Professor at the University of Edinburgh; and the Central Edinburgh 
Liberal Association led by James Still, a successful builder. As a result of the lack of 
compromise between the two wings of the Liberal party, three of the four new 
constituencies were contested by multiple Liberal candidates. In both the East and 
South districts the race was between only two rival Liberal candidates, a Whig versus 
a Radical. There were four candidates in the Central district, three of which were 
Liberals and all of whom claimed to be advanced. The remaining candidate in that 
race was a Tory. The West district was the only district that could be classified as a 
traditional race between one Liberal and one Conservative, as it was the only race 
without a rival Liberal running. 
The Radicals in Edinburgh used two simple, yet effective tactics to take over 
the Associations. First, they quickly called the ward meetings giving members short 
notice to ensure low attendance from the opposition. Second, they encouraged a large 
number of allies to attend the meetings enabling them to have a large majority. After 
the Edinburgh United Liberal Association suggested the formation of the four new 
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districts’ Associations, the electors that formed the Edinburgh East Liberal 
Association (known first as the North-Eastern Edinburgh Liberal Association) held a 
meeting to determine how to structure the new Association on 27 January 1885. It 
was decided that the wards should elect members to represent them in the district 
Association as the Edinburgh United Liberal Association had recommended. The 
first ward meeting was held by the Broughton ward just three days later, hardly 
giving sufficient notice to the Liberal electors eligible to vote in the ward. At the 
meeting there were complaints about the short notice and there were also questions 
raised about the fact that the meeting had been called by the ward’s secretary rather 
than the chairman of the ward. These complaints were dismissed by the secretary 
who claimed that he had given sufficient notice of the meeting and that such 
meetings could be called by himself or the chairman.33 A week later, on 6 February, 
the Newington ward in the South district held a meeting where the officers and the 
committee members were elected. There was some opposition once the nominations 
began and the purpose of the meeting was called into question. The chairman replied 
that the purpose of the meeting was ‘to consider the proposed opening of the 
Meadow Walk, & c.’ implying that they could carry out the meeting however they 
wished and thus they continued with the nomination of the new members.34   
The second strategy employed by the Radicals was to gather enough 
supporters of their cause to attend in order to elect those who agreed with their 
advanced Liberal views. At the Broughton ward meeting there were seventy people 
in attendance who voted to nominate and elect thirty members to the Association. 
The Radicals only needed thirty-six people present in order to secure a majority and 
were therefore able to elect Radicals to represent the ward and make up a significant 
part of the membership of the Edinburgh East Liberal Association. They also limited 
who could be elected by implementing a rule which required that a potential nominee 
had to be present at the meeting in order to qualify for nomination. This rule was also 
used at a Whig-run Canongate ward meeting where, although the chairman spoke out 
against this action, the Radicals had sufficient numbers to constitute the majority and 
took control from the Whigs running the meeting and passed the resolution.35 The 
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same type of resolution was denied at another ward meeting on the grounds that it 
had not been presented at the beginning of the meeting.36 The subject was also voted 
on in several other wards with a variety of outcomes.37 The Conservatives in St. 
Andrews’ ward did not require an individual to be at their Association meetings in 
order to qualify as a candidate. In one instance, William Blackwood, a local 
publisher, was elected as a member of the Conservative Association and at a 
subsequent meeting he was elected to be the Chairman of the ward’s Conservative 
Association without being present at either meeting.38 There was no protest among 
the Conservatives to Blackwood being elected in this manner indicating that the 
redistribution of the seats did not place the same strain on the Conservative party as it 
did on the Liberal party in Edinburgh. Although the Conservatives were not in the 
same position as the Liberals, they could not afford to fight amongst one another. 
In St. Cuthbert’s ward, the 111 people in attendance at the first meeting took 
the subject of electing members even further than simply allowing only those present 
at the meeting the right to be chosen to stand for election in the general election. 
After the attendees voted to place ninety members to represent the ward in the South 
Edinburgh Liberal Association, the newly elected members granted themselves the 
sole power of filling any vacancy that might arise.39 The Radicals’ majority was 
achieved by quickly calling the meeting and loading it with supporters and then the 
majority was insured to remain intact if any of the present members withdrew for any 
reason. 
Another objective of the ward meetings was to decide on the rules of the 
Associations. Although it was a rather straightforward task, the process of rule-
making became controversial throughout the 1885 parliamentary campaign. For the 
most part, the rules were already known, but they had to be approved by each 
individual Association. Professor Calderwood spoke about what the rules required at 
the St. Cuthbert’s ward meeting during the nominating process for the general 
committee which was reported in The Scotsman: 
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Their understanding while forming this Association was that, while it was 
reserved as a perfectly open matter for any elector in the district of Liberal 
politics to propose or nominate as a candidate anyone he might think suited, 
all of them who were to belong to this Association were held pledged to this, 
that when the Association, either by its combined vote or by a preliminary 
vote by the electors outside, decided upon one man, they were all to go 
together for that one man.40 
 
The chief purpose of the Liberal Association was to secure the return of a Liberal to 
Parliament. The notion put forth by Calderwood was not a new idea; it was meant to 
prevent a Conservative victory. In cases where more than one Liberal was in the field 
of candidates, it was believed that the Liberal vote would not be split if all members 
of the Association were pledged to the same candidate. The Radicals who were in 
charge of the East and South district's Liberal Associations in Edinburgh used this 
rule to complement their argument that Liberals should vote for the Radical 
candidates nominated in the districts even though there was no Conservative 
opponent in either race. The Central Edinburgh Liberal Association adopted the 
requirement that all of the members belonging to the Association be bound to the 
nominee.41   
The Radicals’ strategy of controlling the Liberal party’s machinery was not 
limited to Associations in Edinburgh. In Glasgow, the Radicals also fought to control 
their local Associations and were successful in the takeover of all seven 
Associations.42 In two divisions, the Radicals quashed Whig efforts to run as 
Liberals.43 Perhaps the Radicals biggest symbolic victory came in the middle of 
October when they took over a Scottish Liberal Association meeting and then refined 
the meeting to focus only on the questions of the local option and the 
disestablishment of the Church of Scotland. The Scotsman again, as it had done when 
the Radicals took charge of the local Associations in Edinburgh, claimed that the 
meetings had been ‘packed’ by the Radicals, thus implying that the resolutions were 
not valid because of actions taken by the Radicals in order to achieve the support 
needed to pass them.44 As a result of the Radicals passing a resolution in favour of 
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disestablishment by a vote of four hundred to seven at the October meeting, the 
President of the Scottish Liberal Association, Lord Fife, resigned in protest.45  
The passing of advanced resolutions by the Scottish Liberal Association was 
not an uncommon event since the East and West Liberal Associations combined in 
1881 to form the United Scottish Liberal Association. This new Scottish Liberal 
Association held meetings in the first part of the year in either Edinburgh or 
Glasgow, the respective headquarters of the pervious East and West Associations. 
Attendees of this meeting were restricted by the executive which was principally 
made up of Whigs. Members were, however, not restricted from attending a second 
meeting held in the autumn which took place in other cities throughout Scotland. At 
these open meetings the Radicals took the opportunity to pass resolutions which 
would not have normally passed without the added support from the members allied 
to the Radical cause who were restricted at the meetings in Edinburgh and Glasgow, 
but were allowed to join in the open autumn meetings.46 
 
Attack on Party legitimacy 
Once the Radicals had control of the Associations in Edinburgh and Glasgow, 
they used their new-found position of power to implement their true goal: 
determining who the Liberal candidates in the districts would be.47 The Associations 
endorsement of a candidate was supposed to give the candidate a legitimate claim to 
stand in the district. Opponents of the endorsed candidate sometimes questioned the 
legitimacy of the Association that endorsed the candidate as a way to undermine his 
legitimacy as well. The rhetoric that was employed to question the legitimacy of the 
Association attacked the perception that it was a democratic institution, implying that 
the Association was controlled by a few men.48 The Radicals in the Broughton ward 
avoided the whole subject of the Association voting between Liberal candidates in 
order to nominate one as the official Liberal candidate for the parliamentary district 
by rejecting the Whig candidate from the start. At the formation of the ward's 
Association, a resolution was proposed ‘to enter protest against the proposal to 
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introduce to the constituency, as a candidate in the Liberal interest, a gentlemen 
whose well-known opposition to the extension of the franchise and other Liberal 
measures disqualifies him from representing the political sentiments of the north-
eastern district of Edinburgh’.49 This successful resolution was directed at George 
Joachim Goschen, who was the current MP for Ripon at that time and had voted 
against the extension of the franchise to the counties. Goschen was a Londoner, 
educated at Oxford, who had served many years in Parliament and had gained 
recognition for being a member of Gladstone’s cabinet.50 The Radicals wanted to 
block Goschen’s nomination in order to find a candidate who would uphold the 
Radical agenda. Recently elected President Thomas Sloan informed the ward 
members of the meaning of Goschen’s possible nomination: ‘When he looked back 
upon the great demonstration which they had in Edinburgh in support of the 
Government and in favour of the Franchise Bill, and when he considered that Mr 
Goschen retired from the Government and could not assist them to pass that bill, he 
thought they would be taking a step backward if the adopted Mr Goschen as their 
candidate’.51 The Radical members in the Broughton ward hoped that by rejecting 
Goschen in their ward, it might keep him out of the East district even if they were 
unable to take control of the whole district Association. 
The Radical members in the Broughton ward were successful in their 
resolution to block Goschen’s candidature in the ward and they carried the same 
tactic they used in the ward on to the Edinburgh East Liberal Association. A 
resolution was put forth at the first meeting proposing ‘that this Liberal Association 
having carefully considered Mr Goschen’s candidature, is of opinion, judging from 
his votes and speeches, that he is not in harmony with the political sentiments of the 
Liberal party, and that, therefore, he is not qualified to represent the electorate of the 
north-eastern district of the city of Edinburgh in Parliament’.52 There was protest 
against the resolution being brought forward on the grounds that the meeting had 
been called to elect the committee and officers. Nevertheless, Sloan, as the newly 
elected President of the East Liberal Association, ruled that it was in order and the 
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resolution passed one hundred eleven to twelve.53 The Radicals took control of the 
other wards in the East district and thus succeeded with their agenda of denying 
Goschen the approval of the Association. 
The Radicals at that time still did not have a candidate of their own to 
nominate for the parliamentary race in the East district. They only took such actions 
as they were adamant about Goschen not running because he was a Whig. Sloan 
searched for a candidate to endorse before Goschen could claim legitimacy over the 
district without the Association’s approval due to the lack of an alternative. Sloan 
travelled to London to persuade a sitting MP to come to Edinburgh and stand for the 
city’s East district and, when that failed, he invited Andrew Carnegie to run for the 
seat. Carnegie had previously pondered a possible run for a seat in Parliament. He 
wrote in a letter to a friend in 1884, ‘sometimes I feel it is my mission to do so,’ yet 
he had doubts because he believed that the true power rested with the press.54 
Carnegie had divulged in 1884 that he was a supporter of Chamberlain and thought 
that he would become Prime Minister. His support of Chamberlain coupled with his 
notoriety made him a great choice for the Radicals, but Carnegie thought himself too 
Radical to be elected and he ultimately declined.55 In doing so he left both the 
Radicals and Edinburgh a compliment when he said, ‘That I should be thought of, by 
the advanced wing of the Great Army of Liberalism as, perhaps, a man worthy to 
represent the capital of my native Land in Parliament – and the capital is Edinburgh – 
is indeed flattering’.56 Finally, Benjamin Francis Conn Costelloe came forward to 
offer himself as a candidate in the East district. Costelloe was a Roman Catholic born 
in Ireland in 1855. He was educated at the Glasgow Academy, Glasgow University, 
and later at Balliol College before becoming a barrister in London. He had recently 
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been defeated for the nomination as a candidate for the Glasgow parliamentary 
district of the St. Rollox Liberal Association.57 
The legitimacy of the Liberal Association was attacked in the East. Four days 
after the newly inaugurated Edinburgh East Liberal Association declared Goschen to 
be unfit to represent the constituency in Parliament, two letters surfaced in The 
Scotsman in which the writers voiced their concerns about the Association. In the 
first letter, a member of the Association in the East calling himself ‘An Old Liberal’ 
complained, ‘It is painfully evident that this self-constituted caucus of Liberal 
Association spread over the town will seriously interfere with the free choice of the 
electors’.58 In the second letter, ‘A Hater Of Humbug’ complained of the 
‘wirepullers’ and their ‘pet lambs’ who took over the Liberal Association in an 
underhanded way which made the Edinburgh East Liberal Association a ‘huge 
sham’.59 This was accompanied by The Scotsman accusing the ‘so-called Liberal 
Association,’ including ‘Mr Sloan and his fellow-conspirators’ of crowding the 
meetings with ‘“lambs” who held up their hands when he [Sloan] held up his hand, 
and who did exactly what they had been directed to do’.60 Although their true 
complaint was with the structure of the Association, they directed their anger at 
Sloan and his “lambs”, who used the rules of the Association to their benefit. 
The Liberal Association’s rejection of Goschen’s candidacy and their 
invitation to Costelloe to speak before the constituency created a controversy: 
 Beyond doubt it is desirable that as far as possible there should be Liberal 
Organisation. Equally beyond cavil is the theory of our Liberal Associations, 
that they should be representative of the great body of the electors. But it is 
precisely at this point that so many failures are seen. If one thing be more 
certain than another it is, that for the most part, the supposedly representative 
Liberal Associations in Scotland have not that character. [...] The 
Associations have no justification for seeking to make themselves the portals 
through which alone candidates may approach constituencies.61 
 
The writer of this letter felt that the Associations were comprised of only a political 
minority of the constituencies and were ignoring the rest of the constituents. This led 
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him to question the authority of the current Associations and, subsequently, their 
right to make decisions for the constituency at large. 
The Executive of the Edinburgh Southern Liberal Association deployed the 
voting tactic when they called a meeting in late September 1885 to choose a 
candidate to nominate for the district. At the meeting, a few members protested 
against the course of action. In their argument, they claimed that the Liberal 
Association was formed in order to unite the Liberals of the constituency with the 
aim of electing a Liberal. They believed that if a Tory came forward to contest the 
race in the district, the Association would then be justified in selecting a Liberal 
candidate. However, seeing that there were no Tories in the field, a Liberal victory 
was already an obvious conclusion, thus there was no need to pick one Liberal 
candidate over another as doing so would only cause disunion amongst the Liberals 
in the district. Professor Calderwood argued that it would only cause disunion if the 
candidate who did not receive the nomination refused to stand down meaning that the 
Association was not responsible for any disunion among the Liberals. The members 
voted on whether or not the Association should continue with the nomination of a 
candidate and those in favour (the Radicals) won by a vote of seventy-six to sixty-
two. After the vote, almost one quarter of the men present left the meeting in protest. 
Professor Calderwood then nominated his former student Thomas Raleigh. Raleigh 
was born in Edinburgh and attended university there as well as at Oxford before 
becoming an English lawyer and a fellow of All Souls’ College.62 Upon nominating 
Raleigh, Professor Calderwood said, ‘The question they had to decide was between 
advanced Liberalism or moderate Liberalism’.63 No other candidates were nominated 
meaning that Raleigh was going to be carried unanimously. However, upon hearing 
this, someone then nominated the Lord Provost, Sir George Harrison, who had an 
extensive résumé. Harrison was a long-time resident of Edinburgh who had served as 
Town Councillor, Treasurer, chairman of the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, 
director of the North British Railway Company, as well as a member of several 
boards.64 Harrison had offered himself as a candidate in the 1881 by-election but 
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dropped out after the Liberal Association endorsed a different candidate.65 Those 
remaining at the meeting voted and Raleigh was carried eighty-three to two.66 
After this meeting there are several letters printed in The Scotsman that 
questioned the actions of the Edinburgh Southern Liberal Association. The day 
following the Association’s nomination of Raleigh, there was criticism of Professor 
Calderwood and the members of the Association who were favourable to Raleigh. 
The writer of the letter accused them of ‘attempt[ing] to deprive the electors of their 
free choice between two candidates’ and pointed out that ‘83 men have dictated to 
8700 electors the men they are to choose as their representative. It is most probable 
that the electors will resent this trickery’.67 The writer was protesting against the 
rules of the Associations, particularly the caucus. He refers to trickery taking place as 
if the members had done something underhanded when in fact their actions were 
allowed per the existing rules of the Association, thus making it unclear whether he 
was blaming the men or the Association. 
A few days after the meeting, the secretaries of the Edinburgh Southern 
Liberal Association sent a letter to the members who were not present at the meetings 
to inform them of Raleigh’s recommendation by the Association along with a 
statement of the rules regarding the recommendation of candidates: ‘All members of 
the Association shall co-operate in the support of the candidate recommended by the 
General Committee’.68 The letter closed with a place for the member to sign to 
acknowledge and agree to the rule which clearly demonstrates what Professor 
Calderwood was attempting to do when he introduced this rule to the Association in 
February. However, it appears that his plan backfired on him as many voters resented 
the actions of the Association and voiced their outrage in The Scotsman. One of these 
letters from the Association was handed to the newspaper along with a statement 
from the letter’s recipient in which he complained about the Association’s selection 
of a candidate on his behalf. He proceeded to make it clear that he did not intend to 
follow the guidelines of the Association. His frustration with the leadership of the 
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Association can best be summed up by his signature: ‘A Member, But Not Of The 
Caucus’.69 
In an attempt to undermine the authority of the Edinburgh Southern Liberal 
Association, The Scotsman published a letter in which the writer described the 
actions of the Association: 
Working men think for themselves, and they will not be ready to think and 
reward those who would deprive them of the right to private judgement as it 
is shown at the ballot-box. If such pretensions as those by which the 
resolution proposed by Professor Calderwood on Friday night were admitted, 
then working men, and all men in the constituency, would have surrendered 
their votes to the majority of a Liberal Association. It has not come to that 
yet. The franchise, so hardly won will not be thus readily surrendered. The 
working men will desire to act for himself, and will vote as he pleases.70 
 
This is clearly an effort put forth by the Whigs to persuade workingmen that the 
Liberal Associations in question were dubious and were trying to take away their 
vote. They portrayed the Radicals in charge of the Association as men who believed 
that the workingmen were dumb and who expected them to follow orders from the 
Association. 
The Liberal Association in the Central district of Edinburgh remained neutral 
even though three Liberal candidates had entered the race: Adam William Black, 
James Hall Renton, and John Wilson. Black was the son of the former Lord Provost 
and MP for Edinburgh also named Adam Black. He was born in Edinburgh where he 
later went to university before becoming a member of his father’s publishing firm. 
Black had been a Town Councillor in 1870 for St Giles’ ward.71 Renton was also 
born and educated in Edinburgh although he had lived in London for many years 
where he made a name for himself in business. He was a member of the London 
Stock Exchange and the director of the Forth Bridge Railway. Renton ran for 
Parliament for West Staffordshire in 1880 and then in the 1882 Edinburgh by-
election, losing both elections.72 Wilson was a native of Edinburgh as well. He was a 
merchant and deputy chairman of the chamber of commerce. Wilson entered local 
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politics in 1876 when he was elected to be a Town Councillor and he later became 
Treasurer.73  
On 20 October the Conservatives brought forward Major John Scott Napier, 
second son of the tenth Lord Napier, as a candidate for the Central district. Major 
Napier was a member of the Gordon Highlanders and had served in the Afghan 
Campaign and the Boer War.74 His candidacy can be explained by the fact that there 
were three candidates in the field for the Liberal interest already; therefore, there was 
a good chance of the Liberal vote in the district being split three ways causing the 
few Tories in the district the opportunity for a victory over the Liberals. This 
scenario is precisely what the Liberal Associations were supposed to prevent from 
occurring. Perhaps the members of the Executive Committee of the Edinburgh 
Central Liberal Association hoped to keep their legitimacy over the district by 
abstaining from the nomination process after the outcry against the other two districts 
in Edinburgh which had tried to unite the constituency around a single Liberal 
candidate. The lack of action by the Association might also be explained by the fact 
that all of the Liberal candidates in the Central district were advanced Liberals so 
there was no need to weed out a Whig as the Associations in the East and South had 
done. Nevertheless, once a Conservative entered the race, the Association had no 
choice but to protect the district for the Liberal cause by nominating a candidate. 
The Edinburgh Central Liberal Association acted quickly and called a 
meeting to nominate one of the three Liberal candidates just nine days after Napier 
declared he was running. At the meeting, the motion to nominate a candidate 
narrowly passed with a vote of seventy-seven to sixty-three. As the Association 
moved on to vote for the nominees, one-third of the members present left the meeting 
in protest. The vote then concluded with eighty votes for Renton, five votes for 
Black, and three votes for Wilson. It is worth noting that Renton received three votes 
more than the total number of votes for nominating a candidate in the first place. 
Also, it is odd that the members who were against Renton left in protest because if 
they had stayed and voted, Renton would not have received the two-thirds majority 
                                                      
73 Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees, Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament Volume II, 1886–
1918: A Biographical Dictionary of the House of Commons (Sussex, 1978), 377. 
74 The Scotsman, 11 Mar. 1938, 10; 21 Oct. 1885, 8. 
 75 
required for his nomination.75 The Liberals in the South who were opposed to the 
caucus nominating a candidate made it clear that the Association could choose a 
candidate only if a Conservative entered the race.  
Once the Association nominated a candidate in the Central district, there was 
an outcry against their action as well. The complaint, as in the other districts, was not 
with the machinery of the Association, but with the majority of the Association’s 
membership who were accused of trying to take the vote away from the constituents. 
Wilson, one of the Liberal candidates not selected by the Edinburgh Central Liberal 
Association, rejected the Association’s legitimacy He declared that he would not 
abide by the Association’s nomination and drop out of the race because ‘he had not 
come into the field at the bidding of the Association or at his own instance. He had 
become a candidate on the solicitation of more than 3000 of the electors’.76 A voter 
who signed a letter printed in The Scotsman as ‘Observer’ also challenged the 
legitimacy of the Association by asserting that the members supporting Renton 
somehow nominated him in an underhanded way. ‘Observer’ wrote, ‘The Liberals of 
the Central Division will doubtless assert themselves, and teach these men on the 
polling-day that they value their political rights, and will not barter them away at the 
bidding of political tricksters’.77 
    The general accusation against the members of the local Liberal Associations 
in these three districts can be summed up by a reporter for The Scotsman: 
They thought they could by means of the machinery of Associations, coerce 
and gag the electors. Liberal Associations in theory are excellent; that is, 
when they are truly representative of all shades of Liberal opinion, and when 
they are honestly conducted. But the unscrupulousness of others, they 
represent only a faction, and yet pose as lawgivers to all Liberals.78 
 
This writer addressed the machinery of the Association, but he did not go so far as to 
suggest that it needed to be changed. He then went on to say that the Liberal 
Associations ‘will have to be reorganised and purged… to be of any service’.79 This 
writer believed that the problem lay with the select few who had taken control of the 
Association. While he still held on to his hope to have Liberal Associations and for 
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those Associations to have legitimacy in the districts, he opposed the present 
Associations because of the personnel in control. 
The only Liberal Association in Edinburgh which did not have its legitimacy 
attacked was the Edinburgh West Liberal Association. This was also the only district 
to have only one Liberal candidate stand for election. The Liberal candidate in the 
West was the sitting MP for the city, Thomas Rayburn Buchanan. Buchanan was 
born in Lanarkshire and attended university at Balliol College at Oxford. After 
graduating, he became a barrister in London and then entered politics in 1880 when 
he ran in East Lothian against Lord Elcho, Francis Wemyss-Charteris-Douglas, who 
had represented the constituency as an MP since 1847. Buchanan had a good 
showing, but ended up losing the race by less than fifty votes. The following year, 
upon the resignation of Edinburgh MP John McLaren, Buchanan ran unopposed in 
the by-election once his opponents dropped out of the race after he was endorsed by 
the Liberal Association.80 Buchanan’s Conservative opponent in the 1885 election 
was George Auldjo Jamieson. Jamieson was born in Aberdeen where he also went to 
university. Soon after his graduation in 1847, he moved to Edinburgh to work in an 
accounting firm partly owned by his uncle and, by 1885, Jamieson had become a top 
accountant in Scotland. He had also become the chairman of the Edinburgh West 
Conservative Association, the same Association which had invited him to run for a 
seat in Parliament.81 
 Buchanan was the sitting MP for Edinburgh and, as a result of the 
Redistribution of the Seats Act of 1885, his seat was abolished thus causing him to 
look for a new seat among the four new parliamentary seats. Before he could choose 
which constituency he wanted to stand for, Goschen announced his intention to run 
for the East district and Buchanan ultimately decided to stand for Edinburgh West.82 
Buchanan knew how to set up an Association to his advantage and he had previously 
discussed the method of setting up an Association to favour himself with his 
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colleague Arthur Elliot, an MP for Roxburghshire.83 It is uncertain whether 
Buchanan had any influence over the Edinburgh West Liberal Association, but the 
executive of the Association in the district endorsed him shortly after his 
announcement to run.84 The West parliamentary district presented the biggest 
challenge to the Liberal monopoly of the city. Perhaps Buchanan chose the West 
because of the large Tory population rather than despite it. Being the sitting MP, 
Buchanan retained a good chance of winning the seat. It is intriguing that in the 
toughest constituency for the Liberals, a Free Churchman who supported 
disestablishment was running against a Conservative who did not. Not only were 
there many Conservatives in the West, but there were many Whigs as well. It seems 
strange that a Whig favouring the Established Church did not run against Buchanan. 
Either the Whigs respected that Buchanan was a sitting MP or they were concerned 
that a split Liberal vote might produce a Tory victory. 
This leads to the question of why the protest against party politics in 
Edinburgh took place. The protester may have felt that the party system was 
undemocratic or it could have simply been political ideology that fed the protest.  
The same events that caused a controversy among the new associations happened 
with the Edinburgh United Liberal Association. The members of that Association 
endorsed a candidate when there were no Conservatives in the race and they also 
took away the voting right of the constituents with an Association vote in which the 
losers dropped out of the race.85 These actions by the Edinburgh United Liberal 
Association did not raise the questions about it being anti-democratic or regarding its 
legitimacy as those that were raised when the new Associations resorted to similar 
actions.  
It is important to note that the Liberal Associations were not the only 
organisations to use a caucus; the Conservatives also used the caucus in the West 
parliamentary district of Edinburgh. The Conservative caucus was somewhat 
different than the caucus used by Liberals. The Conservatives, like the Liberals, 
divided their district Associations by using the wards. Each ward was responsible for 
electing members and the executive to represent the ward in the district Association. 
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However, unlike the Liberals, the nomination of a Conservative candidate and even 
the decision to run a candidate at all was agreed upon by all of the wards’ chairmen. 
The chairmen then presented their decision to the rest of the Association and asked 
them to sign a requisition to send to the potential candidate.86 There is no evidence of 
any Tory outrage with this setup in Edinburgh, possibly because the Conservatives 
did not face the problem of a party split as the much larger Liberal party faced.  
The attack on party politics and the caucus was not new in British politics and 
one can see why the Whigs in Edinburgh complained about the new Associations in 
the city. Furthermore, Biagini points out, there were many differing views among 
Radicals regarding the local Associations and the caucus. Extreme examples of these 
differing points of view range from the Radicals in Birmingham who favoured the 
caucus to those who opposed the caucus in other constituencies, such as Newcastle 
MP Joseph Cowen and North-East Bethnal Green MP George Howell. Biagini 
suggests that the attitudes toward the Association often correlated to the individuals’ 
relationship with their local Association. In Birmingham, the Radicals had a great 
relationship with their local Association and therefore favoured Associations. Neither 
Cowen nor Howell received support from their local Associations leading them to 
criticism and an overall negative view of Associations.87 
Like Cowen and Howell, many people had ‘upheld the importance of a direct 
relationship between politician and constituents’.88 Some of the ‘old-style’ Radicals 
even maintained that there should be no influence on their constituency from the 
Party.89 Howell’s negative view of the Liberal Associations contained many 
complaints against the Association, particularly the machinery of the caucus.90 
Edinburgh was different in that the ‘local elites’ were not the ones who were resented 
for keeping the mass populace out of party politics.91 It was instead moderately 
important Radicals who faced such resentment. The machinery of the Association 
were not blamed for its failures, instead it was the Radicals who used the rules and 
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the system to their tactical advantage. They were perceived as being anti-democratic 
by abusing the Association for their own political benefit. The Edinburgh Whigs 
were not alone in attacking the use of a caucus as being anti-democratic while still 
supporting the idea of party politics. In his article on triangular contests, James Owen 
addresses ‘anti-caucus’ rhetoric. Supporters of the Nottingham West Liberal party 
used ‘anti-caucus’ rhetoric to attack a Radical candidate during the 1885 elections 
and claimed that he lacked the legitimacy to stand in the constituency because he had 
been placed there by party machinery. While at the same time they promoted their 
candidate as being legitimate due to him being endorsed through a democratic 
process.92 On the use of Liberal Associations as a source of political power Kellas 
writes, ‘The great extension of the franchise in 1884 virtually abolished the direct 
political influence of the Whigs in Scotland, and they tried to retrieve their position 
by maintaining firm control over the Scottish Liberal Association’.93 Perhaps the 
Whigs in Edinburgh hoped that once they took the Associations under their control, 
they could use them to their advantage and this is why they did not advocate 
dramatic changes in the machinery of the Associations.  
A valid argument about the caucus in late Victorian Britain is that it 
marginalised voters and was misused by some individuals for their political will. 
However, it did not strangle democracy in the constituency. In Edinburgh, even 
though the caucus took over local politics, the true power still rested in the voting 
public who demonstrated their power by electing unofficial Liberal candidates in 
three of the four parliamentary districts. This does not portray the failure of the 
national Party because the vast majority of the constituents in Edinburgh were 
Liberal and loyal to the Party. The divide lies in the contrasting ideologies of the 
Party: Whig, Radical, or somewhere in between the two. The scenario in Edinburgh 
seems to back up Lawrence’s claim ‘that local parties were often divided by bitter 
conflicts which, more often than not, ran along political rather than social fault-
lines’.94 
The outright fight between the Whigs and Radicals in Edinburgh is in contrast 
to the political history of the city. This is not to say that there were not already 
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differences and established groups within the city or that the Whigs and Radicals had 
not run against each other before. The difference in 1885 was the direct fight against 
one another in the general election. What is the reason for this change in political 
behaviour of these groups in Edinburgh? Two events took place which brought this 
fight to the forefront of Edinburgh politics. The first of these events was the passage 
of the Third Reform Act, specifically the redistribution of seats, which was detailed 
in the previous chapter. The redistribution of seats was significant to the political 
change because it gave Edinburgh four individual contests within the burgh and these 
single-member constituencies were formed by Sir Charles Dilke in part to encourage 
the Radicals to fight for more representation. The second was the question of the 
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland. The Church Question 
and its impact on the changing attitude of Edinburgh politics in 1885 is discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter.  
As was the case in the preceding decades, it was ecclesiastical questions that 
brought the Radicals together to fight the Whigs, whether it was to fight Macaulay 
over his support of Maynooth or to fight to abolish the annuity tax in the burgh. In 
1885, it was the disestablishment question that was at the forefront of the Radicals 
minds. The Church Question also provided the Whigs with a good principle to stand 
on in defence of the National Church. Together, redistribution of the seats and the 
Church Question led to a standoff in the burgh against the Whigs and Radicals. Since 
the Radicals had taken control over the local Associations, they were able to endorse 
the candidates of their choice resulting in all of the official Liberal candidates in 
Edinburgh being advanced. Some were just moderately advanced while others were 
more radical, yet all four of the official candidates had this one decisive issue in 
common: a desire for the separation of Church and State therefore favouring the 
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland. Two of them did so 
outright while the other two pledged to support disestablishment if the question were 











Disestablishment and Edinburgh Politics 
 
Historians have generally claimed that the question of the disestablishment 
and disendowment of the Church of Scotland dominated all others in Scotland during 
the 1885 election.1 The disestablishment question was not a new debate nor was the 
question of disestablishing national Churches unique to Scotland as it had been raised 
in the rest of the United Kingdom as well. Dissent from the Established Church in 
Scotland pre-dated a split within the Church in 1843 and the movement for 
disestablishment gradually gained support over the next two decades from some of 
the Church’s estranged members due to unresolved issues that stemmed from this 
split.2 In the lead-up to the 1885 election the Church question was causing a rift 
between the two wings of the Liberal party in Scotland. The disestablishment issue 
was furthered in Scotland by such events as the disestablishment of the Church of 
Ireland in 1869, the passage of the Patronage Act of 1874, and Gladstone’s move to 
Midlothian in 1879–80.   
The disestablishment movement came to a climax during the 1885 general 
election. During this election many races in which rival Liberals ran against each 
other developed in Scotland and many of them dealt with the disestablishment 
question. Gladstone attempted to stay out of the debate, but he ultimately made the 
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decision that it was best for the Liberal party if he stepped in. With a powerful 
speech, Gladstone steered the Liberal party away from Scottish disestablishment. He 
did not completely reject disestablishment as part of the Liberal programme; instead, 
he opted to postpone the debate. Overall, disestablishment was a key issue in 
Scotland during the general election of 1885 and the main quarrel between some of 
the Whigs and Radicals which led to many double candidacies during the election.3  
The goal of this chapter is to understand the local impact of the Church 
question in the general election in Edinburgh and to determine if it was the main 
issue among the voters of the city. Before discussing the events of 1885, it is 
important to get a firm grasp of the question of disestablishment in order to better 
understand how the question effected the 1885 election. To understand the question 
of disestablishment, one has to look first to the history of the question and to its 
wider context in the politics of the whole United Kingdom as well as throughout 
Scotland before narrowing the focus to Edinburgh. It is also necessary to look to the 
importance of Gladstone in his role in the question, particularly in Edinburgh. The 
candidates’ positions regarding the question of disestablishment were influenced by 
both national and local politics and became a major factor in the 1885 general 
election. 
 
Disestablishment throughout the United Kingdom 
The political movement for the disestablishment of the Established Church 
was not confined within the borders of Scotland alone. In each of the four nations of 
the United Kingdom, disestablishment of their respective Established Churches 
became a viable political movement during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. These 
movements differed in both size and success and were affected by nationalism and 
numerical strength of the Established Churches. The Established Churches of both 
England and Scotland ultimately survived the campaigns for disestablishment, but 
the Established Churches in Ireland and Wales were unable to withstand the 
individual movements against them and were disestablished during this time period. 
The Church of Ireland saw the first major attempt by any dissenting group to 
                                                      
3 Kellas, ‘The Liberal party and the Scottish Church disestablishment crisis’, 36. Kellas noted that the 
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disestablish an Established Church in the United Kingdom and its disestablishment in 
1869 helped to fuel other dissenters’ disestablishment movements throughout the rest 
of the United Kingdom. The other successful disestablishment campaign came in 
1920 with the disestablishment of the Church of Wales. 
Several differences arose between the various disestablishment campaigns 
including the idea of nationalism which varied amongst the different nations. 
According to Machin, ‘The role of nationalism was obviously important in 
campaigns to disestablish churches which were seen as symbols of external 
domination’.4 The Church of Ireland was attached to the Church of England during 
the 1800 Act of Union and the Church in Wales had been joined to the Church of 
England as part of the province of Canterbury.5 Due to such ties to England, 
opposition to the Established Churches in both Ireland and Wales was seen by some 
as patriotic, because the Established Churches were considered central to an 
interpretation of English dominance over the realms. The feeling of national pride 
was a great advantage to the side of the disestablishers in motivating other 
countrymen to join their cause, despite their attitudes towards the idea of an 
Established Church. 
On the contrary, nationalism was not a factor amongst those pushing for 
disestablishment in either England or Scotland. This can be attributed to the fact that 
in both England and Scotland the Established Churches had grown from within their 
own nations rather than having been forced upon them from outside of their borders 
as was the case in Ireland and Wales.6 Nationalism would have instead acted as a 
motivating factor for those who remained in favour of the Established Churches in 
both England and Scotland. The Committee of the General Assembly on Church 
Interests was one group that argued in support of the Church of Scotland and it 
suggested that the Church ‘might appeal to the fact that the Establishment of the 
Church of Scotland is declared in the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland 
“to be a fundamental and essential condition of said Treaty of Union in all time 
                                                      
4 Ian Machin, ‘Disestablishment and democracy, c. 1840–1930’, in Eugenio F. Biagini (ed.), 
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coming”’.7 Colin Kidd writes, ‘most Scots presbyterians agreed that the Union 
entrenched the privileges and status of the Church of Scotland free from Erastian 
parliamentary interference’.8 Not only was Presbyterianism a form of national 
heritage for Scotsmen, but the Church represented this uniqueness from the other 
nations of the United Kingdom and should therefore be protected and maintained in 
order to preserve the Presbyterian heritage of the nation. This same sentiment could 
be applicable for the Anglicans in England as an argument in favour of the continued 
establishment of the Church of England. In fact, Kidd describes the relationship of 
Scotland and England from the time of the union through to the Edwardian era as one 
of ‘political unionism and religious nationalism’. While the two nations are 
politically united, their religions remain separated and an example of their 
nationalism.9  
Another important factor that played a primary role in whether or not the 
disestablishment campaigns were successful was ‘the relative numerical strength of 
churches (in terms of members and attenders)’.10 The Church of England contained 
just over half the churchgoers in England making it the only Established Church in 
the United Kingdom with a majority of the population attending its services.11 
Conversely, in Ireland, the number of Roman Catholics was far greater than the 
number of Protestants; therefore, the majority of the nation attended Catholic 
churches rather than the churches of the Established Church of Ireland. In Wales, 
only one-fourth of the population attended the national Church. In Scotland, about 
one-third of the people attended the Church of Scotland. The percentage of the 
population attending the National Churches indicates the lack of devout supporters, 
primarily parishioners, of the Established Churches while the remaining larger 
percentage of the populations was made up of potential opponents to the Established 
Churches. 
In Scotland, the lack of a true majority of churchgoers was used as a reason to 
favour its disestablishment. Gladstone gave strength to this argument when he 
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declared, ‘As a general rule, I hardly know how a Church can be national which is a 
Church of the minority. […] Nothing has been said to show upon what principle it is 
that an Establishment is to be maintained which is the Establishment of a minority 
only of the people’.12 On the other hand, those who fought for the Church’s 
protection used the fact that by far the majority of the churchgoers in Scotland were 
Presbyterian and that, of the three Presbyterian churches, the Established Church of 
Scotland had the most members. The Committee of the General Assembly on Church 
Interests defended the Church of Scotland’s numerical position of churchgoers in 
comparison with the other churches in Scotland asserting that no one is ‘repelled 
from the Parish church by any difference of creed, worship, or government. They 
simply prefer their own church.’ The committee declared that ‘The Parish church is 
open to all’ which they claimed gave the people of Scotland the choice to attend the 
Established Church so long as it remained available to them.13   
 
The disestablishment question in Scotland 
The question of disestablishment in Scotland stems from a long debate on 
Church matters. One such point of contention occurred in 1834 when the General 
Assembly passed the Veto Act in an effort to create a compromise on the question of 
lay patronage. This Act provided to the male heads of each household in the 
congregation the right to veto a nominee for minister. On a few of the occasions 
when the Veto Act was used, the rejected nominee appealed to the civil institution of 
the Court of Session and won his case thus forcing his nomination on the unwilling 
congregation. Such cases eventually fostered a debate on whether or not an 
Established Church should have freedom on spiritual matters or if the State had 
supreme power over the religious body.  
In 1843 an event known as the Disruption occurred as a result of the Court of 
Session’s overruling of the Veto Act. The Disruption caused a split within the 
Church where more than one-third of the ministers broke off from the Church of 
Scotland and formed the Free Church of Scotland. By this time there was already a 
group known as the Voluntaries calling for disestablishment because they did not 
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condone the idea of an Established Church. They called for the Government to end 
the Established Church’s endowments and to remove the Established Church from 
administering the schools and managing the poor relief. The goal of the Voluntaries 
was to see the State stripped of ‘any last shreds of authority’ while the newly formed 
Free Church of Scotland desired freedom from the Government only on spiritual 
matters rather than total disestablishment as the members still upheld the principle of 
an Established Church.14  
 The disestablishment issue started to gain support and developed into a viable 
political movement in the 1870s. The disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 
1869 ‘stimulated [disestablishment supporters’] hopes of disestablishment in 
Scotland’.15 A more notable rise in attention for the disestablishment campaign can 
be attributed to an increase in exposure deriving from legislation on subjects relating 
to disestablishment and questions pertaining to the Church of Scotland. Hutchison 
attributes the increase of the disestablishment movement to the passage of the 
Patronage Act of 1874.16 The Patronage Act amended the appointment of ministers 
by taking it away from ‘the Patrons’ and giving the congregation or parish the right 
to elect their own minister in cases where their congregation or parish became 
vacated.17 Gladstone also saw a direct correlation between the Patronage Act and the 
rise of the disestablishment movement in Scotland: 
[...] the Patronage Act of 1874, which gave the appointment of the 
Established ministers to the people of their communion, was an attempt to bid 
and buy back piecemeal within the walls [of] those who had been ejected 
wholesale. It was resented accordingly; and by means of that Act the 
controversy of Disestablishment, which had been almost wholly asleep 
beyond the Tweed, has been roused to an activity, and forced into a 
prominence, which may make it the leading Scottish question at the next 
general election.18 
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Whether the passage of the Patronage Act led to an increased disestablishment 
movement or the increase in the movement led to the passage of Patronage Act, the 
disestablishment debate was certainly fuelled by its passage. 
The Patronage Act did not pass through Parliament without causing a debate. 
Principal Robert Rainy, the leader of the Free Church of Scotland, delivered a motion 
protesting against the Patronage Act at the General Assembly of 1874:  
The Assembly declared that no Act intended to alter the law of patronage can 
have the effect of removing the ground of separation recorded in the Protest 
read before Her Majesty’s Commissioner on the 18th May 1843. Such 
legislation leaves unreversed all those decisions of the courts of law, 
sustained at the time by all the branches of the legislature, according to which 
it was held competent for civil courts to interfere with sentences and actions 
of the Church belonging to its own ordinary providence and to issue orders 
and prohibitions in the discharge of spiritual functions of all kinds, enforcing 
them by pains and penalties.19  
 
Rainy argued that although the Patronage Act attempted to fix the issue that led to 
the Disruption, it failed to address the real cause of the dispute which was in his 
opinion religious freedom from the State. 
 The Patronage Act also caused a dispute over the exclusion of many members 
of a parish in electing the minister for that parish, as only male members of the 
congregation were given a voice in the matter. This raised an important question: if 
the Church was indeed National, should the minister of the Church be raised by the 
whole population of the parish rather than just the congregation as was done in the 
other Presbyterian churches? It was argued that it was the parish as a whole that had 
to pay for the Church, not just the congregation thus making a good case for parish-
wide voting.20 After the passage of the Patronage Act, both Principal Rainy and Dr. 
John Cairns, the leaders of the Free Church and the United Presbyterians 
respectively, started a campaign to promote religious equality in Scotland which they 
believed could only be achieved through the disestablishment and disendowment of 
the Church of Scotland. Ultimately, the Patronage Act did not eradicate the root of 
the problem that had led to the Disruption.21 
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Gladstone claimed that the disestablishment issue was coming to the forefront 
of Scottish politics after the passage of the Patronage Act and that the issue may be 
resolved at the next general election. This claim was furthered in 1877 by the leader 
of the Liberal party, Lord Hartington who said, ‘When the time comes [...] that 
Scotch opinion shall be fully formed on the subject, the Liberal party in England will 
do its best to give effect to that opinion.22 The Liberal leaders had to pay attention 
and show interest in the wants of the United Presbyterian Church and the Free 
Church of Scotland due to the sectarian split in party politics amongst the differing 
clergymen in Scotland. The following table shows the party affiliations of the 
ministers of the various Scottish Churches.  
 
Table 3.1: Scottish Ministers’ Political Affiliations in the 1868 Election23 
Church Liberal Tory 
Church of Scotland 67 1,221 
Episcopalians 4 78 
Free Church 637 33 
United Presbyterians 407 1 
Other Presbyterians 360 35 
Total 1,475 1,368 
 
The Church of Scotland nearly made up the whole of the voting ministers’ total for 
the Tories while the non-Established Presbyterian ministers largely voted for Liberal 
candidates. Drummond and Bulloch offer a possible result of this: ‘They [the non-
Established Churches] could carry Scotland for the Liberals, so that their demands 
for the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland could not be ignored. Scottish 
Liberal members never formed a parliamentary pressure group like the Irish, but no 
Liberal Prime Minister could forget that they had the potential’.24 Hence, the Liberal 
party had to keep in consideration the non-Established Presbyterian ministers and 
their parishioners. 
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In an attempt to keep the disestablishers content in addition to the remainder 
of the party in the rest of the United Kingdom, both Gladstone and Lord Hartington 
expressed their opinions and, as the Liberal leaders, the opinion of the Liberal party. 
They stressed that it was the Scottish people’s choice to decide when 
disestablishment was to happen in Scotland and the people’s opinion could be 
expressed through electing a majority of Scottish MPs who were in favour of 
disestablishment.25 This rhetoric encouraged both supporters of the Established 
Church and those in favour of disestablishment to prepare for the coming battle at the 
next general election. This battle was further intensified in 1879 when Gladstone 
announced that he had decided to stand for the Scottish county seat in Midlothian in 
what became one of the most well-known parliamentary races in British history. 
 
Midlothian and Gladstone 
 With all of the tension created by the disestablishment movement, 
Gladstone’s decision to contest a Scottish seat in the 1880 general election aroused 
suspicion amongst Church supporters. Even before the acquisition of the faggot votes 
that became so prominent in the history of this race, the disestablishment question 
was already a source of misgivings and controversy regarding Gladstone’s intentions 
in Scotland. The negative attitude toward Gladstone by supporters of an Established 
Church was described in a letter from James Begg, the first minister of the 
Newington Free Church in Edinburgh, to Lord Beaconsfield, the leader of the 
Conservatives. In this letter, Begg, who, although a Free Churchman, still supported 
the principle of an Established Church,26 questioned Gladstone’s motives for 
contesting Midlothian:  
Mr. Gladstone can attack the Scotch Established Church--the second in the 
series--with most success as a representative of a Scotch constituency. To 
have attacked it as one of the representatives of England might have given 
natural offence, even to men otherwise favourable; but representing an 
important Scotch constituency, he acquires at once an apparent right to speak; 
and surrounded by Scotch Members of Parliament who are quietly pledging 
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themselves, doubtless by order, to vote for the abolition of the Scotch Church 
as soon as Mr. Gladstone gives the word of command.27 
 
Begg’s theory on Gladstone’s intentions in Scotland was a reasonable fear for 
Church defenders based on Gladstone’s previous statements about the Church of 
Scotland and his role in the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. However, 
there were alternative reasons for Gladstone’s move into Scottish politics.  
In 1878 Gladstone chose to leave Greenwich where he had been an MP for 
the previous eleven years. Advancing Scottish disestablishment was not a main factor 
in his decision and was likely not even a consideration. Rather, Gladstone decided to 
leave his position in Greenwich for three primary reasons: its large size, the gains 
which had recently been made by the Tories, and the dual-member status of the 
Greenwich constituency. First, Greenwich was a large sized constituency consisting 
of over twenty thousand voters and the aging Gladstone worried that multiple 
speeches delivered to large audiences would have an adverse affect on his health. 
Another concern was the great expense associated with campaigning in such a large 
burgh.28 Second, Tories had been making gains in the constituency having won the 
1873 by-election and polling high against Gladstone himself in 1874. Gladstone 
found himself just 225 votes behind a Conservative in the polls and only 407 votes 
ahead of a second Conservative, thus barely holding on to his seat.29 Finally, 
Gladstone disliked that Greenwich was a double-member constituency fearing that 
rival candidates would break up the Liberal vote in the constituency and lead to Tory 
victories, a fear that was based on the results of the by-election held in 1873 in which 
three Liberals ran for one seat that was handily won by a Conservative.30 
Although it was his ultimate choice, Midlothian was not Gladstone’s only 
option for a new seat in Parliament. The Liberals in Leeds asked him to stand for 
their seat, but Gladstone did not state his intention on whether or not he would accept 
the nomination thus leaving it open in case he failed to obtain a seat in another 
constituency. The Liberals in Leeds went through with the nomination of Gladstone 
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as a candidate in their constituency despite his reluctance. He eventually chose not to 
take the seat in Leeds, although he was victorious in the 1880 election, because it 
resembled Greenwich in its size and double-member status.31 Gladstone instead 
chose to stand for the Midlothian seat in order to counter all three of the situations he 
disliked about his currently held seat in Greenwich. Midlothian had a small rural 
population of around three thousand voters as opposed to the large urban population 
of Greenwich and Leeds. The Liberals in the constituency were prepared to pay for 
all of Gladstone’s expenses associated with the campaign thus eradicating his 
financial concerns. Most importantly, the people of Scotland voted overwhelmingly 
for Liberals--the Midlothian constituency was lost by only 135 votes during the 
previous general election in 1874--thus giving Gladstone a good chance of turning 
the traditionally conservative constituency in order to counter the loss of his Liberal 
seat to the Tories in Greenwich.32 Although Gladstone’s decision to stand for 
Midlothian had nothing to do with the question of Scottish disestablishment, his mere 
presence in Scotland brought even more attention to the already heated debate.  
 
Franchise extension and disestablishment 
 Supporters of disestablishment in Scotland hoped for success during the 1880 
general election campaign. The Liberals gained thirteen seats in the 1880 election 
bringing their total to fifty-three compared to only seven Conservatives, yet no more 
parliamentary support for disestablishment emerged from these Liberal successes in 
Scotland and only four Scottish MPs were firmly committed to disestablishment.33 In 
Edinburgh, the issue of disestablishment occupied only a small amount of the debate 
during the 1880 general election. The newly established Liberal Association in 1880 
managed the disestablishment question very well and was able to maintain a united 
Liberal vote in the general election.  
 In 1880, there were three Liberals nominated to the Association and it 
endorsed two of them. The other candidate stood down after the Association’s 
endorsement to ensure a united Liberal vote. The two candidates that were endorsed 
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by the Liberal Association were sitting MPs Duncan McLaren and James Cowan. 
McLaren was a Radical who favoured disestablishment and Cowan was a moderate 
who had just recently endorsed disestablishment which he had not done during the 
previous election in 1874.34 Although both of the candidates that stood in the election 
were the sitting MPs for Edinburgh, there was some opposition to their nomination 
among the Liberals. During the meeting that the General Committee of the 
Edinburgh United Liberal Association held to nominate candidates to stand for 
Parliament, Cowan was attacked for his recent declaration of support for 
disestablishment. Those who objected to Cowan’s nomination claimed that Liberal 
unity was put into jeopardy by Cowan’s statement and opened the city to Tory 
representation. Although he too supported disestablishment, there were no protests to 
McLaren’s nomination perhaps due to either his status as ‘the member for Scotland’ 
or because Cowan’s reversal on the subject threw off the balance between the Whigs 
and Radicals; therefore, Cowan needed to be replaced by another Whig.35  
 Both men went on to be nominated by the Association, but Cowan was 
repeatedly asked by constituents to clarify his position on the question. In an effort to 
avoid alienating any more voters, Cowan quickly took up the same position on the 
question as the leadership of the party and told the constituents ‘that it was for 
Scotchmen to consider the question of disestablishment and to speak out their minds 
on the subject when they had time to think it over... he would be no party to 
precipitate or bring on the question until the judgment of the country was more ripe 
for it’.36 The pledge to postpone the question was enough to secure his return as the 
question was not a real issue among most of the Liberal Churchmen. One Liberal 
Churchman in Edinburgh claimed that it was more important to keep the Liberal vote 
united than worrying about ‘suburbanite questions’.37 The question of 
disestablishment had not risen to a high enough level at that time to constitute a 
legitimate challenge to the Established Church; therefore, it did not have much 
opposition or support amongst the Edinburgh constituents during the 1880 election. 
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 After the failure to move the question to the forefront in 1880, the hopes of 
the disestablishers were renewed in 1884 with the passage of the Third Reform Act 
and the extension of the franchise. The United Presbyterian Synod’s Committee on 
Disestablishment issued a pamphlet in 1885 which proclaimed, ‘The Country and 
Government are to be congratulated on the peaceable admission of two millions of 
new voters to share the duties of citizenship. The course of legislation on Franchise 
and Redistribution has now practically brought Disestablishment to the front of 
questions calling for speedy settlement.’38 The belief that franchise extension would 
help to bring about the disestablishment and disendowment of the Established 
Church can be understood through the historical perspective, an amplification of the 
demand for disestablishment, or perhaps both. 
 Those in favour of disestablishment could have looked to the past at the First 
and Second Reform Acts and found that the results of these Acts indicated a possible 
positive outcome for their current campaign. Machin observes that after both the 
1832 and the 1867 Reform Acts, ‘the voluntary cause had advanced in the twenty 
years or so after each of these measures’.39 In the case of the latter Act, the 
disestablishment of the Church of Ireland was one of the leading questions put to the 
newly enfranchised and, with Gladstone’s leadership, the Liberal party supported the 
question and saw it brought through, ultimately resulting in the disestablishment of 
the Church of Ireland. Then, almost twenty years later, the newly enfranchised in 
Scotland had a new disestablishment question being put to them and the Liberal party 
was once again being led by Gladstone.  
 Another idea that led some to believe that the franchise extension would bring 
a settlement to the disestablishment question in Scotland was that it could clearly be 
shown that a majority of the Scottish people favoured the disestablishment. The 
Liberal leaders’ prerequisite for taking up the question in Parliament was the support 
of the majority of the people. The franchise extension brought the number of voters 
in Scotland to over five hundred thousand, nearly twice the number of voters in the 
1880 election. With this fact in hand, the Liberal leaders could not deny the 
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legitimacy of the electorate’s desire on the subject should the voting show support 
for the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland.  
 
Disestablishment in 1885 
In Edinburgh, as in the rest of Scotland, the disestablishment question 
occupied a significant amount of debate during the 1885 campaign. This contrast to 
the 1880 general election is largely due to the elevation of the question and to the 
division of the city into four parliamentary districts. The candidates’ stances on the 
issue were divided along the lines of political ideology. Of the candidates in 
Edinburgh, both the Conservatives and the two Whigs favoured keeping the Church 
of Scotland an institution of the State while the remaining six Liberal candidates 
favoured disestablishment. The two Whig candidates, Sir George Harrison in the 
South district and George Goschen in the East, were both victorious over their rival 
Radical opponents, Thomas Raleigh and B. F. C. Costello, respectively. The other 
two candidates favouring continued establishment were the Conservatives, George 
Jamieson in the West and Major Napier in the Central district. Both lost to advanced 
Liberals who leaned closer to the Radical wing than to the Whigs and thus favoured 
disestablishment. Based on these outcomes, it remains to be seen whether or not the 
Liberal population of Edinburgh was split on the Church question. The breakdown of 
the four districts provides for two distinct types of races in the city pertaining to the 
question of disestablishment. As already noted, the races in both the South and East 
were between Whigs and Radicals while the races in the West and Central were 
between Liberals and Conservatives. The two scenarios both had candidates pushing 
the disestablishment question and they both encouraged crossover voting in which a 
member of one political party votes for a candidate of another. In the West and 
Central districts, if a Liberal Churchmen did not want to support a disestablishment 
candidate he had to vote for a Conservative or not vote at all. Conversely, in the 
South and East races Tories had to vote for a Liberal if he wished to vote at all. 
The Conservatives’ strategy in the districts where they were running was to 
push the question of disestablishment to the forefront in hopes of dividing the 
Liberals who were split in their support on the issue. If they were successful in 
garnering the support of the Liberal Churchmen coupled with the support of the 
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Tories, the Conservatives knew that they had a good chance of winning. Both 
Conservative candidates made outrageous claims in order to drive a wedge within the 
Liberal party. Jamieson paid his opponent, Buchanan, many compliments in regards 
to his character and ability to represent the people; however, Jamieson asserted that 
‘Buchanan came forward unquestionably as the assailant of the national Church’. 
Although not a member of the Church of Scotland, Jamieson vowed to oppose any 
measure that came up advocating disestablishment.40 Major Napier claimed that the 
only difference between himself and his Radical opponents was their stances on the 
disestablishment of the Church of Scotland.41 Major Napier asserted, ‘There is only 
one line to be drawn, and that is between religion and atheism’.42 His Liberal 
opponents were certainty not advocating atheism; they were campaigning only for a 
separation of Church and State. 
In the West district, the vote of the Liberal Churchmen was a concern to the 
Liberal candidate, Buchanan, who had been an MP for Edinburgh since 1881. 
Although Buchanan was not a Radical, he favoured the separation of Church and 
State, but he did not want the disestablishment question to become a major issue in 
the race. However, he said that if a vote on the subject came before him in 
Parliament, he would vote in favour of disestablishment. Buchanan countered this by 
saying that he would not back any attempts to bring the question forward and he 
further indicated that he believed that the majority of the country was not ready for it 
therefore the subject would not come about. He was worried about losing votes over 
the disestablishment question and feared that Churchmen might abstain from voting 
altogether or that they might back Jamieson, his Conservative opponent, just because 
he favoured the continuation of the Established Church. In an attempt to prevent this 
from happening, Buchanan informed his potential electors, ‘In other constituencies 
there were candidates who were in favour of the Established Church-(cheers)-and 
those Liberal electors who took the other view were willing to waive their opinions 
on that subject in order to maintain the unity of the Liberal cause. (Cheers) He 
thought he might fairly appeal to Liberal Churchmen that there should be some 
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reciprocity shown’.43 Buchanan clearly wanted to separate the Church question from 
the election and instead focus the attention on other issues. 
In the Central district, the race was between three Liberals and one 
Conservative; however, the fear that Liberal Churchmen would support the 
Conservative because of the disestablishment issue does not appear to have been a 
factor amongst the rival Liberal candidates. Two of the Liberal candidates, J. Hall 
Renton and John Wilson, explained the principle of their stance in favour of 
disestablishment while the other, Adam Black, tried to push the question forward. 
Renton and Wilson were both Voluntaries and believed that Church and State should 
be separated from one another. They both made strong claims to the constituents that 
disestablishment was not only for the benefit of the State, but it was also 
advantageous for the Church. Commenting on this, Renton said, ‘It was not to them 
[the Church of Scotland] as Churches that he objected but to the connection between 
Church and State...  The Church of Scotland would do more good were it freed from 
the trammels of the State’.44 Wilson made a similar claim that the Christian Church 
was founded with the intention of individuals maintaining it rather than the State and 
that both civil freedom and the State suffered when a State religion was established.45 
Both Wilson and Renton wanted the Church of Scotland to keep all of the funds that 
rightfully belonged to the Church. Wilson took this even further with his desire for 
the Church of Scotland to be able to use all of the buildings and churches that they 
currently held, though if they wanted to use them in a different manner than their 
current use it would be up to the discretion of the local authorities.46  
Adam Black was the most radical of the three Liberal candidates in the 
Central district and he tried to elevate the disestablishment question in order to 
separate himself from Renton and Wilson. He criticised both Renton and Wilson 
because they claimed to be for religious equality, but refused to make 
disestablishment a test question. Black said that if they were waiting for the new 
Government to take a position on it, they must be content with or without 
disestablishment. He went on to say, ‘…Religion should be free and unfiltered, that 
all men in respect of their beliefs should be equal in the sight of the law as they were 
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before God’.47  The Liberals in this race were not concerned with the possibility of 
losing the support of the Liberal Churchmen over the disestablishment issue. If they 
would have been worried, they could have either dropped out of the race in order to 
unify the disestablishment vote around one candidate or they could have at least tried 
to ease the Liberal Churchman’s concerns about disestablishment enabling them to 
vote for a disestablishment candidate, as Buchanan did in the West. 
In the double candidature races in the South and East, which were both 
between only two rival Liberals, it was the Radicals who pushed the disestablishment 
question. In the South, Raleigh attacked Harrison for what he deemed a lack of 
commitment to religious equality for his refusal to support disestablishment. He told 
the constituents that Harrison claimed to be a moderate Liberal but his position on 
the Church question was reason enough to oppose him. Raleigh further 
acknowledged that some people believed that by bringing up the question of 
disestablishment, he was causing a split within the Liberal party, but he felt that it 
was necessary to bring the question to a close. He believed that if the question was 
not dealt with, it would fester and cause greater damage to the party and that 
disestablishment and disendowment was the only solution that would enable the 
Presbyterian Churches to reunite.48 
In the East, the supporters of the Radical candidate, Costelloe, were so eager 
to push the question forward that they projected it onto the national stage as a result 
of Goschen’s refusal to state his opinion on the question. Goschen notified his 
potential constituents that he would not pledge himself to any question before the 
leader of the Liberal party made his opinion on the subject clear.49 Upon hearing 
Goschen’s statement, Principal Rainy, Duncan McLaren, Jr., Professor Calderwood, 
and James Steel, among others, wrote to Gladstone, the leader of the Liberal party, to 
ascertain his opinion on the subject of the disestablishment of the Church of 
Scotland. Gladstone replied in a letter published in The Scotsman: 
I am reluctant to appear as a critic upon anything that has been said by my old 
friend and colleague, Mr. Goschen. Leaving, however, to every reader of my 
address his liberty of interpretation, I may observe that since I came to Mid-
Lothian in 1879 I have endeavoured constantly to leave the question of 
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Disestablishment in Scotland to be dealt with as a Scottish question by the 
Scottish public, and it is not for me, without presumption, either to force it 
forward or to hold it back.50 
 
Costelloe declared, clearly in reference to Goschen, that every representative for a 
Scottish seat should be required to say whether or not he was in favour of 
disestablishment.51 Costelloe expressed his own stance on the Established Church:  
It was not by reason of their sins or shortcomings that any one objected to 
them. (Hear, hear.) It was because their existence was itself incompatible with 
the principles of a free State. (Loud cheers, and a voice, “Three cheers for the 
Auld Kirk,” and laughter.) The creeds of all men must be equal before the 
State, because the men themselves were equal. The State that endeavoured to 
interfere was infringing the first rights of citizenship, and more than that, it 
was producing a state of things in which jealousy and bitterness would 
necessarily be engendered, and a state of things introduced which would be 
most disastrous to religion.52 
 
Both Harrison and Goschen took a similar position to Buchanan on the Church 
question.53 Unlike Buchanan, they were not in favour of disestablishment, but they 
did want to keep the question out of the campaign as much as they could.  
It is interesting to note that in the races between two Liberals, the Radicals 
wanted to make the Whig candidates appear to be holding the party back in hopes of 
gaining the support of the more moderate Liberal Churchmen. Conversely, in the 
other two races the Radicals wanted to appear more moderate, with the exception of 
Black, and it was the Conservatives that tried to push the disestablishment question 
hoping to make the Radicals seem too extreme. In both cases, the candidates that 
were pushing the question were attempting to secure the vote of the Liberal 
Churchmen. Both the Radicals and the Conservatives were targeting the same type of 
voter, but the Radicals were using it as rallying call pushing liberalism forward while 
the Conservatives were using it as a scare tactic. 
As for the crossover voting in both of the races containing Tories, a Liberal 
candidate won indicating that the Tory strategy of gaining the votes of Liberal 
Churchmen had failed. They may have succeeded in gaining the support of some of 
the Liberal Churchmen, but based on the outcome of the election it is unlikely that 
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either Conservative candidate received much support from them. As a result, the 
city’s political makeup was not affected by any crossover voting in these races.  
In the contests that contained only rival Liberals, the political crossover 
voting would not have affected the Liberal party’s numbers because a Liberal had to 
win, but it would alter the view of the city and mask the true feeling of the Liberal 
constituents. The scenario of Tories backing Whig candidates was not uncommon in 
Edinburgh politics. After the Conservatives lost their power in the city due to the 
passage of the First Reform Act in 1832, they became an important factor in 
determining the outcome of the election of Liberals, often supporting one candidate 
with the goal of defeating another instead of electing the one they voted for, as in the 
election of 1852 which was discussed in chapter two.54 In the 1885 election, being 
the first held since the Third Reform Act and having a split Liberal vote in these two 
districts, it seems unusual that they willingly gave up the opportunity to run a 
candidate of their own. 
The North British Daily Mail, a Radical-leaning Glasgow newspaper owned 
by Dr. Cameron, an MP for Glasgow who vigorously campaigned for 
disestablishment, claimed that both Harrison and Goschen, along with two other 
Whigs running in Scotland, were in an alliance with the Tories.55 This provides a 
possible explanation of the lack of Tory candidates in the two districts. Of course, 
there were several districts in Scotland where the Conservatives chose not to run a 
candidate. Raleigh later wrote of his 1885 election campaign against Harrison in the 
South district, ‘The Conservatives, who numbered about 1,500 in the Division, were 
to decide the result. If they had put forward a candidate I should have probably won. 
But they finally decided to vote for Sir George’.56 Raleigh lost by 1,399 votes which, 
if his statements were true, would have made a very close election. Just two months 
after the race in January 1886, there was a by-election in this district in which the 
race was between a Liberal and a Conservative. The Conservative received 1,730 
votes which is more than enough to have cost Raleigh the election if these 
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Conservative voters had supported Harrison’s candidature during the 1885 election.57 
This is likely what happened in the race between Harrison and Raleigh which, if so, 
points to the majority of the Liberals in the South either supporting or not being 
concerned with disestablishment.  
In the race between Costelloe and Goschen in the East, it is also conceivable 
that the Conservatives that voted supported the candidature of Goschen. However, 
unlike in the South, their vote did not have an impact on the outcome of the election. 
There were no Conservatives to stand for this district at anytime close to the 1885 
election making it difficult to determine how many Conservative constituents there 
were, but it is extremely unlikely that they would have numbered much more than 
1,500 let alone 2,400 which is the amount Goschen won by. Therefore, the outcome 
of the election would have likely been the same even without the support of Tories. 
Even though crossover voting was the main strategy of the Tories in Edinburgh it 
only affected one of the parliamentary races and it was one in which the victor was 
not even a Tory. By the end of the election campaign most of the Liberal candidates 
in Edinburgh altered their stance on disestablishment or at least their tone on the 




It is necessary to look to Gladstone’s stance on the issue of disestablishment 
in order to understand the final role that disestablishment played in the election. 
Although he was vocal about disestablishment prior to his arrival in Midlothian, he 
chose to remain distant on the subject until relatively late in the 1885 campaign. 
According to Hutchison, Gladstone ‘disliked the rival candidatures cropping up in 
Scotland, and also found the plan of disestablishment being peddled “outrageous”‘.58 
Kellas points to the fact that Gladstone became aware of a poll taken in Midlothian in 
which sixty-four per cent of those polled were opposed to disestablishment.59 Hamer 
highlights Gladstone’s concerns with the English Churchmen’s vote if the Scottish 
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question was left in play.60 Instead of one of these being the defining reason for 
Gladstone’s choice to make a stand on the question, it’s more likely that all of these 
reasons contributed to his final decision. 
Another aspect that influenced Gladstone’s decision on disestablishment 
came from Edinburgh. Gladstone was given advice by Lord Rosebery, Gladstone’s 
close associate and adviser in Midlothian, who counselled him on the necessity of 
settling the question in order to maintain the unity of the party.61 Rosebery was 
concerned about alienating Liberal Churchmen in Scotland over what might be 
construed as support for disestablishment. He warned against proceeding down the 
current path of making disestablishment a test question in the coming election in a 
letter written to The Times in late 1885:  
I do not believe that the country is ripe for it, while I suspect the main result 
of raising it will be to further conservative prospects in the coming elections. 
If the people of Scotland wish for disestablishment, nothing can prevent its 
becoming a test question; if the people of Scotland do not wish for it, nothing 
can make it one.62 
 
However, Rosebery’s concerns go beyond maintaining the unity of the party. He was 
also concerned with the possibility of losing the votes of the Liberal Churchmen to 
Conservatives, much like Gladstone’s concern in England.  
Rosebery wrote to Gladstone on 6 November and advised him that ‘Buchanan 
can hardly be saved without some authoritative declaration that the church question 
is not within the scope of the next parliament’.63 In the West district the Liberal vote 
was not in jeopardy of being split among rival Liberals which could have, in turn, led 
to a Conservative victory; instead, the Liberal candidate was in danger of losing the 
election outright to the Conservative over the issue of disestablishment. The concern 
that Liberals could lose to Conservatives in a straight race due to losing the Liberal 
Churchmen’s vote was propelled by Chamberlain’s letter to a constituent in 
Edinburgh named Taylor Innes. In this letter Chamberlain put forth the notion that 
the country’s opinion on the Church question was to be measured by the stance held 
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by the elected MPs. Chamberlain wrote, ‘my belief, confirmed as they have been by 
the experience of my recent visit, are that such an expression of opinion will be 
obtained as will justify the leaders of the Liberal party in giving the question of 
disestablishment a prominent place in any future programme’.64 With this statement, 
he indicated his approval of making disestablishment a test question and thus caused 
a stir amongst the Church Liberals, including some constituents in Edinburgh. 
Chamberlain’s letter also aroused the concern of Gladstone who wrote to 
Chamberlain, ‘We are in danger I think of getting into a false position’. Gladstone 
expressed his concern of disestablishment being turned into a test question in 
England if it was made one in Scotland.65 
The concern of the Church Liberals in Edinburgh was whether their vote for a 
candidate that supported disestablishment would be considered as support for 
disestablishment itself. Taylor Mackintosh, a West Edinburgh constituent, informed 
Rosebery that, before Chamberlain’s letter, he had no problem voting for Buchannan, 
who supported disestablishment, because he understood that the question was to be 
postponed, but now he feared that his vote would be taken as a vote in support of 
disestablishment:  
The result of course would be that a large body (I believe the majority) of 
Scotch Liberals would be put, altogether against their will, to choose between 
their party and the Church. There would be a consequent disruption of the 
party more or less serious, but in the end Disestablishment would probably be 
carried by unwilling votes, and all because at the now impending Election, I 
and others vote for Disestablishment Candidates and thereby misrepresent in 
Parliament and to the Liberal Leaders the true state of public opinion upon 
the question.66 
 
Mackintosh’s letter obviously influenced Rosebery, who in turn wrote his letter to 
Gladstone to express his concern about the situation. 
 Buchanan was also concerned with the potential loss of votes over the 
question and believed that votes for him would be misrepresented if they were seen 
as a sign of support for disestablishment. His reasoning was that many candidates 
had pledged that they would not vote on the matter at all during the next Parliament. 
He himself had promised not to support any attempt to bring the question before 
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Parliament, although he was clear that that he would vote for it if it was brought 
forward. In a letter to Gladstone, he concluded that ‘In no sense therefore could a 
vote on that or a similar Resolution be considered as giving a mandate to the 
Government in the name of the Scottish people to take up such an important question 
for immediate practical settlement’.67 Buchanan was in a tough situation regarding 
the disestablishment question. He felt compelled to support disestablishment and he 
believed that the majority of the Liberals in his constituency supported the question 
as well, but he was very concerned that their vote alone might not be enough to 
overcome a combined vote of Liberal Churchmen and Conservative. For this reason, 
he wanted Gladstone to take a stand and make it clear that a vote for him would not 
be taken as a vote for disestablishment.68 
The concerns of Rosebery may have had the greatest impact upon 
Gladstone’s decision regarding the question because his advice was ultimately 
adopted by Gladstone. Rosebery clearly stated to Gladstone the goal he needed to 
achieve in order to calm the situation: 
What is wanted, in time is this: to make every church Liberal understand that 
in voting for a Liberal candidate he is in no way voting or expressing an 
opinion on the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland.69 
 
It was Gladstone’s task to make the Liberal Churchman comfortable with voting for 
Liberal candidates like Buchanan. Gladstone wasted no time in accomplishing this 
and five days later chose Scotland’s capital as the place to proclaim to the country 
that very message delivered to him by Rosebery. 
On 11 November 1885, in the Free Church Assembly Hall, Gladstone 
delivered his speech on the disestablishment question. Gladstone’s choice of 
Edinburgh as the place to make his stance on the subject heard certainly had a greater 
affect on both the constituents and candidates of Edinburgh than if it had been made 
in London. The audience was to be made up of his constituents in Midlothian, but 
also among the people present were at least four of the Liberal candidates for 
Edinburgh districts: Buchanan, Goschen, Costelloe, and Harrison.70 Through the 
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course of his speech, Gladstone made his position on the Church question clear: he 
did not want the disestablishment issue to become a test question. He believed that it 
was in the best interest of all involved to make ‘a state of things in which every 
Liberal Churchman, being a voter shall feel that in voting for a Liberal candidate he 
is in no way voting for or giving an opinion upon the disestablishment of the Church 
of Scotland, though that Liberal candidate may himself be favourable to 
disestablishment’. Gladstone then tried to end the debate about disestablishment 
during the election by saying ‘absolutely that there cannot be any legislation on the 
Scottish Establishment in the coming Parliament’. He then goes on to give hope to 
the disestablishers by leaving the opportunity in the future open to the question.71 
Charles Cooper, the editor of The Scotsman, wrote to Lord Rosebery, ‘The 
disestablishers are heartbroken’. Of the Churchmen, Cooper informed Rosebery, 
‘One of them told me that he thought the speech a complete victory for the 
Church’.72 The success Gladstone made in lessening the concerns of the Liberal 
Churchmen over disestablishment was echoed by Holmes Ivory, an election agent of 
Gladstone, who did, however, also indicate that the speech might cause a diverse 
reaction among the Radicals within the Liberal party: 
Mr Gs speech has entirely satisfied the Church party. The moderate liberals, I 
mean those who wish for reunion and have not the disestablishment question 
in the brain are entirely satisfied. On the other hand a certain strain has been 
put on the non conformists in Scotland which would have been greatly 
lessened if Mr G had paid them some compliments such as saying that they 
have been the back bone of the Liberal Party and that their time would 
probably come if they had patience.73 
 
The overall affect of Gladstone’s speech on the Liberal party and on the 
disestablishment question is debated by historians. Drummond and Bulloch, as well 
as Hutchison, view Gladstone’s involvement as one of the main reasons behind the 
continued unity of the Liberal party during the 1885 election despite the differences 
between the Whigs and Radicals on the disestablishment question.74 Kellas provides 
an alternate view that it was due to the strength of Liberalism that allowed for the 
Liberal victory despite the dispute over disestablishment which he claimed that  
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‘Gladstone failed to prevent’.75 What can be determined is that the speech was 
interpreted as either in favour of or against disestablishment as Gladstone took no 
direct side of the argument, arguing instead only that it should not be made into a test 
question in the 1885 election, and thus the opinions of the constituents on 
disestablishment should not based on the views held by their elected MP. As a result, 
Gladstone’s speech enabled the prolongation of the disestablishment question and 
eased the tension during the 1885 campaign between the supporters of the Church 
and the disestablishers. One Edinburgh constituent wrote to The Scotsman after 
hearing Gladstone’s appeal that he as a Liberal Churchman was going to vote for 
Buchannan, but Buchanan was to understand ‘that he is supported by the votes of 
many Liberals who like myself are entirely opposed to his views on the church 
question, and that he is therefore not to say that his constituency is in favour of 
disestablishment’.76 Gladstone’s speech had already affected the election in 
Edinburgh. 
 The importance the Liberals in Scotland placed on Gladstone’s opinion 
regarding the disestablishment question is demonstrated by the official response of 
the Scottish Disestablishment Association, a group that desired disestablishment 
more than any other in Scotland, on the day following his speech: ‘…this declaration 
of Mr. Gladstone’s views plainly creates a crisis in the advancing history of the 
question… Mr Gladstone’s refusal to lead cannot relieve us from the obligation to do 
justice to our own convictions’.77 The group goes on to urge the people to vote for 
disestablishment candidates when possible and only those who have pledged 
themselves to vote for disestablishment in Parliament.78 On the other hand, the 
Scottish Disestablishment Association contradicts its own statement by reaffirming 
their ‘admiration for Mr. Gladstone’ as well as their ‘readiness to follow him as a 
leader of the Liberal Party’.79 The official response from the Scottish 
Disestablishment Association shows its unwillingness, if not fearfulness, of being in 
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an outright conflict with Gladstone. The group tried to gloss over the fact that 
Gladstone called for the disestablishment movement to be set aside without being 
overtly against him. 
Gladstone’s speech influenced several Edinburgh candidates’ stances on 
disestablishment. Both of the Conservative candidates tried harder to make 
disestablishment a test question by placing doubt on the suspension of the question 
from the Liberal programme. Most of the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh tried to 
downplay the subject as Gladstone had asked them to do. This was beneficial to the 
two Whig candidates, Goschen and Harrison, because they were able to fight their 
opponents’ attacks by simply pointing to the fact that Gladstone called for the 
question to be put aside. The exceptions to this were two of the three Radicals, Black 
and Raleigh, who wanted to keep the question alive. 
A good example of the Whigs using of Gladstone’s speech as a political 
means is Bailie Russell’s introduction of Sir George Harrison to a crowd of 
constituents at a speech: 
Every word that Mr. Gladstone said in his great speech the other night was 
just what Sir George had been saying for some time past. There might be 
some among them who did not think that Mr. Gladstone was a good enough 
Liberal for them, but for many of them, he was sure, he was quite good 
enough—( hear, hear)-and the candidate who was in complete accord with the 
ex-Premier could not be too little of a Liberal to suit the Edinburgh people.80 
 
Russell argued that since Harrison’s view of the Church question was in line with 
Gladstone’s, that alone should have qualified him for the constituents’ vote over 
Raleigh who had a different view on the question. 
In the West, Buchanan, who received what he wanted from Gladstone’s 
speech, reasserted to his constituents that, while he was in favour of 
disestablishment, he had always stated that he would not force the question in 
Parliament and he noted that Gladstone asked the electors not to make 
disestablishment a test question, a position he had also been advocating. His 
opponent, Jamieson, called attention to the fact that Gladstone had said the same 
thing about the Irish Church in 1868, but then once ‘he became Prime Minister... he 
moved a resolution in favour of the disestablishment of the Irish Church’ which 
                                                      
80 The Scotsman, 14 Nov. 1885, 6. 
 107 
brought up a question as to whether or not Gladstone would do the same regarding 
the Church of Scotland.81  
Raleigh insisted that Gladstone was mainly thinking of the Liberals in 
England when he gave his speech in Edinburgh. He said to his constituents that ‘if 
they believed in Disestablishment as a principle, the duty lay upon them more than 
ever frankly to state so, and do what they could to educate the public mind in what 
they believed was the solution of this question’.82 However, Charles Cooper wrote to 
Lord Rosebery that Professor Calderwood, a Radical who had convinced his former 
student, Raleigh, to run in Edinburgh, ‘at a meeting of Raleigh’s tonight, announced 
that he loyally accepted Mr Gs lectures’.83 Writing on the subject in 1921, Raleigh 
recalled: 
In 1885 a general election was expected in November, and the advocates of 
disestablishment had fixed their hopes on Mr. Gladstone; it was expected that 
he would either give the question a place in his programme, or put forward 
some new plan of reunion and reconstruction. But Mr. Gladstone was close 
on seventy-six, and in Church matters had never been in complete sympathy 
with his supporters in Scotland; he never quite understood how a religious 
nation could be so generally indifferent to what he thought most important in 
Church life. In his first speech to the electors of Midlothian, which was 
delivered in Assembly Hall of the Free Church, he played with the question 
of disestablishment, and said nothing of the merits. It was evident that his 
duty to the Liberal party would not permit him to run the risk involved in an 
attack on the most powerful and popular of the Presbyterian Churches.84 
 
Raleigh still saw the position taken by Gladstone as one for the party, and not a 
personal view of the question. The reasoning that Raleigh assigned to Gladstone’s 
actions on the questioned altered from an English concern to a Scottish one. 
 In the Central district, both Black and Major Napier pushed forward the 
question of disestablishment. Black, like Raleigh, believed that Gladstone removed 
disestablishment of the Church of Scotland from the Liberal programme in order to 
save the Liberal party from losses in England. He asserted, ‘The Church of Scotland 
owes some gratitude to the larger sister establishment for obliging him to do so’ 
indicating that he still believed that the disestablishment question was ripe and 
                                                      
81 The Scotsman, 13 Nov. 1885, 6. 
82 The Scotsman, 12 Nov. 1885, 6. 
83 NLS, Rosebery Papers, MS. 10011, f. 128, Charles Cooper to Lord Rosebery, 11 Nov. 1885. 
84 Raleigh, Annals of the Church in Scotland, 327–8. 
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favoured in Scotland.85 Black also expressed his opinion that Gladstone was not 
personally against disestablishment although he feared losing the English Liberals 
who were opposed to Scottish disestablishment because they feared that the Church 
of England would face pressure if the Church of Scotland was disestablished. Black 
refers to the continuation of the disestablishment fight, noting that ‘the game had not 
been played out; it had only been discontinued’.86 Major Napier, addressing a crowd 
of electors, declared, ‘If they wished to retain the Church they would discard those 
candidates who had laid themselves under an obligation to vote for disestablishment’. 
He then told the electors that they should cast their vote for someone ‘who would 
support the Church through thick and thin’.87 He still hoped to wedge the 
disestablishment question between himself and the Liberals. 
The other two Liberals in the Central division, Renton and Wilson, made an 
attempt to drop the disestablishment question from the race. Renton said, ‘He had all 
his life been a believer... that there ought to be no connection between Church and 
State.’ He did not favour the abolition of either the Church of England or the Church 
of Scotland and believed that ‘if these Churches were disconnected from the State 
they would be better able to carry on their work. At the same time, he quite 
sympathised with Mr. Gladstone... and saw no possibility of carrying it 
[disestablishment] into effect’.88 Wilson assured Liberals that he would support the 
Liberal party and since Gladstone came out against disestablishment he would not 
push it forward.89 Both Renton and Wilson thus supported disestablishment, but for 
Gladstone and the Liberal party they put the question aside in support of the request 
by Gladstone. Although they did follow Gladstone’s call for setting aside 
disestablishment, neither of them supported Gladstone’s plea for local unity by 
abdicating the race in order to display Liberal unity in Edinburgh.   
 
Results of the disestablishment question 
The result of Gladstone’s success in marginalising the disestablishment 
question is vague when examining the voting results of the 1885 election in 
                                                      
85 The Scotsman, 20 Nov. 1885, 5. 
86 The Scotsman, 20 Nov. 1885, 5. 
87 The Scotsman, 12 Nov. 1885, 6. 
88 The Scotsman, 14 Nov. 1885, 6. 
89 The Scotsman, 13 Nov. 1885, 6. 
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Edinburgh in relation to the candidates’ final positions on the question as 
Churchmen, advanced, or Radicals.  
 
Table 3.2: Candidates by Votes and Views on Disestablishment90 
Candidates Churchmen Advanced Radicals 
Black   770 
Buchanan  3,800  
Costelloe   1,929 
Goschen 4,337   
Harrison 4,273   
Jamieson 2,625   
Napier 1,606   
Raleigh   2,874 
Renton  1,683  
Wilson  2,930  
Total 12,841 8,413 5,573 
 
The combined total vote for the advanced candidates and the Radicals, who both 
supported disestablishment, was 13,986 which is only 1,145 votes more than the 
Churchmen received. This seems to suggest a city that was very divided on the 
subject of disestablishment. However, as previously mentioned, the outcome of the 
election was that the city’s seats were equally divided with two pro-disestablishment 
Members and two pro-Church Members. The contests where the Church Liberals 
were victorious lacked Conservative candidates and in the races where 
disestablishers won there was a lack of Liberal Churchmen. Even though three of the 
contests had multiple Liberal candidates, none of them were lost to Conservatives 
which demonstrates the Liberal strength and Gladstone’s success in keeping the party 
together in Edinburgh. 
A final overview of the disestablishment question in Edinburgh during the 
1885 election shows that in the races in both the Central and West districts, the 
Conservatives lost to Liberals who favoured disestablishment indicating one of two 
things: either the Conservatives’ tactics of trying to gain the support of the Liberal 
Churchmen succeeded, but there were not many Liberal Churchmen in either of their 
                                                      
90 The number of votes was taken from Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 
497–500. The candidates’ affiliation as Churchmen, Advanced, or Radicals was determined by the 
stance they took on the Church question during the 1885 election. 
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districts to convert, or the Liberal Churchmen who were targeted in these districts 
voted with their party rather than for the Church as Gladstone had hoped to achieve 
through his speech. If the former were true, one could assume that the Radicals, who 
would have greatly outnumbered the Churchmen in the district, would have voted for 
Black who was pushing the disestablishment issue much more than his Liberal 
opponents. Black, however, only accumulated 770 votes, the lowest of all of the 
candidates in Edinburgh and the victor with 2,930 votes was Wilson, an independent 
Liberal and the least vocal on the subject of disestablishment in the Central district. 
Therefore, it is more likely that the latter is accurate with Liberal Churchmen voting 
for Liberal candidates despite their stance on the Church question. 
The results in the East and South counter those of the Central and West and 
thus demonstrate the divide in Edinburgh regarding the disestablishment of the 
Church of Scotland. In these contests both of the Whigs favoured the preservation of 
the Church and were victorious over their Radical opponents who openly 
campaigned for disestablishment. This could indicate either that the Liberal voters in 
the East and South favoured the Churchmen, or that the Tories in both districts, who 
decided to forego running a candidate of their own, opted to support the two Whigs 
thus skewing the Liberal vote. The Churchmen in the West and Central districts did 
not have the option of voting for a Liberal candidate who opposed disestablishment 
making it difficult to have a clear understanding of the desires of the city’s Liberal 
voters. The exclusion of Liberal candidates who supported the Church in these 
districts suggests that the question was not the main issue among the Liberals in 
Edinburgh. If the disestablishment issue had been at the forefront of the Liberal 
Churchmen’s minds, it is conceivable that they would have run independent Liberals 
who were in favour of the preservation of the Church of Scotland or that they would 
have supported the Conservative candidates which would likely have resulted in their 
election over the pro-disestablishment Liberals. Given this, it appears that the 
disestablishment question was likely not the most important aspect of the election in 
Edinburgh. However, through the correspondence of candidates and others and the 
prominence generated in print media and pamphlets the Church question was an 












Political Traditions and Other Influences on the 1885 Election 
 
 As stated in the previous chapter, historians of the 1885 general election in 
Scotland have often focussed their attention on debate regarding the disestablishment 
and disendowment of the Church of Scotland. They cite the Church question as the 
cause of the Liberal split and as the reason for a constituent to vote for or against a 
candidate.1 More recently, however, historians have pointed to other reasons and 
other issues that may have affected the outcome of the election. In Catriona Burness’ 
study of Glasgow, she points to the St. Rollox district, where the candidates had 
opposing views on the Church question. The winning candidate was supported by the 
Land League, which propelled him to the head of the poll.2 On the contrary, Catriona 
Macdonald indicates in her study of Paisley politics that it was neither 
disestablishment nor any national questions that ultimately decided the race. Both 
candidates in this race held the same views on disestablishment, land, education, and 
licensing questions. Macdonald concludes that the choice of the Liberal candidate 
was decided upon by local politics.3 This leads to the question of whether 
disestablishment was the only source of political discussion in Edinburgh or whether 
other issues, either national or local, might have played an important part in the 
election. In order to answer this question, one should examine the political stances of 
                                                      
1 Alan Simon, ‘Church disestablishment’, 792–3; Savage, ‘Scottish politics’, 118–29; Kellas, ‘The 
Liberal party and the Scottish Church disestablishment crisis’, 36; Kellas, ‘The Liberal party in 
Scotland’, 9; McCaffrey, ‘The origins of Liberal Unionism’, 48–55; Hutchison, A Political History, 
154–62; Fry, Patronage and Principle, 95. 
2 Burness, Strange Associations, 37. 
3 Macdonald, The Radical Thread, 81–2. 
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the candidates on the other leading questions in Edinburgh to determine if any of the 
other questions commanded equal or even larger importance than the question of 
disestablishment. 
While disestablishment was the central issue nationally in Scotland during the 
general election of 1885, it was also the main conflict within the Liberal party, 
particularly regarding the selection of Liberal candidates. The results of the 1885 
election (discussed in the previous chapter) suggest that the four parliamentary 
districts in Edinburgh were split rather evenly on the Church question indicating that 
there may have been other issues that played a role in the election results in addition 
to disestablishment. This conclusion does not mean that the Church question should 
be disregarded altogether, but rather leaves room to further examine the local 
political campaign in its full complexity thus revealing other issues that may have 
affected the outcome of the election. In the post-double-member constituencies of 
Edinburgh, it is difficult to view the city as a whole with regard to parliamentary 
politics because it was actually four individual districts; however, when examining 
the four districts together, similar themes can be found throughout the city involving 
national issues, local issues, personalities and traditions. Comparing the candidates’ 
election literature and election speeches will help to determine the issues that were 
important to the constituents and what the candidates thought would help secure their 
votes. Also, in examining the backgrounds of the candidates as well as the way they 
tried to appeal to the constituents, one may find other commonalities which could 
have played a role in the election. 
 
Issues brought up during the election 
Several questions were prominent in the Edinburgh election of 1885: 
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland (discussed in detail in 
the previous chapter), licensing and local veto, and free education. There were 
certainly other issues that were discussed throughout the campaign, but these three 
questions have been singled out because they were frequently addressed by both the 
candidates and the constituents. Candidates had to endure questions about such issues 
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from election crowds if they wished to claim a legitimate right to represent the 
constituency.4 
 
Table 4.1: Candidates’ Stances on Important Issues5 
Candidate Licensing Education Disestablishment 
Buchanan favoured favoured favoured 
Goschen opposed opposed opposed 
Harrison opposed favoured* opposed 
Wilson opposed favoured favoured 
Black opposed favoured favoured 
Costelloe favoured favoured favoured 
Jamieson opposed opposed opposed 
Napier opposed opposed opposed 
Raleigh favoured favoured favoured 
Renton favoured favoured favoured 
 
The table above details each of the candidates running in Edinburgh in 1885 and their 
various stances on important issues of the election. 
 
Licensing reform 
Reforming the way that licenses to sell alcohol were granted was an 
important issue during the 1885 general election in Edinburgh and the question was 
discussed by both candidates and constituents in each of the four new districts. The 
licensing question was a fairly unique issue as it was pushed by a powerful pressure 
group made up of a vast network of temperance organisations.6 During the late-
Victorian period, pressure groups often dictated the policies that were taken up by 
Parliament by pressuring politicians to support their causes.7 One historian defines 
pressure groups as groups made up of voluntary members which ‘seek to coerce 
others: first, the politicians from whom they extract legislation; and then the general 
public who are expected to obey it’.8 The most prominent of these pressure groups 
                                                      
4 Lawrence, Electing our Masters 62. 
5 Anon., Parliamentary Election. Digest of Proceedings in connection with the candidature of Mr 
John Wilson as Representative of the Central Division of the city of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1885), 
9; The Scotsman, 7 May 1885, 7; 15 Jun. 1886, 6; 20 Jun. 1885, 7; 25 Sep. 1885, 7; 2 Oct. 1885, 6; 
10 Oct. 1885, 9; 12 Oct. 1885, 6; 14 Oct. 1885, 8; 16 Oct. 1885, 6; 20 Oct. 1885, 6; 21 Oct. 1885, 8; 
22 Oct. 1885, 6; 27 Oct. 1885, 6; 31 Oct. 1885, 10; 6 Nov. 1885, 6; 10 Nov. 1885, 7; 17 Nov. 1885, 
6; Reformer, 14 Nov. 1885, 4. 
6 Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815–1872 
(London, 1971), 258. 
7 Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, 244. 
8 Brian Harrison, The Transformation of British Politics 1860–1895 (Oxford, 1996), 157. 
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dealt with such major issues as disestablishment and temperance.9 By the late-
Victorian period, many of these temperance organisations had consolidated their goal 
of reform and had become one of ‘the most important section[s] of the Liberal 
Party’.10 The temperance organisations in Scotland became highly effective because 
they applied significant pressure on candidates. Instead of lobbying political parties, 
temperance organisations tried to push individual candidates to pledge to support 
their cause once in Parliament.11 If the candidate refused to support the temperance 
cause, he sometimes faced drastic repercussions since temperance organisations 
asked their members to support only those parliamentary candidates who pledged to 
support the temperance cause and even recommended that they not vote at all if there 
were no candidates supportive of their views on temperance.12 
Temperance organisations grew throughout the nineteenth century resulting 
in a vast voting bloc and they continued to use this bloc to put pressure on Liberal 
candidates. Consequently, the endorsement or lack thereof by temperance 
organisations swayed elections. Hutchison noted several cases in which candidates 
won elections after being endorsed by temperance members.13 Conversely, Harrison 
discussed instances where the temperance organisations’ refusal to back a candidate 
lost the candidate the election.14 Some people were concerned about the power of the 
temperance organisations to sway the 1880 Edinburgh election due to fears that it 
could cause a Liberal split.15 Did the temperance organisations ultimately play a role 
in the 1885 Edinburgh elections and, if so, were they able to put pressure on any of 
the candidates? 
Before the 1880s, the temperance movement in Scotland worked with other 
movements throughout the United Kingdom to try to pass parliamentary temperance 
legislation for the whole country. While MPs from Scottish constituencies had been 
                                                      
9 Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery, 2–3. 
10 Hutchison, A Political History, 138; Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery, 
98, quoting Harcourt to Gladstone, 21 Jan. 1884, Gladstone MSS, B.M. Add. MS. 44199, folios 3, 
174–5. 
11 Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, 243. 
12 Daniel C. Paton, ‘Drink and the temperance movement in nineteenth century Scotland’, Thesis 
(Ph.D.) University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1977), 304; Norman Longmate, The Waterdrinkers: A 
History of Temperance (London, 1968), 224. 
13 Hutchison, A Political History, 138. Candidates supported by the temperance movement won in the 
1874 elections in Dundee, Leith, and Glasgow. 
14 Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, 241. 
15 Hanham, Elections and Party Management, 168. 
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voting in favour of temperance legislation since 1878, their English counterparts had 
not, thus resulting in the failure of the legislation.16 This created resentment among 
the Scottish temperance members and they soon began calling for a Local Veto Bill 
for Scotland alone which would have allowed local communities the ability to 
prohibit the sale of alcohol within their local communities.17 This local option bill 
was brought before Parliament by Peter McLagan, a Scottish MP for 
Linlithgowshire, who first introduced the Bill in 1883 when the Scottish temperance 
members decided to turn their focus on Scotland. The Bill's aim was to place liquor 
traffic directly in the hands of the local populace rather than the Justices and 
Magistrates who were then in charge of granting licenses in the counties and burghs, 
respectively. McLagan’s Bill would allow all residents of age, male or female, in a 
burgh, ward, parish, or district (defined as a village of more than three hundred 
inhabitants not contained in a burgh, parish, or ward), the ability to vote on three 
resolutions: to prohibit alcohol altogether, to reduce the current number of licenses to 
a specific number, or to cease granting new licenses altogether. The local populace 
would be required to gather ten per cent of the residents’ signatures in order to bring 
the resolution to a vote and then two-thirds of the vote would be required to pass any 
of the resolutions.18 
In 1883, an overwhelming majority of the Scottish MPs voted for the failed 
temperance legislation for the whole United Kingdom while, at the same time, a 
majority voted against McLagan’s Local Veto Bill for Scotland.19 The failure of the 
Scottish local option bill strengthened the licensing debate during the 1885 election. 
The candidates were thus asked by constituents to explain their position on 
McLagan’s Bill and licensing reform. Most of the Edinburgh candidates supported 
licensing reform in one way or another with the exception of Lord Napier who did 
not discuss the question of licensing, but instead focussed on the question of 
drinking. In his attempt to gain the support of the workingmen in the Central district, 
Napier acknowledged that ‘he was in favour of sobriety, but felt it was a man’s 
                                                      
16 Paton, ‘Drink and the temperance movement’, 317, table 9, from S.P.B.A. Annual Reports. 
17 Paton, ‘Drink and the temperance movement’, 316. 
18 PP, 1884–5, ii (28): Liquor traffic (local veto) (Scotland). A bill to enable owners and occupiers in 
burghs, wards of burghs, parishes, and districts in Scotland to prevent the common sale of 
intoxicating liquors, or otherwise to have effectual control over the drink traffic, within such areas. 
19 Paton, ‘Drink and the temperance movement’, 318. 
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decision on what he was to drink’.20 He went on to declare himself to be ‘a supporter 
of the freedom of the British subjects, and he would not submit to be dictated as to 
what he was to drink and what he was not to drink.’21 The other nine candidates all 
wanted to avoid having the temperance members vote against them because of their 
stance on licensing and wanted to gain the support of temperance members whenever 
possible. As a result, they all indicated that they supported change to the licensing 
laws by reforming the current system of granting licenses. The candidates, excluding 
Napier, all claimed that their goal in reforming the licensing laws was to grant local 
residents more control over the licensing process.22 
 By the time of the 1885 election, licensing had become the driving issue 
within the temperance movement. It was particularly important in Edinburgh because 
local temperance men were focussing on the local licensing problems of the city. For 
example, Richard Cameron, the president of the Edinburgh Total Abstinence Society, 
wrote a pamphlet titled ‘The road to ruin’ in which he was critical of the ninety 
public houses on the Royal Mile: 23 
It has too long been the practise of licensing authorities to place the strongest 
temptations in localities where the resisting power was well known to be the 
weakest. [...] Take the High Street and Canongate of Edinburgh, and see what 
a formidable array of liquor shops are thickly planted all the way down from 
Castlehill to Holyrood. Why, they seem as if purposefully placed to tempt 
into their snares all who require to pass them on their way to their homes.24 
 
Cameron, like many Victorian temperance men, believed alcohol to be directly 
related to, if not outright the cause of social ills. As part of a solution to this problem, 
he supported placing the licensing in the hands of the inhabitants of the city. He 
acknowledged that licensing reform would be a hard fight because ‘the drinking 
system [was] powerfully maintained and promoted by the money interest arrayed on 
its side’ from the distillers, brewers, and publicans.25 The ‘money interest’ was also 
noted by an ex-Magistrate of the city of Edinburgh, David Lewis, who commented 
                                                      
20 The Scotsman, 31 Oct. 1885, 10. 
21 Reformer, 14 Nov. 1885, 4. 
22 George B. Wilson, Alcohol and the Nation: A Contribution to the Study of the Liquor Problem in 
the United Kingdom from 1800 to 1935 (London, 1940), 118. 
23 Richard Cameron, ‘Human wrecks’, no. 351 in Total Abstinence Versus Alcoholism (Edinburgh, 
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24 Richard Cameron, ‘The road to ruin’, no. 321 in Total Abstinence Versus Alcoholism (Edinburgh, 
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on this in his book, The Drink Problem and Its Solution. Lewis wrote that the 
Caledonian distillery in Edinburgh alone produced more than two million gallons of 
whisky a year and paid twenty thousand pounds of duty a week.26 Not only was the 
industry profiting from the trade, but the Government had a monetary interest in it as 
well.  
In order to combat this ‘money interest’ other local temperance reformers 
appealed to voters to elect representatives who would fight to pass licensing reform. 
One such reformer, Professor Calderwood, pleaded, ‘the country requires as it 
representatives in Parliament men who are alive to the evils and dangers around; men 
of high purpose and of strong resolution; men who regard social reform as a grand 
end in Parliamentary service.’ According to Calderwood, ‘The power of Parliament 
controls the licensing system; and we must seek from Parliament the popular veto.’27 
Temperance supporters took up this plea and looked for candidates who supported 
McLagan’s Bill. Much like the fight within the Liberal party between the Radicals 
and Whigs in 1885, the temperance political fight in Scotland often took place in the 
nominating process of potential Liberal candidates.  
The party’s nomination process was often seen as the most important vote 
because the nominated Liberal candidate would often go unchallenged or was at least 
strongly favoured to win the election against a Tory opponent.28 According to Paton, 
‘Temperance men were often active on Liberal electoral committees and in Liberal 
associations. They represented a radical element in the party which sought to drive it 
to the left by influencing the choice of candidates’.29  The question of licensing was 
debated in all four districts of Edinburgh. The issue was most discussed in the 
Central district where all three of the Liberal candidates spoke of the importance of 
licensing. Renton said that Edinburgh had a ‘deep interest’ in the issue while Wilson 
remarked that it ‘was an important question, because the temperance electors of the 
division were large’, and Black listed licensing reform along with disestablishment as 
the ‘two great schemes’ of reform for the election.30 These candidates were 
                                                      
26 David Lewis, The Drink Problem and its Solution (London, 1881), 7 and 40. 
27 Reformer, Oct 24 1885, 5.  
28 Paton, ‘Drink and the temperance movement’, 310. 
29 Paton, ‘Drink and the temperance movement’, 310. 
30 The Scotsman, 14 Oct. 1885, 6; 16 Oct. 1885, 6; 7 Oct. 1885, 8. 
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noticeably concerned that the temperance electors in the district could decide the 
winner of the election. 
Hamer suggests that candidates reacted to pressure groups such as the 
temperance movement in two ways: by either fully accepting their calls of reform or 
by refusing to pledge support to any cause at all.31 The approach of fully accepting 
the pressure group’s call for reform was adopted only by Renton who succumbed to 
the pressure of the temperance movement and fully endorsed McLagan’s Local Veto 
Bill in exchange for temperance members’ endorsement even though he disagreed 
with the principle of teetotalism. Sweeney offers an alternative approach that 
candidates took with regards to pressure groups. In her local study of the temperance 
movement in Glasgow, she found that once the temperance supporters in the late-
Victorian period began to consolidate their power in municipal elections, their 
challengers began to push for temperance reform, yet withheld from endorsing 
prohibition. This was seen as a good compromise between the present system and the 
alternative of prohibition.32 This approach was taken in the 1885 Edinburgh election 
by the two Whigs, Harrison and Goschen; the Tory, Jamieson; and Wilson, the least 
radical of the Central division's Liberal candidates. 
 The power of the temperance organisations in Edinburgh was further 
confirmed as they received pledges of support for McLagan’s Local Veto Bill from 
four of the candidates. These four were the three barristers—Buchanan, Costelloe, 
and Raleigh—as well as Renton, the London stockbroker. Each of these men had 
also pledged to support disestablishment. These four all advocated the policy within 
the Local Veto Bill and expressed their desires for the local population to be in 
charge of licensing in their respective districts.33 The three barristers – Buchanan, 
Costelloe, and Raleigh – each had only one opponent: Jamieson, Goschen, and 
Harrison, respectively. Jamieson, Goschen, and Harrison all took the middle ground 
between doing nothing and supporting prohibition by withholding support of 
McLagan’s Local Veto Bill while advocating for change to the existing licensing 
law. They all spoke in favour of placing more authority with the Local Government 
                                                      
31 Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery, 25–6. 
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which was technically popularly elected.34 Harrison’s statement sums up the position 
held by all three: he was against McLagan’s scheme because it would ‘bring forward 
methods not akin to our native modes of government, and seek to do what laws can 
never effect’.35 The ‘methods’ Harrison pointed to in his statement is a reference to 
voting. In his argument, only the people presently eligible to vote would still be able 
to vote for the members of the Local Government which would have continued to 
deny women a vote even though women made up a large portion of the temperance 
movement. McLagan’s Bill would allow every inhabitant of age in a specific district 
a vote on the liquor traffic. It is likely that he was referring to prohibition as ‘what 
laws can never effect’. None of them indicated that they supported the people having 
the right to choose to prohibit alcohol in their communities, only that they supported 
licensing reform. 
Jamieson, Goschen, and Harrison must have all been concerned with the 
temperance vote in their respective districts. A temperance newspaper, The 
Reformer, documented Goschen’s changing attitude on temperance: ‘Mr. Goschen 
would scarcely look at us, but as the battle rages he is becoming a little more 
pliable’.36 This indicates that he was feeling pressure to appease the temperance 
voters or at least that he was open to it. However, these three were also concerned 
with votes from the drink industry because they all pandered to temperance 
supporters somewhat while withholding their full support for the movement, 
probably hoping to receive support from the moderates who supported either the 
temperance movement or the drink industry.  
The temperance members’ choice in the Central division was understandably 
not Major Napier who was against any type of reform.37 The remaining three 
candidates in the Central division—Renton, Black, and Wilson—were all Radicals 
and each had made claims that he should be the temperance candidate. Black, a 
teetotaller like some others in the Liberal party, ‘believed that all other social issues – 
including poverty, crime and unemployment – were subordinate to temperance’.38 
Black was arguably the most radical of the three Central Liberal candidates and he 
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did not support McLagan’s Bill because he was not satisfied with the details in the 
Bill. Black said that ‘he was willing to accept any improvement in the present system 
as long as it was on the lines of popular control, and he believed that the voice of the 
public opinion was ready to speak in favour of the removal of the present system that 
had been tried and found wanting’.39 The main problem Black saw with McLagan’s 
Local Veto Bill was that it enabled the local communities the option to prohibit 
alcohol which he thought went too far. He was in favour of temperance and believed 
alcohol to be the major cause of social ills. When he chaired the 1885 annual meeting 
of the Edinburgh members of the Scottish Temperance League, he told the audience 
of the benefits of teetotalism: 
What a revival and invigoration would take place in every industry, save one; 
what a burst of joy would rise from the wives and little ones in the slums and 
dens of their large cities; how tidy and trim would the poor man's houses 
become, and with what an elastic step would he proceed to his work of a 
morning! They would meet with very few constables on the beat. (Laughter 
and applause.) The police officers might come under the early closing 
movement–(laughter)–while the prisons and the workhouses might be turned 
partly to industrial uses.40  
 
Black went on to say that they needed to keep pressuring the Government to enact 
favourable legislation, but more importantly, they needed to lead by example. He 
simply ‘did not believe in the power of mere law to make men either moral or 
religious’.41 He was therefore against forcing prohibition upon anyone. Black’s view 
that the drink had a powerful hold on the social condition of the urban working class 
was shared by other Scottish Liberals such as Samuel Chisholm, a prominent 
temperance politician in Glasgow in the 1890s and early 1900s. Chisholm, like 
Black, held the belief that if society refrained from the drink, social conditions would 
greatly improve.42 
 Wilson was also against McLagan’s Local Veto Bill and said specifically that 
his opposition was due to the prohibition portion of the scheme. Wilson spoke of his 
position on the licensing question at a speech in mid October: 
Mr. Wilson stated that, whilst he was in favour of reforming the licensing 
laws, and leaving it to districts to give effect to those reforms, he was not in 
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favour of granting to two-thirds of the inhabitants of any district the power of 
total prohibition. It meant granting power to render a trade illegal in one 
district at the same time that it recognised it as legal in another district. If 
there were to be prohibition, it must be national prohibition. So far as legality 
and prohibition were concerned, all the districts of the country ought to be 
dealt with upon the same principles, and therefore he held that in dealing with 
this question they ought to do it nationally and not locally.43 
 
Wilson used the same tactic as Harrison, Goschen, and Jamieson by trying to take the 
middle ground hoping to appeal to all sides, yet he was attacked as a hypocrite while 
the other three candidates did not face similar attacks. Wilson faced such criticism 
because he was the only one who opposed McLagan’s Bill while simultaneously 
favouring disestablishment. It was said that Wilson was ‘willing to give the people 
the power to disestablish and disendow the Church, but at the same time refused to 
give the people the power to deal with liquor traffic’.44 Wilson refuted this attack by 
restating his position that there should be more control over licensing, but that 
prohibition should be dealt with nationally, although he never indicated that he 
supported national prohibition. He could have strengthened his argument by adding 
that his position on temperance was the same position he held on disestablishment: 
he supported disestablishing the National Church on the national level, but not 
granting individual districts the ability to disestablish their local Church of Scotland. 
 Renton, as noted before, was the one candidate who fully succumbed to the 
pressure of the temperance members. In June 1885 Renton told Edinburgh members 
of the Good Templar Order that he ‘approve[d] the principle of Mr M’Lagan's [sic] 
Bill’ and that he would vote for the Bill if it was brought before Parliament.45 By 
early October he was approaching the issue with a more compromising tone. When 
asked, he no longer said that he favoured McLagan’s Local Veto Bill, only that he 
believed it would not be brought before Parliament. Instead, he changed his strategy 
to one of compromise and said that they should focus on the local boards that would 
be established through Local Government to handle licensing reform.46 However, on 
22 October the temperance electors in the Central division held a meeting and, in 
spite of Renton’s recent lack of support, decided to endorse him as their candidate. 
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The following day complaints appeared in The Scotsman aimed at Renton’s 
nomination. The writers of the letters did not claim to be teetotallers, but they felt 
that Black would have been the better choice for the temperance movement. They 
listed two reasons: one, Black was an abstainer while Renton was a moderate drinker 
and two, Renton did not believe that McLagan’s Local Veto Bill would be brought 
up in the new Parliament.47 On 31 October Renton addressed a temperance crowd 
and told them that he ‘did not see eye to eye with them on the point of total 
abstinence, but that did not weigh in the matter of a Parliamentary election. He was 
prepared to support their views by giving the people the legal power to restrain or 
abolish the liquor trade’.48 Renton feared the loss of the temperance members’ 
support and was therefore pressured into supporting McLagan’s Local Veto Bill, 
despite the fact that he personally did not support prohibition. 
It has been established that pressure groups in Edinburgh during the 1885 
general election influenced, in some way, most of the candidates’ positions 
concerning the licensing question. It is more difficult to ascertain the precise impact 
of pressure groups on the outcome of the election. The majority of the discussion in 
Edinburgh regarded the concept of McLagan’s Bill. Three of the elected MPs were 
not endorsed by the temperance movement and did not support McLagan’s Local 
Veto Bill. They did, however, play to the middle by supporting changes to the 
current licensing laws, and, according to The Reformer, the temperance vote in 
Edinburgh was divided, resulting in the defeat of the endorsed temperance 
candidates.49  The one elected MP that supported the Bill was in a straightforward 
race between a Liberal and a Conservative. In the Central division’s race between a 
Conservative and three Radicals, the most moderate Radical, who was also the least 
supportive of disestablishment, won the seat. Ultimately, the men elected in 
Edinburgh held similar views on both licensing and disestablishment which points to 
a possible connection between religious affiliations and temperance. 
 Paton points out that the Established Church of Scotland had very few 
teetotal ministers while both the United Presbyterians and the Free Church had a 
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large number of ministers that were teetotallers.50 Other historians found that 
teetotalism was more predominant among the nonconformists in England and Wales 
as well.51 Nonconformists embraced the teetotal movement early as a way to gain 
‘moral superiority’ over the Established Church.52 Paton posed an important 
question: ‘Why in particular did the Free Church prove more susceptible to teetotal 
arguments than the Established Church?’53 He believed that it was based on the 
location of the institution. Since the Established Church remained dominated by the 
landed class, it was comprised of a mainly rural base, whereas the Free Church and 
the United Presbyterian Church grew from urban areas. This, he concluded, might 
have caused the ministers of the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church to 
be influenced by their close proximity to the living conditions of the working class.54 
This is a valid point, but it is more likely that the Church of Scotland ministers would 
not have supported teetotalism because the majority of the teetotal supporters, 
including candidates, were also in favour of disestablishment and disendowment. 
Therefore, if the Church of Scotland ministers supported candidates that favoured 
teetotalism, they would have likely been supporting disestablishment as well. 
Paton himself points out that temperance members were predominantly 
radical and trying to move the Liberal party to the left. He also notes that the 
temperance organisations required their members to pledge to vote only for 
candidates who supported temperance. Consequently, if a Church of Scotland 
minister was a teetotaller, he would have been expected to vote for candidates that 
supported disestablishment. It is a safe assumption that such a minister would have 
found the matters of the Church more pressing than those of teetotalism. Taking this 
into account, one could switch the Church of Scotland ministers with the members of 
their congregation and come to the same conclusion that they would have held 
church matters above that of drink. It appears that there is a commonality between 
the supporters of teetotalism and disestablishment. This correlation explains why 
Black received the least amount of votes even though he was the most supportive of 
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disestablishment and disendowment in the Central division. The vast amount of 
voters who strongly supported disestablishment were in favour of teetotalism and 
therefore backed Renton over Black because of his commitment to McLagan’s Local 
Veto Bill.  
The licensing question provides a further insight into the constituents’ wants 
and reveals the candidates’ attempts to match them. It also provides a possible link to 
the disestablishment question through a want of decentralization as both questions 
sought to provide the constituents with more control over their local communities. 
Most importantly, for this present chapter the attention given to the licensing 
question during the election reveals that the Church question did not dominate the 
election in Edinburgh. 
 
The issue of free education 
 Free education was another issue that was discussed nationally in 1885 
although it did not have a large pressure group advancing the issue as the licensing 
issue had. Education was principally being pushed to the forefront of the national 
debate because of its link to the Church question. Proponents of disestablishment and 
disendowment argued that once the funds were set free from the Established 
Churches they could be applied to free education. As a result, free education was 
supported by Radicals who were also pushing disestablishment. Chamberlain worked 
to convince Gladstone to take up the education issue and make it part of the Liberal 
platform. He informed Gladstone that he believed most of the Scottish candidates 
were supportive of free education and that ‘it is a subject which is daily becoming of 
greater importance, especially in Scotland’.55 Gladstone replied that free education, 
as well as disestablishment and the reform of the House of Lords, were not ‘in a state 
to be brought into the programme’.56 The lack of free education in the Party platform 
did not stop it from becoming an important topic in Edinburgh. 
 The debate on free education was particularly interesting in Edinburgh 
because Edinburgh already had a form of free education in its seven hospitals. By the 
eighteenth century, Edinburgh had invested in these hospitals and had more than any 
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other city outside of London, despite its small size. The most well-known of these 
hospitals was George Heriot’s Hospital which was founded in 1659 by George Heriot 
who had left a substantial sum upon his death for the education of the ‘poor 
fatherless boys’ of the city.57 By 1836, Heriot’s investments were yielding such a 
profit that the governors were able to start twelve day schools to provide free 
education to the poor working class children of the city.58 In the summer of 1885 a 
Government scheme was passed which turned Heriot’s into a fee-paying day school. 
Leading up to the passage of this scheme, there were heated debates in Edinburgh 
because many believed that the new scheme was taking away the property of the 
poor who George Heriot had intended to help.59 The movement for changes to 
Heriot’s and other outdoor schools had been a local issue for years. McLaren had 
been a leading opponent of the proposed changes which reinforced his reputation as a 
supporter of the working class. McLaren was out of office by 1885, but he was still 
heavily involved in the campaign against the Bill through public speeches and 
writings in the press.60 Buchanan, one of Edinburgh’s two MPs at the time, led the 
opposition to the scheme in the House of Commons, but ultimately fell short of 
stopping the Bill.61 
 During the campaign, most of the constituents’ questions on education 
regarded Heriot’s. They wanted to know what the candidates would do if elected. 
The constituents were also worried about Fettes, another hospital for the poor, 
following Heriot’s. This was one issue on which all of the candidates agreed in that 
they all thought that it was unfortunate that the Bill had passed. Despite their dislike 
of the Bill, only Costelloe wanted the Bill to be overturned saying that ‘if returned to 
Parliament he would assist in getting one more inquiry into these endowments for the 
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purpose of having the stolen property of the poor returned to them. (Cheers.)’.62 
Raleigh only indicated that he would support it if a good measure came up against 
the scheme.63 The remaining Liberal candidates did not like the scheme, but said that 
it had gone too far to be reversed.64 Even the Conservatives, Jamieson and Napier, 
thought the scheme was wrong and that Heriot’s needed to be returned to the 
‘fatherless children of the poor’ as its founder had intended.65 The candidates who 
addressed Fettes pledged that they would do all that they could to make sure that it 
remained as the founder intended.66  
 In dealing with the question of free education, the candidates were divided. 
Both of the Conservatives and Goschen were against free education. Napier believed 
that free education ‘was treating a freeman as if he were a beggar’.67 Goschen argued 
that if free education was implemented, it would dilute the quality of education. 
Harrison took the middle ground on the issue, as he had done on licensing by 
advocating that one of the great cities should ‘try the experiment’ to assess how it 
worked before it was implemented in the whole country.68 The other six candidates 
all favoured free education and most held the view that Heriot’s would not matter 
soon because they would have free education throughout the country.69  
 As with the other main questions in the 1885 election, the four elected 
candidates in Edinburgh were divided on the education issue as well. Both Buchanan 
and Wilson favoured free education, Goschen opposed it, and Harrison took a more 
centrist stance on the issue. The losing candidates were split along party lines. The 
four Liberals favoured free education while both of the Conservatives were in 
opposition. The candidates’ positions on the education question, like the questions of 
disestablishment and licensing, does not reveal why a particular candidate was 
elected. However, it does provide insight into the importance placed on the questions 
and helps determine that there was not only one issue that dominated the 1885 
election. 
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Candidates’ and their backgrounds  
Some historians have argued that burgh candidates had to adapt in many 
cases to the constituencies’ political traditions in order to be successful.70 
Candidates’ backgrounds and their correlation to the traditional historical identity of 
the constituency for which they were standing were important factors in the Victorian 
period, so much so that when dealing with the redistribution of seats in the Third 
Reform Act it was acknowledged that although equalising the constituencies based 
on population was desirable, it was just as important, if not more so, to maintain the 
historical identities of the constituencies.71 Those who argued for the latter did so 
because they had a local connection to the constituency they represented and wanted 
to maintain that connection. To determine if this notion had an effect in Edinburgh, 
one needs to look at the candidates’ backgrounds and assess how they correlated with 
the political traditions of the city. 
The political tradition of Edinburgh consisted of multiple aspects of the 
candidates’ backgrounds such as Liberalism, age and experience, career, education, 
local connection, and religion. The political traditions of Edinburgh were used by 
both the candidates themselves and those who opposed them as a reason to vote for 
or against particular candidates. Throughout the election campaign, the candidates 
battled to present to the constituency a positive image of themselves that fit a 
traditional pattern of the old double-member constituency of Edinburgh. In some 
cases it was this image that was attacked. There were several complaints raised 
against different candidates for various reasons concerning their personal traits and 
experiences in an attempt to alter the image of the candidates’ personal backgrounds 
in a negative way.  
A basic overview of the main points of the candidates’ backgrounds included 
such aspects as their career, their previous governmental experience and their age, 
their political ideology, as well as their local connection to the city. 
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Table 4.2: Candidates’ Bios72 
Candidate Career Experience Age Supported 
Buchanan barrister/fellow X 39 Gladstone 
Goschen businessman X 54 Gladstone 
Harrison businessman X 74 Gladstone 
Wilson businessman X 50+ Gladstone 
Black publisher X 49  
Costelloe barrister  30 Chamberlain 
Jamieson accountant  57 Tory 
Napier Army officer  36 Tory 
Raleigh barrister/fellow  34 Chamberlain 
Renton businessman  64 Chamberlain 
 
The above table shows the variation amongst the candidates with regards to the key 
aspects of their career, experience in Government, age, and where their support lay 
nationally. Each of these issues, in addition to local connection, were brought up 
during the 1885 election campaign. The following sections of this chapter seeks to 
determine what role if any these aspects played in the election. 
 
The careers of the candidates 
One way that the political tradition of Edinburgh was used to attack the 
candidates’ identity was by pointing to their profession. As noted above in Table 4.2, 
three of the candidates were barristers, six were businessmen in one form or another, 
and one was an army officer. The candidates’ careers were all discussed throughout 
the course of the campaign. Some were viewed positively, especially as the 
businessmen whose businesses were connected to the city as it was pointed out how 
many people they employed in the city. Conversely, the barristers faced the most 
scrutiny for their occupation.  
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The three barrister candidates – Costelloe, Raleigh, and, to a lesser extent, 
Buchanan – were beleaguered throughout the campaign due to their employment as 
barristers. The dislike and mistrust of lawyers had a historical context in the politics 
of Edinburgh going back to the 1830s. Advocates were exempt from paying the local 
Annuity Tax which supplemented the local Established Churches. This rightly upset 
some of Edinburgh’s other citizens.73 Furthermore, from the First Reform Act to 
mid-century, the politics of the city was dominated by Whig advocates. However, the 
domination of party politics in Edinburgh by lawyers was not limited to the Liberal 
party. In his description of Conservative party organisation in the late-Victorian 
period, Miller writes, ‘Edinburgh lawyers were neither liked nor trusted outside their 
own narrow circle’.74 According to Williams, opposition to the lawyers and their 
power came from their adoption of candidates from outside of Edinburgh and even 
outside of Scotland itself: ‘Many citizens began to criticize the domination by 
expectant lawyers and wondered if it was so natural that this “clique” should retain 
exclusive control’.75 The lawyers that faced complaints in the beginning and middle 
of the century were local Edinburgh advocates while in 1885 the lawyers that were 
criticised were barristers that pursued their careers in London. The true nature of the 
complaints against the  barristers was not solely that they were lawyers, although 
their career did evoke the traditional feeling of distrust that the constituency members 
felt toward the earlier Edinburgh advocates who fell out of political favour because 
they chose Englishmen, or outsiders, as the city’s candidates in earlier elections. The 
lawyer candidates in 1885 were English barristers and were thus attacked as being 
outsiders trying to steal a Scottish seat. This attack for being outsiders is confirmed 
by the complaints publicly made against them.  
The objection that the candidates were lawyers became blurred with an 
objection to them being outsiders. For example, at a meeting supporting the 
candidature of the Lord Provost, Sir George Harrison, it was said that there were 200 
London barristers trying to secure a parliamentary seat in Scotland ‘not because they 
cared about Scotland but because it would benefit them personally to have any seat in 
Parliament’. He went on to claim that if they were elected, they would ‘put London 
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before any Scottish constituency’.76 At a different meeting with a similar sentiment 
of support for Harrison, it was ‘remarked that there were about 200 English lawyers 
waiting to get into Parliament and as many of them would get in, it was necessary 
that they, when they had the chance, should send local men to defend their rights’.77 
This tactic of attacking English lawyers and denouncing them as outsiders was not 
limited to the constituency of the South division; the Conservatives in the West 
deployed this tactic as well. The Chairman at a meeting held to secure the 
candidature of Mr Jamieson said, ‘It was a strange commentary on the additional 
members granted to Scotland that the representatives could not be found without 
going to London to import the surplus stock of English barristers’.78 
 The attack on the candidates for being outsiders was selective though. In a 
letter to The Scotsman from ‘An Old Independent Liberal’, the writer attacks all three 
of the barristers plus Renton, a stockbroker, for being outsiders, yet he said nothing 
of the lone Englishman running in Edinburgh: 
The very thought of the possibility that all four might be London barristers 
and stockbrokers should lead thoughtful citizens to look well at the present 
position of matters, and to bestir themselves to prevent such a calamity 
overtaking the city. Local Optionists and Disestablishers, at such a crisis, are 
throwing consistency and everything else to the winds, that their respective 
shibboleths may be adopted. Just fancy Edinburgh, the capital of Scotland, 
represented by Costelloe, Raleigh, Renton, and Buchanan. The last named, 
though a good Liberal, has never been associated with the city in any 
capacity. None of them are acquainted with its business.79  
 
The writer tried to justify the complaint against the lawyers by including Buchanan, 
but then goes on to say that he is a ‘good Liberal’ indicating that it is alright to vote 
for him even though he is a lawyer. Buchanan was the only Liberal candidate 
running in the West, and for that reason the writer did not want to bring opposition 
against him for being an outsider since his Conservative opponent, Jamieson, was a 
local accountant. At the same time, the writer includes Renton in the group because 
he is a London stockbroker, but says nothing of Goschen’s employment as a London 
banker. The writer did reveal his true purpose by demanding that half of the city 
members be local men. He even writes that the two should be Harrison and Wilson 
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leaving as the remaining MPs Buchanan, who in his words is a ‘good Liberal’, and 




The concept of being opposed to a candidate based on his lack of a local 
connection to the constituency that they wished to represent was not unique to 
Edinburgh.  During the Victorian period, it was to the candidates’ advantage to be 
able to be identified with the community and it was a definite disadvantage to be 
viewed as an outsider. Biagini found that being perceived as either a local or an 
outsider was an important factor in both the successes and failures of the early 
Labour candidates.80 Having a local connection to a community could be obtained 
through several means including living in, having been born in, having ancestors 
from, owning a business or land in, or trading with the community. Any of these 
could qualify as a connection to the constituency and thus with the inhabitants of that 
constituency.  
The election of local candidates was an important issue in the 1885 election 
in Edinburgh following the political tradition of Edinburgh. From 1841 until the by-
elections after the 1880 general election, the constituents of Edinburgh had elected 
local men such as the senior Adam Black or Duncan McLaren who could look out 
for the interests of the city.81 In the first of three by-elections held between 1880 and 
1885, local resident John McLaren succeeded his father as an MP for Edinburgh. 
Upon John McLaren's resignation, Buchanan, a Scotsman, though not from 
Edinburgh, was elected in 1881 briefly ending the forty year tradition. Most of the 
Edinburgh candidates in 1885 were aware of the importance of having a local 
connection to the constituency and stressed their own local connection to the 
constituents. If there was no local connection for the candidate to point to, he 
addressed the lack of such a connection and tried to make up for it in other key 
aspects. 
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Wilson and Harrison had no trouble in projecting their connection to the 
constituents. Both had recently served on the Town Council and both used this as 
evidence of their local connection. A group called ‘The committee who are 
promoting the requisition in favour of Ex-Treasurer Wilson’ put together a pamphlet 
in which they listed five reasons to support him of which three of these reasons 
addressed his local connection to Edinburgh.82 Another leaflet in the support of 
Wilson declared that ‘it was the primary duty of the division to choose the man 
whom they knew—to choose him from amongst themselves—and thereby make the 
representation true—true of themselves, and true of their political opinions’.83 When 
Harrison was introduced to the constituency, his local connection was certainly 
known as he was the current Lord Provost. Still, the chairman informed the crowd of 
his past ten years of working for Edinburgh and said that ‘he had served the city in a 
way which could hardly be surpassed; he had spent a long life most honorably and 
usefully in promoting the best interests of Edinburgh’.84 
Some of the candidates were known in the city through other connections 
such as education or business. Raleigh was first introduced to the constituency by 
Calderwood, his former Professor, who tried to demonstrate Raleigh’s local 
connection by noting that he was from Edinburgh, although he had left the city for 
work.85 Though he had come from Edinburgh, Raleigh still faced criticism for a lack 
of local connection by some constituents who felt that it was not enough:  
It seems to me to be a jump from the frying-pan into the fire to take Mr 
Raleigh, a young English barrister, with no Parliamentary experience, after 
having a Q. C., with very considerable Parliamentary experience and of 
undoubted ability. The fact of his having been born in Edinburgh is of very 
little moment, as he left the city for good when a mere lad, and, on his own 
showing, he has paid very little or no attention to Scottish affairs since.86 
 
The writer attacks the image of Raleigh for being a young and inexperienced 
barrister who had become an outsider to his native city. Raleigh tried to counter this 
attack by telling his constituents that he ‘hoped they all understood that he was not a 
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stranger from the south coming there of his own motive, and seeking to make this 
city merely a convenient stage in his own advancement’.87 
Jamieson was known for his work as one of the top accountants in the 
country.88 A circular put out to promote him highlighted his local connection: 
Mr Jamieson is a well-known citizen, and his conspicuous abilities and wide 
reputation mark him out as a gentleman well deserving the support of his 
fellow-citizens. His special knowledge of Scottish affairs, his firm and 
intelligent grasp of all questions which he handles, his power of lucid 
exposition, and his thorough independence of character, eminently qualify 
him for the honour of representing one of the divisions of the city of 
Edinburgh in Parliament.89 
 
Jamieson also attacked some candidates based on their lack of a local connection. 
When he first addressed the constituents he asked ‘whether the representation of the 
urban constituencies of Scotland must henceforward be entrusted to old foggies, or to 
budding politicians, or to carpet-baggers’.90 This was surely a direct attack on the 
barristers, one of whom was his opponent. 
Black was known in Edinburgh for several reasons: his work, his term as a 
Council member, and for his father, the senior Adam Black, former Lord Provost. In 
introducing Black to the constituents before one of his speeches, the speaker told the 
crowd that ‘Mr. Black was the only candidate who was an elector in this division, 
and the firm with which he was connected had for half a century or more carried on 
an extensive business in the ward of St. Giles, and had given employment to a very 
large number of working men’.91 At a different speech of Black’s, someone noted 
that ‘there could be no doubt that local men had an opportunity of knowing the wants 
of the city which strangers and foreigners had not. Mr Black’s father was well known 
in Edinburgh as the representative of the city–(applause)–and Mr Black himself had 
served in the Town Council...’92 Black was a local and also had an ancestral 
connection to the city which he was able to invoke to constituents.  
Other candidates tried to use their ancestral connection to the city to make up 
for their lack of a present local connection. This was attempted by both Renton and 
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Napier. A pamphlet put out by ‘the committee for promoting the election of Mr J. 
Hall Renton’ lists Renton’s local connections as one of the main and most important 
reasons to vote for him. Renton himself had left Edinburgh and moved to London 
where he worked as a stockbroker, a fact that was constantly pointed to by his 
opposition. The committee that was favourable to him listed his local claim as ‘his 
family's long connection with the city (his father and Grandfather having both been 
Merchants in Edinburgh, and Member of the Merchant Company)’.93 On the other 
hand, Major Napier also used his family’s name as his local connection. When he 
was introduced to the constituency, the speaker declared that ‘for five hundred years 
the family had been closely associated with the city; and he believed that over the 
civilised world the name of Napier was well known’.94 Renton and Napier were not 
alone in channelling an ancestral connection to the constituency in which they were 
running. Gladstone had also used the same tactic when he decided to run in 
Midlothian. He was born in Liverpool, but both of his parents came from Scotland. 
Gladstone used this local connection to his advantage when he ran in Scotland.95 
Costelloe, Buchanan, and Goschen all lacked any local connection to 
Edinburgh. Costelloe and Buchanan were Scotsmen, but neither was connected to the 
city. They did not try to use their Scottish roots as evidence of their local connection 
but, like Joseph Cowen in Newcastle, they still endorsed the idea that an MP should 
have a close relationship to the constituency he represented. Instead of using their 
personal identity to make a connection to the city, such as being born or carrying on 
business within the constituency, they used the constituency’s identity which they 
tried to connect it to themselves. Costelloe openly acknowledged that he was an 
outsider, but repeatedly proclaimed that it was more important that the constituents 
be represented by a Radical and not a Whig. He said, ‘Scotland and the capital of 
Scotland had long been associated with a robust and earnest Liberalism, and he did 
not think he would be far wrong in supposing that there in the cradle of Scottish 
history, and the centre of the working population of Edinburgh, a reasonable Radical 
ought to be at home’.96 Buchanan also had no real connection to Edinburgh besides 
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having had represented it for the four years preceding the 1885 election. He told his 
constituents that Scotland, especially the burghs, and Edinburgh had a tradition of the 
last half-century of Liberalism and that it was the constituents’ ‘duty’ to ensure that it 
remains so.97 Buchanan also told his constituents that ‘if he were returned for this 
constituency he should consider himself as a Member for Edinburgh’; therefore, he, 
like Cowen, felt that he was a representative of the burgh and not of the individual 
constituents.98 These two things made up for the fact that he was an outsider. 
Buchannan’s approach worked better than Costelloe’s because he projected that he 
cared for Edinburgh and that he would be a continuation of Edinburgh’s historical 
identity to Liberalism seeing that he was the only Liberal running for election in that 
district. 
 While Buchanan and Costelloe attempted to make up for their lack of a local 
connection, Goschen, the only Englishman running in Edinburgh, did not. Like 
Buchanan and Costelloe, Goschen had no local connection to speak of, yet he was 
the only candidate to completely avoid the local connection issue. It is interesting to 
note that the two barristers and Renton, two of which had some form of a connection 
to the city, were attacked for being outsiders while Goschen was not. The reasoning 
for Goschen’s exemption from the criticism was explained at a meeting held to 
secure the candidature of Harrison where Mr Elliot said ‘that justice was not done to 
Scotland in Parliament’ and would not change ‘unless they took care to send citizens 
to attend to their interest, and not to allow their representation to get into the hands of 
strangers and people from a distance’.99 Elliot then goes on to exempt Goschen from 
this because of his experience. Elliot also objected to ‘young men who had no 
interest in Scotland’.100 Elliot’s argument is rational in that for Scotland to be 
governed better, it would be wiser to send men to Parliament that had a vested 
interest in Scotland. However, his method of weighing the candidates’ interests in 
Scotland appears to be flawed. He believed that Goshcen, a man in his mid-fifties 
who has never lived in Scotland, has more interest in the country than younger men 
who were raised, educated, and attended university in Scotland. This is not the case 
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though as he indicated it was Goschen’s age and experience that nullified his lack of 
a local connection. 
 
Age and experience 
Discussion of candidates’ age and experience took place in the campaigns of 
several candidates’, not just regarding Goschen, as mentioned above. There was a 
significant amount of discussion regarding the importance of the candidates’ 
experience in Government affairs or lack thereof. Age and experience were not just 
viewed as good attributes for a candidate to have in Edinburgh, but throughout 
Scotland where the constituencies had a tradition of having ‘undue respect for age 
and experience, and a weakness for long pedigrees’.101 Electing MPs who had 
Government experience was a tradition in Edinburgh. Though they had not been very 
successful at electing experienced MPs, they did elect such experienced men as T. B. 
Macaulay and Samuel D. Waddy. Waddy was elected in 1882 in the third by-election 
between the 1880 and the 1885 general elections and he was a well-known English 
politician and Queens Counsel who had already sat in Parliament for Barnstaple and 
Sheffield.102 In the lead-up to the 1885 general election, Waddy and Buchanan held a 
joint meeting where the constituents asked both men their position on various issues. 
Buchanan took questions from the crowd first and they were satisfied with his 
responses. Waddy's responses, however, caused an uproar amongst the crowd. 
Shortly after the meeting Waddy announced that he would seek a parliamentary seat 
in London because it was unlikely that he would be re-elected.103 Despite this, in 
1885 some Edinburgh constituents still wanted ‘to get a man of Imperial rather than 
local reputation as their representative’ because the political image of the 
constituency rested to some degree upon the MP that represented it.104 
 Age and experience in government appears to have been on the minds of the 
voters in 1885. Of the ten candidates, half were over the age of fifty, as were the 
majority of the MPs in other great cities, and half had prior experience in government 
whether it was local or parliamentary.105 Although usually positive, experience was 
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not always a good trait to have. For example, in the 1885 election in Paisley, the 
sitting Lord Provost was beaten mainly due to his record, while the victor, a well 
known local merchant, had no record to defend and thus had an advantage in this 
race.106 In Edinburgh, however, age, and more so experience, are certainly 
contributing factors to the election as indicated by a comment made by a supporter 
introducing Harrison to the constituency who said that he did not believe ‘that the 
city of Edinburgh should be used as a nursery for the training of Parliamentary 
infants’.107 
 Of the four elected candidates in Edinburgh, all had prior favourable 
government experience and three were over the age of fifty. Buchanan and Goschen 
were the only two candidates who had previously been elected to Parliament and 
both won their elections in 1885. Buchanan, the Liberal candidate in the West, 
although only thirty-nine had been an MP for the city of Edinburgh for four years. 
On the other hand, his Conservative opponent, Jamieson, was in his mid fifties and 
had plenty of experience in business, but lacked any experience in government. In 
the East district, Goschen was in his mid-fifties and had the most experience in 
government of all the candidates in Edinburgh having first been elected to Parliament 
for the city of London in 1863.108 His opponent, Costelloe, was a young barrister in 
London with little experience, even outside of politics. The other two candidates 
elected in 1885, Harrison and Wilson, both had long and prestigious careers in 
municipal government and, as a result, were well known and respected in the burgh’s 
local affairs. Harrison was in his seventies and was just topping off his long career in 
municipal politics by finishing his term as Lord Provost of Edinburgh while his 
opponent, Raleigh, was similar to Costelloe as he too was a young barrister in 
London with no prior experience in government. Wilson, a retiree from municipal 
politics, had the least amount of experience among the four newly elected MPs. He 
had moved through the ranks of the Edinburgh Town Council and had most recently 
been the Treasurer. Of Wilson’s opponents, Napier was the youngest at thirty-six, 
Black was forty-nine years of age, and Renton was the oldest losing candidate at 
sixty-four. Each of these three had varying levels of experience. Napier had no 
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political experience, but he had government experience as an Army officer. Renton 
had no government experience, but he had run twice for parliamentary office. Black 
had the most experience among all of the losing candidates in any of the four 
parliamentary districts in Edinburgh as he had been elected to one term as a Town 
Councillor for the burgh.109  
Traditionally, the constituency of Edinburgh elected two different types of 
MPs, one local and one national. The local was wanted to look out for the interests of 
the city while the constituents wanted the other MP to be a well-known and 
experienced political figure that could bring prestige to the city. Edinburgh was not 
alone in believing that this makeup of MPs was in the best interest of their city; some 
constituents in Leeds also wanted both types to represent them in the early Victorian 
period.110 There were still other political traditions of the city that were important in 
1885 such as the religious backgrounds of the candidates. 
 
Religion 
  Religion was a rarely discussed topic outside of the candidates’ views on 
disestablishment. The candidates’ personal beliefs were not a factor in the campaign 
with the lone exception of the East division where both Costelloe and Goschen dealt 
with this question. Late Victorian Edinburgh, especially the 1880s, is seen as 
somewhat open minded to Catholics compared to the rest of Scotland. In his studies 
of anti-Catholism in Scotland, Gallagher pointed to the election of Canon Edward 
Hannan, a parish priest, as deputy chairman of the Edinburgh school board and to 
Charles Cooper, a Catholic, the editor of The Scotsman, as evidence for this view.111 
Regardless of the achievements by these two Catholics in Edinburgh, Costelloe was 
attacked for being a Catholic by the Protestant National Alliance in 1885. This 
alliance put out a pamphlet ‘to the Protestant Electors’ in the East division which 
began by appealing to the tradition of the city: ‘Fellow Electors – A crisis in the 
history of our city has arisen in that a Roman Catholic is pressing to be elected as 
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your Representative in Parliament.’ The pamphlet then went on to claim that the 
Papacy was trying to regain ‘supreme authority’ over the Government and that a 
Catholic MP could not be loyal to a party or the country because their loyalty lay 
with the Pope. The pamphlet closed by pointing to the tradition of the city having 
only been represented by Protestants and asked the electors: 
To resist to the utmost the return of such a man to Parliament as one of the 
representatives of the capital of Scotland, is a sacred duty binding on every 
true Protestant and every loyal subject. We plead with you to put the 
question—would it not be a perpetual disgrace for the citizens of the city of 
Knox, on any plea whatever, to send a Roman Catholic to Parliament as their 
representative?112 
 
This plea to the historical identity of the city affected some of the constituents. At the 
meeting of the Edinburgh East Liberal Association which was held to nominate 
Costelloe, one constituent said that even though he favoured the positions held by 
Costelloe, ‘He, for one, would never support a Roman Catholic representative for 
Edinburgh.’ This position was moved as an amendment, but no one came forward to 
second the motion. Costelloe was thus nominated as a candidate for the East 
division.113  
 Goschen also faced attacks because of religion. He defended himself at one of 
his speeches saying that supporters of Costelloe had been falsely stating that he was a 
Jew and that he held the Jewish faith.114 Despite Goshen’s attempt to correct this, it 
appears that they were successful in spreading this falsehood. During a speech by 
Major Napier in which he was discussing the Egyptian War, he said it was ‘an 
attempt on the part of the Liberals to crush a free people in order to support a lot of 
money-lending Jews’ at which someone in the audience shouted ‘Goschen’.115 This 
exemplified that not only was Goschen perceived to be Jewish by some, but that 
common stereotypes of Jews were accepted.116 Since Jews, like the Irish, were often 
viewed as un-British, the supporters of Costelloe hoped that by creating doubt about 
Goschen’s religion, it would negate the issue of Costelloe’s religion and its break 
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from the Protestant tradition of the constituency. This would therefore mean that the 
religious backgrounds of the candidates would cease to be a dividing issue among the 
voters.117 
 
Liberalism: Chamberlain vs. Gladstone  
The principal political tradition in Edinburgh could be easily overlooked by 
historians because it is so obvious: the city’s long-standing tradition of Liberalism. 
Since the passage of the First Reform Act, Liberals had been elected in every 
election and Conservative candidates had not even come close to being elected 
during that time.118 While the political tradition of Edinburgh had obviously been 
Liberal, by 1885 the Liberal party had become polarised. On one side were the 
Whigs led by Hartington and on the other were the Radicals with men like 
Chamberlain. Falling in the middle of these two sides politically was Gladstone who 
was theoretically holding the whole Party together because both groups wanted to 
have him on their side.119 In the Edinburgh Evening News there was an article 
describing the Liberal party at that time titled ‘The Old Umbrella’ in which the 
author claimed that the umbrella was wide enough to cover both Goschen and 
Chamberlain and that with the downpour of the general election they all needed to 
get under the umbrella.120 Gladstone, as the leader of the Liberal party and in his 
position of holding the party together, was holding that umbrella. 
 Chamberlain became ambitious and had high expectations in 1885 due to the 
passage of the Third Reform Act. He told Gladstone that these reforms would bring 
about ‘the greatest revolution this country has under gone’.121 To bring about this 
great revolution, Chamberlain had several objectives that stemmed from these new 
reforms. He wanted to form the debate around Radical ideas, he wanted to place 
himself as the outright leader of the Radical wing of the Liberal party, and he wanted 
the Radicals to pick up more seats than the Whigs which would put them in a 
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position to take control of the party once Gladstone stepped down. In order to shape 
the debate of the election campaign, Chamberlain presented a Radical programme 
which became known as the ‘unauthorised programme’, so called because neither 
Chamberlain nor his programme had authority over the Liberal party. The 
‘unauthorised programme’ consisted of several proposed reforms, some of which 
became particularly important in Edinburgh during the 1885 election such as 
disestablishment and free education.  
 Chamberlain had already laid the groundwork for his programme through a 
series of articles released throughout the previous two years in the Fortnightly 
Review. However, once the Third Reform Act was passed he was inspired by the 
opportunity presented by the Act to persuade the newly enfranchised county voters to 
take up the Radical cause and openly campaigned for the programme beginning with 
three speeches he gave in January 1885.122 If the Radicals could gain the support of 
the newly enfranchised county voters, they would very likely take power of the 
Liberal party itself. Chamberlain determined that one of the best ways to inspire the 
newly enfranchised was to carry out a speaking tour in order to get the message of 
the ‘unauthorised programme’ out to the people. In the autumn, Chamberlain went on 
the road making a few stops in England before continuing on to Scotland. His tour 
cut right through the middle of Scotland with stops at Glasgow and Inverness. The 
speeches helped focus the national spotlight on Chamberlain by enhancing his profile 
and his possible future takeover of the leadership of the Liberal party, especially in 
Scotland. 123 
 Through his speaking tour, Chamberlain gained popularity in the country and 
thus managed to influence some of the candidates in Edinburgh. Costelloe, Raleigh, 
and Renton all embraced Chamberlain’s ‘unauthorised program’ in speeches they 
gave while campaigning in Edinburgh. These three candidates not only supported 
Chamberlain’s platform, but they overtly praised him as well. Costelloe had the 
closest relationship with Chamberlain of any of the candidates in Edinburgh and was 
believed to have been sent to East Edinburgh to challenge Goschen on Chamberlain's 
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wish.124 Chamberlain was in contact with the chairman of Costelloe’s election in 
Edinburgh, but how much involvement he had is unknown.125During the election 
Gladstone wrote to Chamberlain about his involvement in the race and told him that 
Liberal leaders should not meddle in the contest between two Liberals. After the 
election Gladstone even wrote to both Hartington and Goschen to express his joy in 
Goschen’s victory because of the conduct of Chamberlain toward Goschen.126 
The relationship between Costelloe and Chamberlain goes beyond Costelloe 
running against Goschen. At a speech Costelloe delivered in Glasgow as a candidate 
for the St. Rollox district, Chamberlain sent a letter of apology for being absent and 
commented that while he did not want to ‘interfere’ with parliamentary divisions he 
was not connected to, ‘he would be glad to see Mr. Costelloe elected for any division 
to which he might be invited by the Liberal party’.127 Subsequently, when Slone and 
the rest of the Edinburgh East Liberal Association Executive needed someone to run 
against Goschen, they found Costelloe willing to move his unsuccessful candidacy in 
Glasgow to Edinburgh. 
Slone and the Executive invited Costelloe to run as a candidate in Edinburgh 
due to his Radical views and his ties to Chamberlain. They wanted someone who was 
very Radical to challenge the candidacy of Goschen who was an ultra-Whig. Before 
his invitation to become a candidate in the East division, Costelloe was invited to 
speak to the constituents of the division. In that speech he pressed the issue of the 
next Parliament’s programme, indicating that it was extremely important and that the 
‘programme had to some extent been prepared for it already, in the first place, by 
those admirable, masterly, vigorous, and high-minded statements of policy which 
had fallen from Mr. Chamberlain in his recent speeches’.128 Three days later 
Costelloe gave a speech in Hamilton in which he declared, ‘The real contest would 
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no longer be between Whig and Tory, but much more between Radical and Whig’.129 
He went on to say that the new changes to the electorate would result in a 
‘distinctively Radical shade’ and that the ‘Moderate Liberals’ were holding back the 
efforts of Chamberlain.130 With this statement, he asserted that Chamberlain was 
trying to lead the Party forward, but was being held back by the Whigs and Goschen 
was one of the most influential Whigs in the Liberal party. The combination of 
Costelloe’s overt support of Chamberlain’s policy, his willingness to fight against 
moderate Liberals, and Chamberlain’s support of Costelloe made him a good choice 
for the Radicals in charge of the Edinburgh East Liberal Association. By the first of 
October, the Executive of the Edinburgh East Liberal Association had been in 
contact with Costelloe to discuss his candidacy in the district.131 In picking Costelloe 
to run against Goschen it perpetuated the feud between Chamberlain and Goschen 
and also helped to solidify the fight between the Radicals and the Whigs.  
Costelloe did not shy away from the fact that he was in East Edinburgh 
fighting Whiggery. Instead, he openly embraced the fight. He told his constituents 
that voting for him was ‘to declare with a voice that would be heard throughout the 
nation, and whose meaning could not be explained away, that the gospel of the 
Whigs was out of date–(cheers and hisses)–and that the day of a frank, courageous, 
and clear-sighted Radicalism was come’.132 Costelloe even went as far as saying that 
he was opposing Goschen, ‘because he knew that the time had come when the battle 
of principles must be fought amongst those who still took shelter under the Liberal 
name, and that the constituencies should have an opportunity of saying whether the 
Liberalism of the new democracy should be Radical or Whig’.133 Such statements 
reveal that Costelloe’s main reason for running in the district was because he 
opposed Goschen and the Whigs. 
 Raleigh also voiced his support and admiration of Chamberlain. In one 
instance when speaking about the Heriot’s scheme Raleigh said, ‘Unless a man like 
Mr Chamberlain took it up, it would be almost impossible to get the House of 
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Commons to reverse the mistake in regard to that fund’.134 However, this blatantly 
high regard of Chamberlain’s power and position in British politics was not typical in 
Raleigh’s speeches. Raleigh’s references to Chamberlain were usually in a much 
more reserved fashion than statements made by the other two candidates, Costelloe 
and Renton, in Edinburgh who also vocally supported Chamberlain. For example, 
Raleigh told his constituents in a speech that he believed social questions would take 
up a considerable amount of the next Parliament’s time and ‘in the recent speeches of 
Mr Chamberlain–(cheers)–they had abundant proof that public discussion would be 
concentrated for a long time to come upon the inequalities and defects of their social 
system’.135 Raleigh proceeded to make it clear that he did not subscribe to all of 
Chamberlain’s ‘theories’ or ‘remedies’.136 He then closed out his speech by praising 
the ‘good Radical programme for the next Parliament’ and defending Chamberlain’s 
proposal for local government officials to have power to purchase land.137  
 This back and forth on Chamberlain is put into perspective by Raleigh’s own 
reflection on the campaign in which he says that he ‘had to make himself out as a 
Radical’ and that the temperance and home rule advocates were making him 
uncomfortable.138 Raleigh admitted that he also ‘did not exactly welcome Mr 
Chamberlain’s “unauthorised programme”’.139 With such statements, Raleigh reveals 
that he falsely presented himself to the constituents. He probably did so more to 
please his advisor, Professor Calderwood, rather than the constituents themselves. 
Whether he did so because he knew that Calderwood supported Chamberlain and his 
‘unauthorised programme’ or because Calderwood advised him to do so is unclear. 
Raleigh more than likely felt a need to subscribe to a similar political view because 
he was Calderwood’s former student and Calderwood was the person who opened 
the door to the constituency for him. In 1885 Raleigh appeared to be almost a proxy 
for Calderwood himself. 
In several of Renton’s speeches, he too invoked Chamberlain’s name. Renton 
told one audience that he held the same views as Chamberlain on local 
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government.140 He even prefaced his answers on issues such as the land question by 
stating Chamberlain’s opinion and solution regarding the subject before going on to 
endorse the same thought and action. His support of Chamberlain can be summed up 
by his statement that Chamberlain was ‘a man for whom he had very high regard, 
and whose principles in the main he might say he thoroughly adopted’.141 It may 
have been better for Renton, as well as Costelloe and Raleigh, if they had only 
expressed their support of Chamberlain’s ‘unauthorised programme’ instead of their 
support of him as leader of the Party. For example, speaking on Gladstone’s 1885 
election manifesto Costelloe said:  
“the family umbrella” perfectly characterised it. (Cheers.) It formulated a 
programme sufficiently wide to embrace the Whigs, and yet sufficiently 
progressive to allow scope to the pioneers of progress. When Mr. 
Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke were cordially accepting the manifesto 
Mr. Goschen was hurrying up from the opposite direction to put his foot on 
the line. (Laughter).142  
 
This statement supports the notion of Radicals fighting Whigs for a more progressive 
Liberal party. At the end of the speech, a resolution was passed ‘that this meeting 
cordially approves and adopts the political programme and policy formulated by Mr. 
Chamberlain’ not that of  Gladstone ‘and resolves that Mr. Costelloe is a fit and 
proper person to assist in carrying out the same, and to represent this division in the 
people’s Parliament.’143 Even though Costelloe did not explicitly endorse pushing 
Gladstone’s policy aside in favour of Chamberlain’s programme, he did not dispute 
the resolution passed in his favour. 
Renton, on the other hand, expressed his explicit support of Chamberlain as 
the leader of the Liberal party. Although he did not say that Chamberlain should be 
the leader at that moment, he did not indicate how long he should wait to take over. 
In a speech to his constituents, Renton spoke about this:  
He was glad to think he [Gladstone] was going once more to buckle on his 
armour, and that the place in which he would appear in his full strength 
would be Mid-Lothian. (Hear, hear and loud applause.) They must be looking 
around, he added, and seeing who were the public men who now occupied a 
prominent position in this country with reference to who would be likely to 
succeed Mr Gladstone. He, for one, had been carefully reading the various 
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speeches that had been delivered lately by prominent politicians, and he 
confessed that if there was one man more than another to whom he should be 
disposed to entrust the guidance of this country, and to look upon as the 
future leader of the Liberal party, it was the man he named before – Mr 
Chamberlain. (Loud and prolonged applause.)144 
 
With this Renton left no doubt in the minds of his constituents that he was a follower 
of Chamberlain. 
The support of Chamberlain’s ‘unauthorised programme’ surely energised the 
Radicals in the constituency while having an adverse affect upon the Whigs, but as 
for the voters who were undecided about the candidates, the praise of Chamberlain 
and his programme was probably not enough to turn them against a Whig candidate 
on its own. Chamberlain did not want to be seen as a complete opposite to Gladstone 
and believed it to be ‘undesirable to have even the remains of his tremendous 
influence against us’.145 Once the Radical candidates in Edinburgh endorsed 
Chamberlain as the future leader of the Liberal party and declared that, not only did 
they support his policy, but they did so over Gladstone’s own, they lost support 
because the name of Gladstone was an important factor in the city, as Gray suggested 
in his work on Edinburgh.146 The three candidates’ strategies of focussing on 
Chamberlain and his ideas could have been considered attacks upon the traditional 
brand of Liberalism which was dependent on Gladstone. 
 There were other candidates who tried to use Gladstone to their advantage. 
Wilson, Harrison, and Buchanan all knew the benefit of being identified with 
Gladstone and displayed their connection to him to their constituents. Wilson did not 
have a personal connection to Gladstone, but his committee still listed that he was a 
‘warm and consistent supporter of Mr Gladstone’ as one of the five reasons to vote 
for him.147 Harrison was noted by his supporters as having helped get Gladstone 
elected to his seat in Mid-Lothian and as being ‘personally known’ to Gladstone.148 
Buchanan commented on the effect that Gladstone’s appearance had on the workers 
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in 1880 and asked him to make an appearance in the West district in 1885 to help 
him in his race.149 Goschen, whose connection to Gladstone was well known since he 
was a cabinet member, was also aware of Gladstone’s effect on the city. He was 
worried about being overshadowed by Gladstone in Edinburgh. Goschen wrote to 
Rosebery in order to plan his visit around Gladstone’s.150 Gladstone’s effect on some 
of the citizens of Edinburgh is recorded in this poem by David Drysdale: 
What I felt and thought on seeing  
Mr Gladstone’s arrival in Edinburgh 
  
My heart was glad when I set out, 
To see the Grand Old Man, 
Although my breath was very short, 
My hair as white’s the swan. 
  
And when the Grand Old Man appeared, 
Then every head was bared, 
I felt that I was like to cry, 
‘Tis truth I have declared. 
  
I never saw such hearty crowds, 
Nor heard such loud huzzas, 
All hats were flung into the air, 
Midst thunders of applause. 
  
I saw upon some strong men’s cheeks, 
The tears were trickling down, 
In vain tried many stalwart men 
To keep emotion down. 
  
I stood beside some working men, 
Their cries did rend the air 
And when their chief was fairly past, 
They breathed this earnest prayer. 
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“May God protect that good old man, 
“And spare him to us long, 
“Aye ready to defend the right, 
“And to denounce the wrong.” 
  
I then began to hurry home, 
That was not very fast, 
Right glad I’d seen the Brave Old Man, 
Before I breathed my last.151 
 
From this testament, one can see the benefit of a candidate being perceived as an ally 
of Gladstone’s and the drawback if a candidate was viewed as an opponent of him. 
 
Conclusion 
The attention generated by the questions of licensing and education, coupled 
with the local importance placed on the biographies of the candidates reveals that 
disestablishment, though an important aspect of the election, did not dominate the 
election in Edinburgh. Moreover, the idea of historical identity and tradition played a 
significant role in electing each of the candidates in Edinburgh during the 1885 
election. For all the questions that divided the candidates – licensing, education, 
background, liberalism, and, the Church question – the one commonality all of the 
newly elected MPs shared was that they fit into the tradition of the city or how the 
constituents wanted the city’s tradition to be perceived. The contest in the East was 
simple: both candidates were outsiders, but Costelloe was seen as young and 
inexperienced compared to Goschen who was viewed as an experienced, high-
ranking Statesman who could bring his ‘Imperial reputation’ to Edinburgh.152 The 
race in the South was also rather straightforward as it was a choice between the 
young and inexperienced Raleigh who had been branded as an outsider since he had 
left the city, and Harrison, a very experienced local politician. The race in the West 
was slightly more complicated as it was between Jamieson, a well-known local man, 
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and Buchanan, a young, but experienced outsider. Buchanan was in a tough race 
because the West was the wealthiest district in the city and therefore contained the 
most Tories and Whigs. He made a strong plea that he would continue to represent 
the whole burgh and reminded his constituents of the city’s tradition of liberalism. 
The Central division’s race was even less straightforward. Two of the candidates, 
Renton and Napier, did not have a viable connection to the city or any relevant 
experience while both Wilson and Black were locals who had some experience in 
government. Black had only one term as a Town Councilman and was known from 
his father whilst Wilson had rose through the ranks of the Town Council to become 
the treasurer and as a result was well known and liked. 
A consequence of the Third Reform Act was the breakup of the large cities’ 
historical identities. In the pursuit of equalising parliamentary districts, the cities 
were divided into single-member constituencies. This led to the new districts’ 
development of political identities unique to that district, rather than the city as a 
whole. Lawrence points to several examples of this and concludes that after 1885 no 
one party could dominate the cities.153 In 1885, Edinburgh as a whole was able to 
hold onto its historical identity despite the break-up. The divisions among some of 
the voters were brought to the forefront of the election due in large part to the new 
caucuses that were established upon the splitting up of the city. One could argue that 
the city was split because it elected both Radicals and Whigs, but it has been 
established that they were elected based on the historical political identity of 
Edinburgh. This was the last election in which the Liberal dominance was 
maintained. Moving beyond the 1885 election the city faced a new test to its 
historical political identity in the question of Irish Home Rule.  
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Edinburgh Liberal Associations and the 1886 Election 
 
 The year following the 1885 general election saw the introduction of new 
legislation pertaining to the future of Ireland. With the introduction of Irish Home 
Rule, a great strain was placed upon the Liberal party, both nationally and locally, 
which ultimately led to a split within the Party. This split, between Home Rule and 
Unionist Liberals, has been well documented by historians; however, the focus has 
traditionally been on high politics with more attention placed on national political 
figures and national associations. There has been little focus on how the local 
political figures, and especially the local Associations, reacted to the question of Irish 
Home Rule. Though Catriona Macdonald has explored the local reaction in Paisley 
and both Catriona Burness and John McCaffrey have written about the local reaction 
in Glasgow, the local impact in Scotland’s capital city has largely been ignored with 
the exception of the reactions of a few of the local elite.1 This chapter aims to 
understand the impact of the introduction of Irish Home Rule on the local politics 
and Liberal Associations of Edinburgh. 
Based on the election results, the 1885 election was very favourable to the 
Liberal party in Scotland. The Liberals won 62 of the 72 parliamentary seats.2 Be that 
as it may, the Liberal party suffered greatly at the hands of internal fighting which 
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caused the unity of the party to be weakened. As mentioned in chapter two, there 
were twenty-eight double candidacies during the 1885 election on the Liberal side.3 
Most of these were brought on by the shift to single-member constituencies through 
the reforms of the Third Reform Act which enabled Whig and Radical candidates to 
fight directly against one another in a constituency for the supremacy of liberalism. 
 In Edinburgh the local Liberal Associations were also injured due to the 
infighting that took place during the 1885 general election. Edinburgh gained two 
seats when it was divided into four individual parliamentary districts as a result of the 
implementation of the Third Reform Act. In order to cope with these changes, the 
local Liberal Association decided to also divide itself into four single associations, 
one for each of the four new parliamentary districts. During this process the Radical 
section of the local Liberals took control of each of the four newly created Liberal 
Associations. This resulted in all four of the Liberal Associations supporting 
parliamentary candidates that held similar advanced views on the leading questions 
in the 1885 election. The legitimacy that the endorsement of the Liberal Association 
was supposed to bring to the official Liberal candidate was called into question by 
the Liberal opposition because of this one-sided support. If any of the Associations 
had been controlled by Whigs or had supported a Whig in the election, it would have 
made it difficult for that wing of the Party to undermine the legitimacy of the 
Associations because the Association that they controlled might have had its 
legitimacy called into question as well.4 
This feud among the local Liberals became worse with the result of the 
election because only one of the official Liberal candidates won his race. 
Consequently, in early 1886 there was another fight for control of the local Liberal 
Associations in Edinburgh. This fight led to the breakup of some of the local Liberal 
Associations, largely based on the ideological differences between the Whigs and 
Radicals. However, in the 1886 election the main question to cause a divide amongst 
the Liberals was very different than the questions of disestablishment or local 
licensing which were prominent questions in 1885. The Irish Home Rule question 
did not remain in the Whig versus Radical framework as the other questions had 
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done because it affected members of both wings in the same way. Irish Home Rule 
caused a situation where Whigs and Radicals, who had just been in opposition to one 
another, worked together against other Whigs and Radicals with whom they may 
have just been allied against. 
 
A renewed fight for legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the four Edinburgh Liberal Associations was further 
hindered by the outcome of the 1885 election. Buchanan, who was elected for the 
Edinburgh West seat, was the only successful candidate endorsed by a local Liberal 
Association in Edinburgh. He was also the only Liberal candidate in Edinburgh that 
did not have an independent Liberal running against him. The other three candidates 
were endorsed by their local Liberal Associations and lost their races to independent 
Liberals. This outcome resulted in the failure of the Liberal Associations which were 
set up to combine the Liberal opinion of the district and then place that voting bloc of 
members behind one officially nominated candidate. The failure of the Liberal 
Associations, and in such a predominantly Liberal district, led the legitimacy of the 
Association to be called into question. The Liberal Associations in the Central, 
South, and East districts had an unofficial mandate placed on their legitimacy due to 
the loss of their nominated candidates to independent Liberals. Shortly after the 1885 
election all three of the Liberal Associations whose endorsed candidates lost to 
independent Liberals had to fight to maintain their legitimacy within their districts. In 
both the Central and South districts, committee members of the winning independent 
Liberal candidates attempted to reorganise the Liberals in their respective 
parliamentary districts. Although both of the committees claimed that they were 
trying to reunite the Liberals in their districts so that there would be a cohesive 
liberal thought and vote in the districts, which appears to be a very noble position, 
their true objective was to secure the legitimacy of a parliamentary Liberal 
association for themselves. 
Rosebery expressed his concern about the division that took place during the 
1885 campaign and his desire to unite the Liberals in the local parliamentary district. 
At the Scottish Liberal Association’s annual meeting in February the unification of 
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the Liberals dominated Rosebery’s statement. In a letter to the Association Rosebery 
wrote:  
Almost all our Liberal Association require complete reorganisation, if not 
reconstruction, together with a fair presentation of the districts and a clear 
definition of their duties. We have much to learn yet – and, perhaps, from 
some bitter experience – before we can arrive at a satisfactory solution of 
these difficult problems. I would urge that some small committee be 
appointed to consider the subject very thoroughly, and to report to a later 
meeting of the Association. Some of the local Associations have perhaps 
exceeded their proper functions, and some are not held in the proper respect, 
often not from their own fault, but from the abstinence of Liberals who ought 
to combine for the sake of the party to make these organisations as useful and 
as representative as possible. How far a Liberal Association can carry its 
functions without straining its authority is also an important point, but the 
main thing to mind is this: to get as large a number as possible of the Liberals 
of a district to elect the representatives who form the Executive Council. 
Unless you have a broad base to rest upon, you can neither hope for authority 
nor command respect.5 
 
In this letter, Rosebery did not identify which Associations he was referring to, but it 
could certainly apply to the local Associations in Edinburgh. His description of the 
breakdown of the Liberals within the Associations and his concern of the loss of 
legitimacy mirrored that of the local Associations in Edinburgh. In fact, Rosebery 
cites the division within the South Edinburgh parliamentary district as a reason for 
reorganising the Liberal Associations in a letter to Gladstone. Rosebery writes, ‘As to 
the “Liberal Association”, that is Raleigh’s committee which was well beaten at the 
last election. It represents nothing and nobody: it declared Harrison unfit, Harrison 
set them at defiance and left them at the bottom of the poll’. Mr Reekie, a member of 
Raleigh’s committee, asserted that the Liberal Association represents the Liberal 
opinion of the district which Rosebery said ‘is one of the many proofs that our 
Liberal organization wants reorganizing’.6 
Those who sought the legitimacy of the Association as a reason for reform 
used the belief that in order for an Association to be viewed as legitimate it needed a 
broad base of support from the constituents. Legitimacy was the central aspect in the 
suggestion of reuniting the Liberals in Edinburgh. The loss of legitimacy in the 
Liberal Association of the Central division was openly expressed in mid-January 
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1886 when the committee that formed to support Wilson’s candidature held a 
meeting to form a new Liberal Association. Before the members of the committee 
voted to form a new Liberal Association, Bailie Anderson spoke on the importance 
of Liberal unity and the legitimacy of the Association:  
With regard to the unity of the Liberal party, that unless an association or 
committee fairly represented in its own composition of general Liberalism of 
the district that it professed to represent, it must want that influence and that 
power which should belong to a Liberal organisation. Just in proportion as it 
represented every plank in the Liberal platform would it become an influence 
and power in guiding the opinions of the people.7 
 
Anderson finished his speech by offering the Liberal Association that existed in 
Edinburgh between 1880 and 1885 as an example of the type of association he would 
like to have because it had broad authority over the city’s politics. While this type of 
an association sounds good, its establishment was not the main factor motivating the 
members of the committee. Anderson said that the Association needed to have a 
broad membership in order to be legitimate and therefore to have the political power 
to sway opinion in the district. However, he made no plea for the opposition to join. 
The members of this committee had emphasised the importance of unification and 
had complained about the lack of cooperation and the actions of the Central 
Edinburgh Liberal Association. Despite this, they then formed a new Liberal 
Association with no regard to the current Association or without inviting any of the 
members from either of Wilson’s Liberal opponents’ committees to join.8 Wilson’s 
committee was not truly concerned about reuniting the Liberals of the district; rather, 
they sought the legitimacy that was gained by being the official Liberal organisation 
of the district. 
In the South district, Harrison’s committee’s goal of obtaining the legitimacy 
that an association brings was veiled in the reunification of the Liberals better than it 
was in the Central district. The desire to reunite the Liberals in the South came about 
mainly due to the death of Sir George Harrison in late December, thus creating the 
need for a by-election to fill his seat in South Edinburgh. Members of Harrison’s 
committee wasted no time finding a replacement having invited Hugh Culling 
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Eardley Childers to stand as a candidate even before Harrison’s funeral.9 Childers 
had represented Pontefract since 1860 and had held many posts throughout his 
career, most recently acting as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, yet he had lost his 
seat in the 1885 general election. This made him a prime candidate to fill any 
vacancy for the Liberal party which brought him to the attention of Harrison's 
committee.10 Childers was not, however, the first choice of Gladstone who wrote to 
Rosebery on the matter: ‘I am shocked and grieved of the death of Sir George 
Harrison. It would be an excellent thing if they [Edinburgh constituents] would take 
Herschel for the vacancy. I cannot understand Childers. His queer letter about 
Pontefract looks to me as if he did not wish to come into Parliament’.11 Rosebery 
reassured Gladstone that Childers was the best candidate between the two because 
Edinburgh constituents had ‘a strong prejudice against English Lawyers’ and 
Childers had been a cabinet member.12 Rosebery’s reasoning fits in the political 
tradition of Edinburgh discussed in chapter four. Edinburgh constituents highly 
valued political prestige and they certainly distrusted lawyers.  
In Childers’ reply to Harrison’s committee, he said that ‘he heartily accepts 
the invitation to offer himself as a candidate, on the understanding that the majority 
of the electors are represented by the committee’.13 Childers did not want to be 
viewed as an outsider who came to Edinburgh at the request of only a few citizens. If 
he had been invited to stand at the Liberal Association’s request, he would not have 
been concerned with conveying ‘that the majority of the electors are represented’ as 
it would have been implied that the Liberal Association was the embodiment of the 
Liberal electors of the division. Upon Childers’ agreement to come forward as a 
candidate, a general meeting of Harrison’s committee was called. At the meeting a 
resolution was proposed to endorse Childers as a candidate which propelled a small 
protest among some of the members present. The protest questioned the extent of the 
authority that the committee had. One of the protestors, J. Heddle, said, ‘They [the 
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committee] had objected very strongly to the actions of the caucus; and they, who 
had received no commission from the public, and were entirely a personal 
committee... must exercise care in regard to the course they perused’.14 Heddle 
proposed that they hold a public meeting open to all Liberals in the Southern 
division. When that was denied, he ‘pointed out that if there was any right to state the 
action they were now taking, it lay with the Liberal committee’.15 The chairman of 
the committee defended their action and responded that they were meeting as 
individuals. It was then pointed out that this was the same action that they took to 
secure the return of Harrison in 1885, and determined that if anyone disagreed with 
this course, they should leave the meeting. Heddle and his supporters left in protest 
declaring that they too supported the candidacy of Childers, but they rejected the 
actions of the committee. Once the protesters left, the remaining members of the 
committee voted unanimously to invite Childers as their candidate and to form into a 
new committee to promote his election. The formation of this new committee was 
done very casually as it was suggested and approved to keep the same officers. The 
new committee then sent a copy of the resolution to the Southern Liberal Association 
and invited them to join them in their support of Childers.16 
The Executive of the Southern Liberal Association rejected the resolution for 
many reasons. The Executive had not been consulted on Childers’ nomination as this 
went further than them rejecting the resolution because Childers complained to 
Gladstone that the Radicals ‘are carrying on a controversy’ about the ‘supposed 
impropriety of the action of those who asked me to stand’ indicating that it was 
causing him trouble outside the Association as well.17 The Executive also 
complained that, although the representative from Childers’ committee claimed that 
they sought to reunite the Liberals of the district, the resolution only invited members 
of the Association to join in the support of Childers. The Executive claimed that by 
nominating Childers his committee had made an ‘infraction of the rights of the 
electors’.18 Raleigh, who had lost to Harrison in the last election, warned Rosebery of 
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the consequences of Harrison’s committee having invited Childers so soon and 
without consulting anyone from his committee: 
If these gentlemen had had the common courtesy to recognise our existence, I 
might have induced my committee to concur in the nomination, and go to re-
unite the party, at least for the moment. As it is, the case stands this –  
 Since the election, some of my last supporters (e.g. Telfer, the 
Chairman of the Trades Council) have been in favour of dividing the party. 
They wish to organise the Advanced Liberals on a basis of their own – Dr. 
Calderwood & I have done our best to moderate the energy of the Separatists, 
and to preserve the unity of the party. Our reward is, that the Whigs 
deliberately ignore us and rule us out of the party at the first opportunity. 
What my supporters will do now, I don’t know. My only safe course is to 
refrain altogether from advising them.19 
 
Raleigh claimed that he and Calderwood had been labouring to keep the Party 
together, but the latest actions of Harrison’s committee would cause a greater divide 
between the two local wings of the Party. Raleigh advised Rosebery that there was 
nothing more he could do.  
 There were other reasons for the Executive’s opposition to Childers that were 
not based  on party rules. Duncan McLaren, Edinburgh’s MP from 1865 to 1881, 
openly expressed his opposition to Childers at the meeting. McLaren was concerned 
that if Childers was elected, local concerns would be pushed aside because 
Edinburgh would have two of its four MPs in the cabinet. However, Scotland as a 
whole highly valued experience and Edinburgh had traditionally balanced its 
representation by having both a ‘local’ MP and a well known ‘national’ politician.20 
The other member of the Executive to hold political motives behind his reason was 
Calderwood. Childers decried Calderwood as ‘a very honest straight-forward man’ 
who was ‘against everyone who had to do with Harrison’s election’.21 This was 
likely due to ideological differences between himself and the members of Harrison’s 
committee such as their stance on disestablishment and it may also explain why 
Calderwood was against Childers’ candidature. Childers was a high ranking Whig 
and as such he was opposed to disestablishment. Calderwood, along with most of the 
members of the Executive, favoured disestablishment since this Association had 
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nominated a Radical during the 1885 election, thus leaving most of them 
unfavourable to Childers based on this political issue.22 
The Executive of the Southern Liberal Association was interested in reuniting 
the Liberals of the district, but they felt that no candidate should be nominated before 
they met as a united body. More than likely this too was a ploy to get rid of Childers. 
The Executive knew that the Association had lost its legitimacy amongst most of the 
constituents. The members believed that this might return some of their power or at 
the least get rid of Childers by causing Harrison’s committee to remove their 
invitation to Childers due to the ‘infraction of the rights of the electors’ and under the 
guise of reuniting all the Liberal electors of the division who would have then been 
able to vote on which candidate to invite to stand.23 
Childers’ committee rejected the conditions for a reunion called for by 
Executive of the Southern Liberal Association. The rejection left no hope of unifying 
the Liberals in the district and placed the Southern Liberal Association in an 
abnormal situation. The Executive called a general meeting of the Southern Liberal 
Association to decide what action the Association should take. At the meeting a very 
exhaustive motion was proposed that the Association disapprove of Childers’ 
candidature. There were a number of reasons they opposed Childers’ candidature. 
First, he had received a pension from the government, a move of which, as advanced 
Liberals, they disapproved. Second was the claim that he had accepted the offer to 
stand on the day of Harrison’s death. It is known that Childers had already accepted 
the invitation to stand two days after Harrison’s death, but it is unknown whether he 
had accepted it sooner as some claimed. However, the Executive should not have 
complained about this because Calderwood, a member of the Executive, wrote to 
Rosebery on the day of Harrison’s death seeking his approval to bring Raleigh 
forward again as a candidate to fill the seat.24 Rosebery discussed the situation with 
Gladstone saying, ‘I thought it indecorous of Harrison’s committee to ask Childers so 
soon. But I found out that the other side had asked candidates with equal promptitude 
but less success’. Finally, throughout the motion, the Executive’s central complaint 
against Childers’ candidature was that the legitimacy of the Association as the 
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official Liberal organisation of the division was being undermined by the actions of 
Harrison’s committee and by Childers.25  
The Radicals obviously outnumbered the Whigs as they took control of the 
Association in 1885, but the makeup of the Association contained members who 
identified with both wings of the Party. The Whigs who were present at the meeting 
brought opposition to the motion to disapprove of Childers’ candidature and 
defended Childers, but the main debate of the meeting focussed on who had 
legitimacy in the division: the Liberal Association or Harrison’s committee. The 
seconder of the motion said that ‘he thought that Mr Childers had practically defied 
the Association and had prevented any chance of union amongst them’. In dealing 
with Party politics, the Liberal Association was supposed to be the legitimate 
authority of the parliamentary district; therefore, Childers would have defied the 
Association by not coming before the Association. However, the legitimacy of the 
Association was already in question before Childers accepted an invitation to come 
forward.26  
After the motion against Childers was seconded, the members of the 
Association who were against it raised an amendment to disband the Association in 
protest to the motion because the Association had lost its legitimacy and, therefore, 
no longer represented the Liberal opinion of the district. The amendment was 
proposed by Ninian Elliot who said that ‘whatever resolution they passed would not 
in the slightest affect Mr Childers’ candidature’. The amendment was seconded by T. 
C. Jack who said ‘he thought this Association, as an Association, had completely 
discredited itself in the eyes of the community’. The evidence he provided to prove 
his point was that Harrison had won the election against the Association’s nominated 
candidate. This brought out a debate on whether Harrison had received the most 
Liberal votes in the election. The proposer of the amendment did not deny that 
Harrison had received Tory votes, his dispute was with the number of the Tory votes 
he received. He believed Harrison received no more than 700 Tory votes while 
Joseph Thomson, a supporter of the Association, claimed that Harrison received 
1,600 Tory votes. Harrison had won the election by 1,400 votes; therefore, depending 
on the actual Tory vote, either candidate may have had the majority of the Liberal 
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vote and consequently the claim to the legitimacy of the Liberal organisation in the 
district. The motion was passed eighty to three with neither Elliot nor Jack voting.27 
The Southern Liberal Association failed to endorse any candidate and took no 
other action during the by-election other than passing the resolution against Childers. 
Gladstone’s election agent, P. W. Campbell, attributed this in part to Conservative 
W. G. Hepburn-Scott whose entrance into the race ‘practically closed the Liberal 
ranks’.28 However, despite numerous attempts to persuade someone to stand against 
Childers, there were not any Liberals willing to come forward against him.29 Raleigh 
wrote to Rosebery that ‘it is of course impossible for me to place my claim in 
competition with him’.30 The reason no one was willing to stand against Childers was 
surely due to his stature within the Liberal Party. This placed the members of the 
Association in a difficult position. They rejected Childers based on his unwillingness 
to acknowledge the Association’s authority in the district by not having sought its 
approval before he decided to stand, but if they would have publicly sought a 
candidate of their own through the Association and failed to get them to stand, it 
would have furthered the damage to their claim of legitimacy. 
 
Table 5.1: Edinburgh South Parliamentary Elections31 
Candidates Nov. 1885 general election Jan. 1886 by-election 
Harrison 4,273  
Raleigh 2,874  
Childers  4,029 
Hepburn-Scott  1,737 
Total 7,147 5,766 
 
Childers won the by-election by more than 2,500 votes. His lone opponent, 
Conservative Hepburn-Scott, received 1,730 votes. This vote total suggests that 
during the 1885 election Raleigh could have had the majority of the Liberal vote if 
the same amount of Tory voters that supported Hepburn-Scott had supported 
Harrison. This would support the Association’s claim of legitimacy. However, the 
strength of the Tory vote in the 1886 election is questionable as some of the 
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supporters of the Association had indicated that they intended to vote for Hepburn-
Scott as a protest against Childers’ candidature due to the disregard that had been 
shown towards the Association. More likely, the majority of them withheld their vote 
which would account for the large decrease in the voter turnout just two months after 
the general election. 
Nevertheless, due to the Association members’ threat of voting for Hepburn-
Scott during the campaign, the members of Childers’ committee could still question 
the Association’s claim of legitimacy because the amount of cross-over voting in 
either the 1885 or the 1886 by-election is unknown. The Conservative vote for 
Hepburn-Scott was probably not skewed that much by Liberals. The last 
Conservative to run in the pre-Third Reform Act double-member constituency of 
Edinburgh, J. H. A. MacDonald, received 5,651 votes in the general election of 1880. 
The average of the Conservative total vote across the city in the 1880 election is 
slightly above 1,400 votes. The West and South districts contained the highest 
concentration of middle-class voters who were more inclined to vote for a 
Conservative. The West district had the highest number of middle-class constituents 
in the city and in the 1885 election, Jamison, the Conservative in the race, received 
2,625 votes. By the 1886 by-election, there were also more than 3,500 voters added 
throughout the whole city. Therefore, it is likely that the South had a higher 
percentage than the mean as well and, since Harrison only won by 1,400 votes, it is 
very conceivable that Raleigh held the majority of the Liberal vote.32 
 Even though the Association was more than likely supported by the majority 
of the Liberals in the district, its legitimacy was severely damaged due to the 1885 
election, 1886 by-election, and the complete disregard of the Association by 
Childers. Consequently, the Executive of the South Liberal Association decided to 
dissolve the Association in early February. Unlike the Central district where a new 
Association was formed with no regard to the Liberal Association already set up in 
the district, in the South they dissolved the current Association and even voted to 
take on its financial obligations. With the polarisation that had taken place within the 
Liberal party, this seemingly sensible action was attacked by opponents of the 
current Association. The opponents of the Association upheld the desire to have a 
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new united Liberal Association, but rejected ‘the idea of a handful of busy bodies 
undertaking to legislate for the 8700 electors in the Southern Division’. The main 
complaint was with the proposed constitution in which the members of the 
Association were accused of trying to divide the party by including a platform. The 
proposed rule that the Association would endorse candidates in all cases involving 
more than one Liberal candidate in the field also brought opposition to the 
Association by those who only wanted the Association to vote on multiple Liberal 
candidates if there were a Tory in the race.33 
 At the opening meeting of the new Association, chairman Bailie Turnbull 
said ‘that it was a matter of regret that they should already have to take steps to heal 
divisions in the Liberal Party of Edinburgh... It was pretty plain that they were back 
to where they were before the United Liberal Association was formed’. Like Bailie 
Anderson, who opposed the Radical controlled Liberal Association in the Central 
district, Bailie Turnbull also pointed towards the United Liberal Association as an 
example for the new association to aspire to. At the meeting, speakers defended the 
addition of a platform as a way to avoid a division in the party at elections. They 
believed that if the Liberal opinion of the division was already expressed through a 
platform, there would be no need to divide on questions during an election.34 
 The formation of the new South Liberal Association did not bring about the 
reunion of the Liberals in the divisions; rather, it actually contributed to the further 
polarisation of the two wings of the Liberal party. Less than two weeks after the 
formation of the new Liberal Association in the South, the members of Childers’ 
committee formed the Parliamentary Liberal committee for South Edinburgh. The 
members of this new committee complained that the Liberal Association was 
dividing the Liberals in the district. The committee they formed was their solution to 
this divide. The Committee had two goals that were set out in the first resolution 
passed by the Committee: ‘(1) to secure the continuance of the Liberal representation 
of the division, and (2) to promote the united expression of opinion upon questions of 
importance as these arise in conjunction with other Liberal organisations’. James 
Thom proposed this resolution and said that there was still a possibility that the 
Liberals could reunite. He then, as others had done, pointed to the Edinburgh United 
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Liberal Association as a model Association. Thom ‘believed that the party [the old 
Southern Liberal Association] failed because they did not sufficiently recognise the 
right of private judgement’ as they were supposed to be bound by its resolutions even 
if they disagreed with them.35 This is made clearer by Bailie Russell who said that he 
had been a member in the Association and felt as if he had no voice in the 
Association. These men were complaining about the use of the caucus in the 
Association. As discussed in chapter two, there were several critics of the caucus in 
late-Victorian Britain who often complained that it was anti-democratic and enabled 
a few men to impose their political will on the whole Association.36  
Both Thom and Russell were playing to the anti-democratic view of the 
caucus when they spoke of why there needed to be an alternative to the Liberal 
Association. However, Russell’s solution to the anti-democratic problem was to set 
up the power structure of the Liberal Committee in a pyramid, basically identical to 
that of the old and new Liberal Association. Russell said that ‘it was necessary for 
them to have some sort of working mechanics which would enable the object of the 
associations to be carried out’. He believed that this committee would not put men 
into the position who would abuse their power. With this, he reveals that the real 
problem he had was not the caucus, but instead the men running it.37 
 The Parliamentary Liberal Committee for South Edinburgh was formed 
because the members said they wanted to reunite the Liberal party of the district, yet 
they declined to join the new Association for two reasons. First, they did not believe 
in the proposed platform which, had they joined, they could have voted on and 
changed if they had the majority of voters. Second, they did not like the power 
structure of the old Association due to those in charge which again, had they joined, 
they could have voted their own members into power if they had the majority. 
Instead of joining in forming a new United Liberal Association, they set up their own 
organisation which polarised the Liberals even further. Still, despite their objection to 
its use in the old Association, they used the same power structure of the caucus to set 
up their organisation. Reuniting the Liberals and the oppression of the caucus were 
reasons used to validate their action because their true goal was to gain the 
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legitimacy of the Liberal Association to help propel their political ideology within 
the district. 
  The new Liberal Associations in Edinburgh were not all set up under the 
guise of reuniting the Liberals as some were set up to attract members from one wing 
of the Party. In late January constituents in the East division of Edinburgh formed the 
Radical and Advanced Liberal Association for the East Division of Edinburgh. The 
membership of the Association was made up of supporters of Costelloe which is not 
surprising given that they were Radicals. However, it is quite curious in view of the 
fact that the Liberal Association that already existed in East Edinburgh had been 
dominated by Radicals and had supported Costelloe in the 1885 election. In the 
inaugural address of the Radical and Advanced Liberal Association for the East 
Division of Edinburgh, the speakers made no reference to the other Liberal 
Association or any plea for the union of the Liberals in the district. Instead, the main 
focus of the meeting was their opposition to Goschen. Goschen was criticised for 
voting against the extension of the franchise to the counties and for being a 
carpetbagger. The members of this Radical and Advanced Liberal Association did 
cover some political issues. One of the speakers, Cunninghame Graham, an extreme 
Radical and Liberal MP for North-West Lanarkshire from 1886 to 1892, pointed to 
land reform as an important Radical issue and said that it, along with the regulation 
of capital and labour, would be the focus of a Radical Government. Nevertheless, 
Goschen was clearly the target of the Association. At the close of the meeting a 
resolution was passed against him for ‘supporting the Conservative Party in the 
House of Commons on matters so deeply affecting the welfare of the agricultural 
labourers, and his desertion of Mr Gladstone and the Liberal Party.’ The main goal of 
this Association was certainly to oust Goschen.38 
 Even though this group of Liberal electors chose to name their Association 
the Radical and Advanced Liberal Association, they too clearly wanted to be viewed 
as a legitimate outlet of the constituents’ desires. However, the Association’s 
authority was challenged immediately following its founding. The members of this 
Association sent a letter to Goschen to inform him of the resolution passed at its first 
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meeting. Goschen dismissed both the resolution and the Association. Writing about 
the Association to James Cowan, the chairman of his election committee in 1885, 
Goschen declared, ‘To such a body I owe no explanation’. The Radical and 
Advanced Liberal Association was not viewed as representing the Liberals in the 
district and consequently their resolution was not taken seriously by Goschen.39 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Irish Home Rule is widely seen as the 
major cause of the breakup of the Liberal party. Additionally, Hutchison points out 
that the Liberal party was already at odds with itself over questions like 
disestablishment, but he concludes that the Church Liberals were ‘quite secure’ in the 
Liberal party. Indeed, the Liberals in Edinburgh were at odds with one another so 
much so that three of the districts split, yet at the same time both groups of Liberals 
wanted to stay within the Party. This led them to set up opposing Associations in an 
attempt to capture the legitimacy of the district and in doing so they would be able to 
shape the Party towards their brand of liberalism. It is noteworthy that the only 
Liberals in Edinburgh that did not divide and create separate Associations were in the 
West district, which was the only district that had a single Liberal candidate run in 
the 1885 election. This further demonstrates that the disunity that stemmed from the 
1885 election was the leading factor in the early 1886 spilt before the introduction of 
Irish Home Rule.40 
 
The reunification of the Liberals 
The jockeying for authority within the individual parliamentary districts by 
the various Liberal Associations in Edinburgh was interrupted by Gladstone’s 
introduction of Irish Home Rule. In early April, Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule Bill 
was presented to the House of Commons and on 8 June 1886, after two months of 
debate, a vote on the Bill was held. The measure was defeated by a vote of 341 to 
311. Ninety-four Liberals voted against the Bill including twenty-three from 
Scotland.41 Three of the MPs sitting for Edinburgh – Buchanan, Goschen and Wilson 
– voted against it as well, while Childers, the Home Secretary, was the lone 
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exception among Edinburgh’s MPs. With this defeat, the Government dissolved and 
an election was called for mid-July. The defeat of the Government’s Bill, coupled 
with the Liberals splitting their vote, placed the local Liberal Associations and their 
members into a situation where they had to decide whom they were going to back. 
For the majority of the Association members in Edinburgh it was a decision between 
their current MP and Gladstone. Historians have debated how the Irish question 
affected various Liberals. Some have described it as the ‘passing of the Whigs’, 
indicating that the majority of the Whigs left the Liberal party in favour of becoming 
a member of the new Liberal Unionist party. More recently others have argued that 
both wings of the Party had defectors, but Gladstone retained the majority of all the 
different types of Liberal MPs. However, some historians acknowledge that both 
Whigs and Radicals left the Party, but still see it as a split between left and right 
leaning ideologies. Edinburgh brings a different perspective to the debate given that 
three of its four Liberal Associations spilt prior to the introduction of Irish Home 
Rule and created two separate Associations in the each of the three parliamentary 
districts, two of which were between Whigs and Radicals. This enables insight into 
how the ideological stance of the local Associations affected their attitude on Irish 
Home Rule.42 
There were two stages that the various Liberal Associations in the country 
underwent during this time. First, they reacted to Gladstone’s initial introduction of 
Irish Home Rule, as in other constituencies, by indicating either their support for or 
opposition to the Government’s Bills in April and May.43 Second, after Parliament 
voted against the second reading of the Bill in June, the Associations began 
endorsing candidates for the 1886 election based principally on the candidates’ 
stances on Irish home Rule. The Liberals of the four parliamentary districts in 
Edinburgh were all in a different condition when the Irish question was introduced.  
The West district, having just one Liberal Association, had the most in common with 
the rest of the country. The other three districts had two Liberal Associations or 
organisations in their districts. While both the Central and South districts’ 
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Associations were divided along the political lines of Whig and Radical, the East 
district had two Radical Associations. There were two interesting developments that 
took place among the Liberal Associations in Edinburgh during this time. First, in 
some cases, supporters of the Association in 1885 and early 1886 questioned the 
legitimacy of the Association after it voted to support Irish Home Rule. Second, even 
though two of the districts were split along political lines of Whig and Radical, all of 
the Associations were divided within themselves on the question of Irish Home Rule. 
A better understanding of the effects of Irish Home Rule in Edinburgh is ascertained 
by examining how these different districts reacted to the Irish question. 
The West Liberal Association was the only Liberal Association in Edinburgh 
to survive the 1885 election intact. There is one key reason why it stayed together 
while the other Liberal Associations in Edinburgh did not: the West only had one 
Liberal candidate in the 1885 election while the other districts had two or more. The 
harmony that the West Liberal Association enjoyed came to an end upon the 
introduction of Irish Home Rule. In late April when Irish Home Rule was announced, 
the Executive came out in support of the Government’s Bills. After this, Buchanan 
called for a meeting of all Liberals in the district to discuss his position on the 
question before the Executive could call an Association meeting to vote on their 
recommendation to support the Irish Bills. Buchanan’s tactic did not prevail as he 
had hoped because, on a split vote, a motion passed ‘...regret[ting] that he cannot 
support the Irish legislation proposed by the Government, which, in the opinion of 
the meeting, afford a satisfactory basis for the settlement of the Irish Question’.44 
Buchanan went on to vote against the Irish Bills in early June. 
The Executive Committee of the West Liberal Association worked quickly 
after the vote in an attempt to persuade their members against Buchanan. On 16 June 
they held a meeting and passed a motion against Buchanan due to his vote against the 
Government’s Irish Home Rule Bill. The Executive concluded that based on 
Buchanan’s vote, they ‘cannot recommend his re-election as Member for the 
division’.45 They thought they were justified in not recommending him due to the 
outcome of the debate that took place in the district leading up to the vote. They then 
called for a General Committee meeting to discuss their motion to not endorse 
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Buchanan.46 The Executive Committee’s motion did not bring any criticism, but the 
fact that they met alone did anger some members. The motion was surely the reason 
for the criticism, but the Association’s caucus setup was attacked just as the other 
three Liberal Associations had been attacked throughout the 1885 election.  
 William McEwen, a successful Edinburgh brewer and a constituent in the 
West district, said that meetings of the Executive should not take place without the 
full General Committee and further declared that ‘nothing has been done more to 
prejudicially affect Associations of the kind then the very general idea amongst 
electors that two or three active members control the whole thing’.47 McEwen also 
pointed out that the actions of the Association were being monitored by the ‘papers’. 
This was certainly supposed to be taken as a threat by the Executive as McEwen was 
trying to persuade the Executive to act as he wanted or the legitimacy of the 
Association would be called into question.48 The following day the Secretary for the 
West Liberal Association replied to McEwen’s claim that the Executive was acting 
underhandedly. He said that the actions of the Executive were in accordance with the 
Constitution of the Association and that no rules of the Association had been 
violated. McEwen responded to this by acknowledging that no actual rules had been 
broken; however, he still objected to the Executive’s actions because the Government 
had been dissolved and the Liberal party was divided on the question of Irish Home 
Rule. He believed that Buchanan’s ‘jury should not be the few who attended the 
meeting last night’. At this time, the legitimacy of the Association might not yet have 
been in question, but the setup of the Association and the idea of the caucus was 
certainly under scrutiny.49  
The week after the Executive passed the motion against Buchanan, there was 
a meeting of the General Committee to discuss the motion. The two opposing sides 
of the motion based their opinions on the role of the Association more than either the 
merits of Buchanan or the question of Irish Home Rule. Those in favour of the 
motion said that Buchanan voted against the Government and the Association could 
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not approve of his actions, while those opposed to the motion believed that the 
Association should stay neutral on the subject because it ‘would have the effect of 
driving out of it a majority of its members’. Following up on this idea, a counter-
motion was introduced that ‘it was inexpedient in the circumstance to make the point 
of any recommendation to the constituency’. This led to a small compromise on the 
part of those favouring the motion to not recommend Buchanan. The Chairman of the 
meeting said his interpretation of the motion ‘was, not that they offered any 
opposition to Mr Buchanan, but simply that they did not endorse his candidature, on 
the ground that they disapproved of his voting against the second reading of the Irish 
bill of the Government, and that they were in favour of the principle of that bill’. 
Even with this interpretation placed on the motion, one-third of the members present 
voted against it.50 The Edinburgh West Liberal Association was not alone: the West 
Perthshire Liberal Association also offered no opposition to their sitting MP who 
opposed Irish Home Rule when they had voted to support it.51 The Executive’s 
motion to not recommend Buchanan as the parliamentary candidate passed by the 
General Committee, but it was basically an empty motion. The Liberal Association 
was set up to organise the Liberal vote behind one candidate and in this instance the 
Association was sending the message that, although they did not approve of 
Buchanan’s actions, they were not recommending anyone to stand against him and 
that the members were welcome to vote for him. In this case, the Association 
essentially delegitimised itself by making its own opinion irrelevant.   
The role of Irish Home Rule is more complicated in the other three 
parliamentary districts owing to the multiple associations set up in each district. The 
two sets of associations in the districts provide different perspectives based on the 
political identity of the association. It has been suggested in this chapter that the 
original Associations that were set up in 1885 were taken over by Radicals which, for 
the most part, caused the Whigs in the district to leave those Associations. After the 
1885 election, in two of the districts, the South and Central, the Whigs set up rival 
associations in order to push their own political agenda in the district. Conversely, in 
the East district, some of the Radicals broke off from the already Radical-leaning 
association to form a new Radical named association. Due to this it can be seen how 
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the Irish question affected the Liberals in Edinburgh based on political identity in the 
Central, South, and East districts. 
 
Central 
The Edinburgh Central Liberal Association, the original Liberal Association 
from 1885 in the division, held a meeting on Irish Home Rule in late April. The 
meeting was presided over by Councillor Steel who was the President of the 
Association and who had considered standing in the East division in the Radical 
interest in 1885. Several motions were raised, ranging from an outright rejection of 
Irish Home Rule to expressing complete confidence in Gladstone and the 
Government. Toward the end of the debate it was suggested that the Association not 
vote on the question of Irish Home Rule and instead wait until the question was fully 
discussed by the leading members of the Party. On a very narrow majority this 
motion was passed twenty-four to twenty-three. In an interesting development during 
the meeting, the legitimacy of the Association was called into question by John 
Grant. Steel defended the Association by saying that they were ‘The Liberal 
Committee appointed by the Wards about a twelvemonth ago’.52 This, in his mind, 
gave the Association and the members a legitimate claim to speak for the 
constituents. Strangely, however, both Grant and Steel were on the same side of the 
Irish question making it unclear whether Grant was concerned with the Association’s 
ability to pass a motion in favour of the Government’s proposal, or if he and Steel set 
up the exchange to state the Association’s authority in the district.  
The Executive of the Liberal Association of the Central Division of 
Edinburgh, the new Liberal Association that formed in the Central division, voted to 
oppose the Irish question and invited Wilson to speak before the General 
Committee.53 At the General Committee meeting two motions were proposed. The 
first one thanked Gladstone for his work, but held that both Irish Bills should be 
postponed ‘and that a scheme providing for a large measure of local government or 
Home Rule, applicable to England, Scotland, and Ireland, be introduced on the basis 
of maintaining the legislative unity of the United Kingdom’. The second expressed 
‘sympathy and support to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone and his Cabinet, and 
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accept their proposals as a basis for the satisfactory settlement of the Irish 
question’.54 The first measure passed by a large majority. Grant and MacPherson, 
who were both in favour of the Government’s measures at the other Liberal 
Association meeting, were the leaders of the losing motion at this meeting. 
MacPherson made it clear that he was not a member of Wilson’s committee, but 
Grant and the other supporters of the Irish question did not make the same claim.55
 Since those supporting the Irish question including Steel, MacPherson and 
Grant were unable to get either association to fully back the Government on the Irish 
question, they sought other outlets to push their agenda. There were clearly 
supporters of the Government and Irish Home Rule among both of the Liberal 
Associations’ members in the Central district. In order to use this division and gather 
support for their cause Steel, MacPherson and Grant held a Home Rule meeting in 
the district. R. W. Duff, MP for Banffshire since 1861, was the guest speaker. Duff 
placed the Irish question as a Liberal versus Tory question and then told the crowd: 
‘The history of the Liberal party taught them that large measures of reform were not 
carried in a day. What would have become of the great achievements of the Liberal 
party if the pioneers in the path of reform had allowed themselves to be turned aside, 
even by that powerful force a parliamentary majority’?56 With this question, Duff 
was telling these Liberals that they were on the right side of the question, that they 
were the true Liberals in the division, and, therefore, that they had to continue to 
fight for the Liberal cause which was at that moment Irish Home Rule. 
  Steel, MacPherson and Grant were certainly involved in organising the 
Home Rule meeting. MacPherson was the chairman of the meeting and Steel 
accompanied him on the platform. Grant proposed a motion at the meeting in favour 
of Gladstone, the Government and Home Rule and this motion passed by a large 
majority,. These three men stayed closely involved in the pro-Home Rule section of 
the division. MacPherson even became the chairman of the election committee for 
local brewer William McEwan who stood as a pro-Home Rule candidate in the 
division.57 
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On 14 June the Executive of the Liberal Association of the Central Division 
of Edinburgh recommended Wilson, the current MP, to the General Committee as the 
Liberal candidate for the division. They justified their decision by saying ‘while 
many gentleman in the division who favoured the second reading of the Irish bills, 
which Mr. Wilson had opposed, had declared that this would not prevent Mr. Wilson 
receiving their cordial assistance in the event of a contest’.58 This was not the case 
for a large part of those favourable to the Bill in the division. Eight days after the 
announcement by the Executive, Liberals favourable to the Irish Bills secured the 
candidature of McEwan to oppose Wilson. Shortly after McEwan came forward as a 
pro-Home Rule candidate, Wilson informed the Liberal Association of the Central 
Division of Edinburgh that he was retiring from Parliament because ‘he found the 
duties incumbent upon him as their representative too heavy’.59 After this 
announcement by Wilson, a general meeting of the Liberal Association of the Central 
Division of Edinburgh was called. Through the course of the meeting it was decided 
that despite Wilson’s announcement he was still desired to be their candidate and 
they unanimously passed a resolution to that effect. The remaining members of the 
Association were successful in their quest to persuade Wilson as he announced later 
that evening that he would stand.60  
 Despite the loss of some of its members caused by the controversy following 
the successful vote to support Wilson’s candidature, the Liberal Association of the 
Central Division of Edinburgh succeeded in being viewed as a legitimate association. 
Wilson certainly viewed it as being the legitimate embodiment of the Liberal desire 
for the district as he immediately reconsidered standing for Parliament upon their 
request. The other association in the district became delegitimised, but this was done 
by the leaders of that association themselves. After Steel and company were unable 
to get the association to favour the Irish Bills in April, they gave up trying to use the 
association to push for Home Rule in the division. Instead, they became complacent 
with the alternative of holding association meetings open to all Liberals favourable to 
Home Rule in the district. This is partly due to the fear that the majority of the 
association might have opposed Home Rule and partly due to the great success they 
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had in holding the Home Rule meetings that attracted members from the other 
association. In both cases the associations lost members and Liberals allied 




In the South district the rivalry amongst the Liberals was more intense 
compared to the Liberals in the other three districts of Edinburgh owing to the 1886 
by-election. By early April when Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule Bill was unveiled, the 
two opposing sects of Liberals in the South had already been in conflict practically 
since the formation of the district’s first Liberal Association in 1885. At first, the new 
question of Irish Home Rule was no different. Both the Southern Liberal Association, 
the reorganisation of the old Southern Liberal Association and Raleigh’s election 
committee, and the Parliamentary Liberal Committee for South Edinburgh, the 
organisation of Harrison’s and then subsequently Childers’ election committees, held 
meetings to discuss the Government’s Irish Bills and determine whether or not they 
should their support. 
The Edinburgh Southern Liberal Association was the first of the two groups 
to hold a meeting on the subject. There was an attempt to continue the fight between 
the Radicals and Whigs that had been taking place since the passage of the Third 
Reform Act. To start the meeting, the chairman, J. B. Gillies, convener of the 
Newington Ward Committee, emphasised that this association was made up of 
Radicals and told the crowd that the ‘Advanced Liberal party to which they belonged 
were much more likely to give Mr Gladstone sympathy and support just now – than 
those who were prepared to follow him blindly, as had been said at one time, but 
who, now that he was not to do exactly what was expected, turned round upon him 
without any ceremony’.61 Gillies was attempting to set the tone of Irish Home Rule 
as another Radical versus Whig question in the way the disestablishment issue had 
been during the 1885 election. The way in which disestablishment and other 
questions were used to divide the Liberal party into two camps is discussed in both 
chapters three and four. After the implementation of the reforms called for in the 
                                                      
61 The Scotsman, 14 Apr 1886, 9. 
 175 
Third Reform Act, the Radicals hoped to take control of the Liberal party and push 
their agenda forward. Radicals hoped to use questions such as disestablishment to 
unite the Radical wing of the Party against the Whigs.  
There was a motion proposed to the Association by Councillor Pollard who 
had been elected President of the Association upon its new founding. In this motion 
Pollard proposed that the Association give its support to Gladstone and express that 
they approve of the Irish Bills. There was a stipulation applied that they trusted that 
the Bills would not ‘affect the integrity of the Empire’.62 The stipulation was added 
in an attempt to persuade members who were concerned that the current Bill might 
lead to an independent Irish nation. After the motion was introduced one such 
member, Professor Calderwood, offered an amendment that the Association 
approved of Home Rule for England, Scotland and Ireland, but that they disapproved 
of ‘independent Home Rule for any one of the three nations, and consequent 
exclusion of that one from joint representation in the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom’. There ensued a debate and the two sides tried to compromise, but were 
unable to do so. Upon a split vote, the motion to support the Irish Bills passed.63 
Hutchison provides an alternative motive for Calderwood’s opposition to the Bills. 
He proposes that Calderwood, among other Radicals, was bitter toward Gladstone for 
his exclusion of disestablishment from the 1885 elections and Calderwood believed, 
probably correctly, that the disestablishment issue would not come about with 
Gladstone at the helm of the party.64 
 The Parliamentary Liberal Committee for South Edinburgh held their meeting 
in mid-May, a month after the Southern Liberal Association came out in favour of 
the Government’s Bills. Almost the exact opposite happened at this meeting 
compared to the other Association’s meeting in the district. Bailie Russell introduced 
the findings of the committee’s sub-committee which recommended that they oppose 
the Government’s Bills mainly due to Ireland’s exclusion from the Imperial 
Parliament. This is in line with Calderwood’s objection to the Bills. Upon the 
conclusion of its reading, James Thom, the only dissenting member of the sub-
committee, proposed an amendment in favour of the Bills. A debate then followed 
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regarding the Bill and its intentions. At the conclusion of the debate, a vote was taken 
with a motion against the Bill passing by a vote of twenty-seven to eighteen.65 Given 
the amount of disagreement these two groups had, it is not surprising that they 
disagreed on supporting the Irish question. However, it is quite interesting that there 
was a division on the question amongst both groups’ members. This is indicative of 
the overall split of the Party. It was not a Whig versus Radical question; it affected 
both the Whig and the Radical organisations in the same way: they both split. 
 After the second reading of the Bills in Parliament, the question was thrown 
to the country and the Associations again held meetings to discuss the coming 
election. During these rounds of meetings the members were to decide the 
endorsement of a candidate in addition to their stance on the Irish question. The 
Southern Liberal Association had no problem passing a resolution supporting both 
Gladstone and Irish Home Rule. However, after that motion was passed, it was then 
moved that the Association should endorse the candidature of Childers in the coming 
election. This motion brought opposition from some of the members. Gillies, a 
supporter of Irish Home Rule, declared that he could not support the candidature of 
Childers due to his stance on disestablishment.66 This view that Childers was too 
moderate for the constituency due to his stance on disestablishment was a main 
concern of Childers’ when he first stood for the division in December 1885.67 A 
motion was even proposed that the Association could not support Childers because of 
differences in political opinion, but that they would still support Irish Home Rule. 
After some discussion during which it was emphasised that the Association needed to 
show their support of Gladstone, it was decided that the best way for them to do that 
was to endorse Childers. Upon a vote Childers was endorsed by a large portion of the 
Association, but he was not endorsed unanimously.68  
 The Parliamentary Liberal Committee for South Edinburgh had problems 
with endorsing Childers as well. This committee formed from Childers’ election 
committee just months earlier; however, they had more recently voted to oppose Irish 
                                                      
65 The Scotsman, 15 May 1886, 12; 19 May 1886, 9. 
66 The Scotsman, 25 Jun. 1886, 6. 
67 Edmund Spencer Eardley Childers, Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. 
Childers, 1827–1896, Vol. 2 (London, 1901), 237, quoting from letter ‘To his Daughter Milly’. 117 
Picadilly, December 28, 1885; Hutchison, A Political History,  162. 
68 The Scotsman, 25 Jun. 1886, 6. 
 177 
Home Rule which Childers had supported. Some of the members had shifted their 
political opinion in favour of Irish Home Rule. The most notable of these is Bailie 
Russell, the president of the committee, who had introduced the motion to oppose 
Irish Home Rule in May. Bailie Russell raised a motion to support Childers’ 
candidature and Irish Home Rule and was seconded by James Thom who had raised 
the amendment against Bailie Russell’s motion in May. This was met by opposition 
and a motion against both the endorsement of Childers and Irish Home Rule. The 
motion against was brought by Lindsay Mackersy who ‘appealed to the Committee 
to recollect that about a month ago they came to the conclusion that the two bills 
[Irish Home Rule and Land Purchase] of the Government with reference to Ireland 
ought not to pass, and, concurring in that decision, he declined now to stultify 
himself by voting for a member who supported those bills’.69 This was a member of 
Childers’ own committee saying he could not vote for him based on his stance on 
Irish Home Rule while the Association that denied his candidature in the by-election 
endorsed him in spite of the political differences because of his views on the Irish 
question. In the ensuing discussion after Mackersy’s amendment, members 
favourable to Childers’ candidature said that they did not approve of some issues 
within the Irish Bills that were before Parliament, but that they were confident in 
Childers and ‘that in electing Mr Childers they would be sending to Parliament a man 
who would not take an extreme view of those measures, but would pursue a safe and 
a reasonable course’.70 Childers was endorsed with seventy-three votes to thirty-six 
opposed.71 As a result, both of the Liberal organisations in the South ended up 
supporting Childers’ candidature even though they had been at odds with one another 
since the formation of the South Liberal Association in 1885. They had split into two 
separate organisations in early 1886 and had voted differently on the Irish question 
just one month prior. With the Government falling, it seems that these groups in the 
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East 
The strain that the Irish question placed on the local Liberal Associations is 
displayed perfectly by the Eastern Liberal Association which held its meeting in late 
May. The president of the Association was Thomas Sloan, a Radical who had 
strongly opposed Goschen’s candidature in 1885. Sloan was against the Irish Bills 
and thus favoured Goschen. During the course of the meeting, two opposing 
resolutions were proposed. The first was for the members of the Association to 
express their support of the Irish Bills as well as their ‘unabated confidence in Her 
Majesty's Government’. This resolution also condemned the actions of the district’s 
MP, Goschen, who had come out strongly against Irish Home Rule and thus the 
Government. The second resolution, proposed by Sloan, disapproved of the Irish 
Bills on the grounds that they ‘did not maintain sufficiently the principle of popular 
representation’ and that it was unfair to levy a tax on England and Scotland for the 
benefit of the Irish landowners.72   
The resolution in favour of the Government’s Bills passed with over eighty 
per cent in favour. Upon the vote, Sloan resigned in protest from his post as the 
president of the Association. Sloan was not alone in protesting the Association in this 
way as executive members in other Liberal Associations in Scotland also resigned 
when motions were passed against their member. After the resolution against 
Goschen, members of the Association’s Executive Committee who opposed the Irish 
Bills suddenly questioned the Association’s legitimacy. One such member ‘held that 
the Association had lost its commission at the last election and that it did not 
represent the Eastern Division’. He then proposed electing new members to the 
Association. Councillor McLachlan, who took the chair as interim president, ruled 
that the current members were to hold their positions until the end of 1888, as was 
understood during their election. The meeting was then adjourned with cheers for 
Gladstone.73 
The Radical and Advanced Liberal Association for the East Division of 
Edinburgh was also divided on the Irish question, but not to the same extent as the 
Eastern Liberal Association. They too proposed two motions: one expressed 
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confidence in Gladstone and approved the measures of the Irish Home Rule Bill and 
the other supported Irish Home Rule on Irish issues, but maintained the importance 
of keeping Irish members in the Imperial Parliament ‘on the principle that there can 
be no taxation without representation’. Although the vote was split with those 
favouring the current Bill losing, none of the members resigned or left the 
Association in protest.74 
After the Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in Parliament, the Associations 
readdressed the question. In late June both the Eastern Liberal Association and the 
Eastern Radical and Advanced Liberal Association voted on endorsing Robert 
Wallace as their candidate for the coming election. Wallace was a former Minister at 
Greyfriars and Editor of The Scotsman and at the time was an English barrister. He 
was unanimously adopted as the candidate for the Eastern Liberal Association. 
McLachlan, who had been elected president after Sloan stepped down, said that ‘he 
would have been very much astonished if there had been any amendment’ to 
Wallace’s nomination.75 It appears that all of the members opposing Irish Home Rule 
left the Association after the endorsement of the question in May.   
The Eastern Radical and Advanced Liberal Association also voted in favour 
of endorsing Wallace. Although the vote of ninety-five to eight was not unanimous, 
there was not much opposition brought against Wallace in this Association. This is 
perhaps more impressive than the unanimous vote in the Eastern Liberal Association. 
The unanimous vote is easily explained by the fact that those who had opposed the 
Irish question left the Association after it endorsed Irish Home Rule in May. 
However, this Radical Association did not vote to endorse the Bill in late April, but 
voted to endorse a candidate who supported Gladstone against Goschen who had 
voted against the Irish bills. The members who voted against endorsing Wallace 
claimed to do so because they did not want members to be bound to any candidate, a 
familiar cry to the last election.76 Perhaps their endorsement had more to do with the 
personalities and less to do with the Irish question.  
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Eugenio F. Biagini questioned ‘historians who see 1886 as the “crisis” of 
Liberalism’.  He instead asserts that ‘in focusing on Home Rule Gladstone provided 
his Scottish and Welsh supporters with an issue on which “old” and “new” Liberals 
could combine efforts’.77  D. A. Hamer expressed a similar view of the Liberal party 
after the split over Irish Home Rule, writing that although a third of the party left, the 
remaining Liberals were ‘much more united’.78 Even historians such as John 
Belchem and Michael Fry who view the Liberal split along ideological lines 
acknowledge the Liberal Party’s newfound unity after the Irish Home Rule split.79 
The following table shows an overview of the movements on Irish Home Rule of the 
seven Liberal Associations in Edinburgh between April and July 1886. 
  
Table 5.2: Edinburgh Liberal Associations’ Voting on Irish Home Rule80 
 April & May June & July 
Edinburgh Western Liberal Association support support 
Edinburgh Central Liberal Association  no decision no vote 
Liberal Association of the Central 
Division of Edinburgh oppose oppose 
Edinburgh Southern Liberal Association support support 
The Parliamentary Liberal Committee for 
South Edinburgh oppose support 
Edinburgh Eastern Davison Liberal 
Association support support 
The Radical and Advanced Liberal 




In Edinburgh, as noted in the above table, there was a great deal of movement on the 
Irish question within the Liberal Associations between Gladstone’s announcement of 
Irish Home Rule and the 1886 election. During the debate on the Irish question 
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between April and May before the second reading of the Bill, the Liberal 
Associations in Edinburgh were divided on the question with three in favour, three 
opposing, and one which took no action. The three in favour of Irish Home Rule 
were all original Associations formed in 1885 and were slanted towards a Radical 
ideology because they had been taken over by advanced Liberals at their formation. 
On the other hand, the three new associations, two of which were dominated by 
Whigs, were against the Bill. Despite the breakup of the original associations into the 
two separate associations based on their political allegiance to either the Radicals or 
the Whigs, none of the associations passed these motions without opposition from 
members within their own association. This indicates that Irish Home Rule affected 
both the Radicals and the Whigs in Edinburgh causing them to fight amongst 
themselves over the issue. 
After the Bill was defeated and the Government dissolved, only one of the 
seven Liberal associations in Edinburgh opposed Irish Home Rule. One of the 
associations did not meet to vote on the issue, but the president of the association 
held many meetings in favour of Irish Home Rule and was joined by members of the 
association and defectors from the rival association in the district. Each of the other 
five Liberal Associations ultimately endorsed Irish Home Rule. This suggests that the 
Irish question did not divide the Liberals in Edinburgh along ideological lines and 
that, in effect, the party that was divided in early 1886 along ideological lines was 
reunited in June and July over the question as most of the associations endorsed Irish 












Irish Home Rule and the 1886 Election in Edinburgh 
 
 This chapter covers the debate on Irish Home Rule and the role it played 
during the 1886 general election in Edinburgh. The Irish question raised many issues 
within the Liberal party. The proposed Bill created such a controversy that many 
Liberals left the party in protest, whilst others publicly displayed their disagreement 
with the leadership of the Party and their overt hostility towards Irish Home Rule. 
The study of the Liberal Party’s split over Irish Home Rule has traditionally been 
preoccupied by the supposed departure of Whigs from the Liberal Party.1 However, 
this view has been challenged by historians, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
who maintain that the Liberal Party’s spilt over Irish Home Rule had an effect on 
both Radicals and Whigs which resulted in the majority of all Liberals staying loyal 
to both Gladstone and the Party.2 Therefore, although the ideological stances of the 
Liberal MPs, and subsequently the Liberal candidates in the 1886 election, surely 
helped them to form their positions on Irish Home Rule, it was not the only 
determining factor. This leads to this chapter’s primary concern of determining what 
the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh did use to form their positions on Irish Home 
Rule. The basis of Liberal candidates’ support or opposition to Irish Home Rule has 
been discussed by many historians.3 The arguments that were particularly important 
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in the Edinburgh elections were democracy, protection of the Ulster Protestant 
minority, and opposition to the Land Bill.  
The Irish Home Rule debate created a political environment in which people 
questioned not only who were the true Liberals, but also what liberalism meant. This 
chapter analyses this conflict over liberalism in Edinburgh. A large portion of the 
election discourse pertained to defining which candidates were the legitimate 
Liberals. Catriona Macdonald describes a similar fight that took place in Paisley to 
determine which candidates would carry on that constituency’s tradition of 
Radicalism.4 However, unlike Paisley, in Edinburgh the fight pertained more to 
Liberalism as a whole and the continuation of the city’s tradition as a Liberal beacon. 
The discourse over which candidates were the true Liberals was incorporated into the 
candidates’ positions on the Irish question. Both the candidates that favoured and 
opposed Irish home Rule used a rhetorical claim to the ‘ownership’ of Liberalism. 
One argument involved the concept of democracy which was a core value of 
Liberalism. In a democracy the constituents have the right to decide who should 
govern them. The debate over Irish Home Rule and democracy arose due to the 
question of who should make that decision. The supporters of Irish Home Rule 
believed that the decision lay with the people of Ireland who had shown they wanted 
home rule by voting for Irish Parliamentary party members, while the opponents 
argued that it should be the whole of the United Kingdom.  
Another value of liberalism which became a factor in the discussion was the 
protection of individuals’ independence and liberty under the law.5 The opponents of 
the Bill argued that the Protestant minority would have been subjected to unfair 
treatment by the Catholic majority of Ireland if the Bill had passed. The rhetoric they 
used in promoting this argument was anti-Irish and anti-Catholic, sentiments which 
were further expressed in other opposition to the Bill which was also based on fear 
and prejudices. They cautioned that Irish Home Rule would lead to a hostile 
independent Ireland, weaken the Empire, and flood Britain with Irish immigrants. 
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Another issue that received significant attention during the 1886 election was 
the Land Purchase question, which proposed the buyout of landlords to help enable 
the tenants to purchase land. All of the candidates in Edinburgh addressed the 
question and none of them favoured the measure. Although there were different 
reasons for their opposition to the Bill, they were all financial. The Land Purchase 
question was directly tied to Irish Home Rule. There was a debate on whether or not 
Irish Home Rule had to be accompanied by the Land Purchase Bill in order to be 
passed, but no one disputed that for the Land Purchase Bill to pass it had to 
accompanied by Irish Home Rule. Due to the low favourability of the Land Purchase 
Bill, the candidates opposed to Irish Home Rule tried to use its connection to the 
Land Purchase Bill to gain support in opposition to Irish Home Rule. On the other 
hand, the candidates who favoured Irish Home Rule downplayed the importance of 
the Land Purchase Bill by claiming that the bill was already dead.  
  The last aspect of the election that is looked at is the role played by 
Gladstone. The name of Gladstone was used by his supporters as a rallying cry. 
During a speech in Edinburgh, Gladstone himself made a plea to the constituents to 
help him by defeating one of the candidates in opposition to Irish Home Rule. With 
Liberalism having been fought over by the opposing candidates during the 1886 
election, being aligned with Gladstone in support of Irish Home Rule would have 
helped more than hurt the candidates’ cause in Edinburgh. These issues of liberalism, 
including democracy, protection of the minority and the debate on the Land Purchase 
Bill, as well as Gladstone’s role in the campaign became the defining points of the 
debate over Irish Home Rule and thus defining points of the 1886 general election in 
Edinburgh. 
 
Irish Home Rule 
 The focus on a single issue in the 1886 general election was much different 
from the 1885 general election in which there were multiple issues surrounding the 
election. As discussed in chapter three, the main Scottish question in 1885 was the 
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of Scotland; however, in 
Edinburgh, both Local Licensing and education were also discussed throughout the 
election and even rivalled that of disestablishment. Also, the issue of local tradition 
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was relevant during the election as the candidates tried to present themselves to the 
constituents in a way that would continue that tradition. Conversely, the 1886 
elections, both nationally and locally, revolved around one question: Irish Home 
Rule. The Irish Home Rule Bill proposed the establishment of a separate parliament 
in Dublin to deal with Irish matters although some matters were to remain under the 
control of the Imperial Parliament. The Irish MPs were to sit in the new Irish 
parliament in Dublin and were to be excluded from Westminster entirely. Ireland was 
to remain responsible for contributing to defence and such matters as coinage, 
customs and excise, defence, and foreign policy were still to be dealt with in 
Westminster. The critics of the Bill argued that a separate parliament in Dublin and 
the exclusion of Irish MPs from Westminster would lead to a permanent separation. 
An independent Ireland would weaken the empire and create a potential threat just 
off the British coast. Also, some felt that it was too costly to implement given the 
attachment of the Land Purchase Bill that was proposed to buy out Irish landlords. It 
was these complaints that led some Liberals to oppose the Bill.6 
 The introduction of Irish Home Rule placed a strain on Liberal MPs who 
were forced to decide whether to support the measures and the Government or vote 
with seceding Liberals, who for the purpose of this chapter are referred to as Liberal 
Unionists, and the Conservatives in opposition.7 Of the four Edinburgh MPs, who 
were all Liberal, Childers was the only one to vote for the Bills on the second reading 
in June 1886. Leading up to this vote, a great deal of pressure was placed on Childers 
to oppose the Bills. Most of the effort to convert Childers came from Charles Cooper, 
the editor of The Scotsman. Cooper had been Rosebery’s confidante in Edinburgh 
and had supported Gladstone in his Midlothian campaigns. Nevertheless, in 1886, 
under his editorial leadership, The Scotsman became a Unionist paper. Cooper and 
The Scotsman were the first to leak Gladstone’s proposed Irish Home Rule Bill on 29 
March.8 Cooper warned Childers that he would lose his seat if he supported the 
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measure of Irish Home Rule in which the Irish were to have control over customs 
and excise. He even suggested that Gladstone might lose his seat in Midlothian over 
Irish Home Rule.9 Cooper tried to persuade Childers to do as Chamberlain had done 
and resign from the Cabinet: 
The question is not whether you sh[ould] resign y[ou]r seat but whether you 
sh[ould] resign the Cabinet. The former course w[ould] be ruin: the latter 
might save Mr. G. from the suicidal course upon which he seems bent. It 
appears to me that those who think as I do, are bound to sacrifice their 
personal feeling towards Mr. G. if that be necessary in order to save him from 
a step which w[ould] be most injurious at once to the Liberal party & most 
calamitous in its consequences to the country.10 
 
Copper was appealing to Childers’ admiration of Gladstone and trying to convince 
him that not only would it have been in his best political interest to stand against Irish 
Home Rule, but that it would have been in Gladstone’s best interest as well. Cooper 
argued that Childers, along with the other seceding Liberals, would be saving 
Gladstone from ruining his legacy. 
Cooper was not the only one trying to persuade Childers to resign from the 
Cabinet in protest at the Bills. Mr Buchan, Childers’ local election agent, informed 
Childers of the local reaction to the Bills and what he believed would be the political 
consequences of supporting them: 
I am not going to offer any criticism upon the proposals or to suggest to you 
any course of action regarding them. I feel that I have no right to do either. 
But what I wish to say to you & to urge most earnestly upon you is that 
y[ou]r constituency in my humble judgement w[ould] never return a Member 
to support such proposals. We are all prepared for a pretty large measure of 
Home Rule for Ireland, but I am sure this scheme w[ould] not receive the 
support of more than the merest fragment of the electors.11 
 
Buchan went on to claim that the Bill had placed people ‘in a state little short of 
panic’ and that it was ‘political suicide’ to bring the Bill forward. He also claimed, as 
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Cooper had done, that the Bill would have placed Gladstone’s own seat in Mid-
Lothian in danger.12 Buchan’s next attempt to persuade Childers was more forward: 
Unless you can succeed in getting Mr. Gladstone very considerably to modify 
his supposed proposals, I can see no course open to you but the resignation of 
y[ou]r seat in the Cabinet. Were you to make a firm stand, Mr. Gladstone 
might take warning. You cannot be more loyal to him than in doing that. 
...You have so long been regarded as Mr. Gladstone’s lieutenant, that it is 
only natural that you sh[ould] be looked to to save him from himself & by 
doing this, to rescue the liberal party from annihilation.13  
 
In this letter, Buchan was clearly far from trying to stay neutral as he claimed he was 
in the last letter. Instead, he was trying to intimidate Childers into resigning from the 
Cabinet by inciting fear of the loss of his seat and possibly Gladstone’s too.  
 Childers disliked the proposed Bill himself. His opposition was to the control 
of customs and excise being given to an Irish parliament. Historians and 
contemporaries portray Childers as having worked with Cooper to expose the 
proposed draft of the Bill hoping that an outcry against it would persuade Gladstone 
to make alterations to the Bill. Shortly after the draft of the Bill was printed in The 
Scotsman, the Bill was altered regarding customs and excise.14 In Childers’ 
biography, his son claims that after the ‘obnoxious features of the Bill were struck 
out’ Childers had no problem supporting the Bill. However, throughout the campaign 
Childers expressed his dislike of the Bill to Cooper.15 Cooper and Buchan both used 
the same argument, telling Childers that he needed to stand against Gladstone in 
order to save him, which appealed to Childers’ loyalty to Gladstone. Cooke and 
Vincent suggest that Childers had been in a senior Cabinet position only due to 
Gladstone. It was Childers’ loyalty that kept him in support of Irish Home Rule 
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despite his opposition to some parts of the proposed Bill and his belief that support of 
it would cost him his seat.16 
 After the Government’s defeat in June on the second reading of the Irish 
Home Rule Bill, Parliament was dissolved and an election was called to be held in 
July. The four sitting MPs in Edinburgh all had an opponent come forward to stand 
against them. Robert Purvis challenged Childers in the South division. Purvis was a 
forty-two year old English Churchman who had stood unsuccessfully for the 
Abingdon division of Berkshire in 1885. He had attended university at Downing 
College at Cambridge and at the time of the election was a barrister at Middle 
Temple.17 William McEwan a local man originally from Alloa, stood against Wilson 
in the Central district. McEwan at age fifty-nine had no experience in politics, but 
was well-known in Edinburgh through his trade as a local brewer.18 There were two 
candidates that stood in Edinburgh in 1886 that were named Robert Wallace. The 
first Robert Wallace, from here on referred to as Mr Wallace, was Buchanan’s 
opponent in the West district. Mr Wallace was a thirty-six year old Protestant from 
Ireland who was educated at Queen’s University in Dublin and, like Buchanan and 
Purvis, was a barrister at Middle Temple. He had been unsuccessful in a 
parliamentary campaign for Wadsworth in 1885.19 The other Robert Wallace, 
hereafter referred to as Dr Wallace, was a fifty-five year old local who was educated 
at the University of St Andrews, Edinburgh University and had received a DD from 
the University of Glasgow. Although Dr Wallace had been called to Middle Temple 
in 1881 he was well-known for his past service in the community as Chair of Church 
History at Edinburgh University, a minister at Greyfriars and the editor of The 
Scotsman.20 
 Even though all eight of the candidates in Edinburgh in 1886 professed to be 
Liberals, they were divided on the question of Irish Home Rule. Their split on 
support of Irish Home Rule was in contrast to the 1885 election where the Liberal 
candidates that stood against one another seemed to do because of their ideologies. In 
                                                      
16 Cooke and Vincent, The Governing Passion, 397; CUL: Royal Commonwealth Society Library, 
Childers Papers, RCMS 37/5/183, Childers to Carmichael, 3 Apr. 1886. Childers believed that he 
was to lose his seat in Edinburgh if the Irish were given control of customs and excise. 
17 The Times, 30 Jun. 1886, 8. 
18 Donnachie, ‘McEwan, William’. 
19 The Times, 30 Jun. 1886, 8; The Scotsman, 28 Jun. 1886, 1. 
20 MacDonald, ‘Wallace, Robert’. 
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the 1885 election the contrast between the candidates was largely between Radicals 
and Whigs, even though these differences became evident because of their stances on 
questions such as disestablishment, local licensing and free education. During the 
1886 election the candidates’ ideological stances of Whig or Radical did not correlate 
to a particular stance on Irish Home Rule.   
 
Table 6.1: Candidates’ Ideologies and 
Stances on Irish Home Rule21 
Candidate Support IHR Oppose IHR 
Buchanan  Radical 
Childers Whig  
Goschen  Whig 
Wilson  Radical 
Purvis  Whig 
McEwan not known  
Mr Wallace Radical  
Dr Wallace Radical  
 
As seen in the above table, there were two Whigs and two Radicals who opposed 
Irish Home Rule and there were at least two Radicals and one Whig who supported 
it. On the question of Irish Home Rule, a pre-existing Whig or Radical ideology was 
not a main factor when it came to whether or not the candidates in Edinburgh 
supported the measure.  
 
The role of Liberalism 
Irish Home Rule was certainly the main question of the 1886 election, but it 
served as a lightning rod for wider questions about the past, present, and future of 
Liberalism. The Liberal party was openly fighting amongst itself in 1886 as they had 
done previously in 1885, but in 1886 it led to a split in the Party. The formation of 
                                                      
21 MacDonald, ‘Wallace, Robert’; Spinner, ‘Goschen, George Joachim’; Carr, ‘Childers, Hugh Culling 
Eardley’. The remaining candidates’ ideologies were derived from the following: both Buchanan 
and Wilson should be classified as more advanced than true Radicals, but their support of 
disestablishment, local licensing and free education during the 1885 election, discussed in chapters 
three and four, places them in this category; Mr. Wallace is classified as a Radical for his support of 
a progressive land tax and local licensing during the 1885 election for Wadsworth in Daily News, 14 
Aug. 1885, 3; Purvis due to his staunch stance in favour of Established Churches during the 1885 
election in the Abingdon division of Berkshire in Jackson Oxford Journal, 26 Sep. 1885, 1; this was 
the first political race for McEwan, therefore, due to lack of information, it was not possible to form 
an opinion on him. 
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Liberal Unionist organisations to help the seceding Liberals organise support for 
their candidacies had a profound impact on the 1886 election in Scotland. In forming 
these organisations, Edinburgh and the East of Scotland greatly differed from 
Glasgow and the West. The West of Scotland Liberal Unionist Association was 
established in May before the 1886 election whereas the East of Scotland Liberal 
Unionist Association was not formed until November, several months after the July 
election.22 Burness concludes that in 1886 the success of the Liberal Unionist 
candidates in the West was due in part to the rapid establishment and organisation of 
the Liberal Unionist Associations.23 The Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh 
were in communication with the Conservatives who, in order to strengthen the 
opposition to Irish Home Rule, declined to run their own candidates and instead 
recommended that Conservative constituents vote for the Liberal Unionist 
candidates.24 Although, the Liberal Unionists candidates in the west still claimed to 
be Liberals, the fact that they had established a separate party from the Liberal party 
could have reinforced the idea that they had abandoned the Liberal party. The lack of 
an official Liberal Unionist Association gave the Liberal Unionist candidates in 
Edinburgh the opportunity to still claim to be the Liberal candidates instead of 
galvanising the fact that they were part of a different political party. 
     As discussed in the previous chapter, the Liberal Associations had been 
damaged from the 1885 election and the continuation of the dispute over legitimacy 
from that election. Therefore, at the start of the Home Rule crisis, the Liberal 
Associations were split on their support of the policy, but as the election came most 
of the Associations began to support Irish Home Rule and the candidates who 
favoured its passage. The legitimacy of their endorsement was used by the candidates 
to justify that they were the true Liberals in the races. The best example of this is 
Childers, who during the by-election earlier in the year, had viewed the Liberal 
Association as irrelevant. He had agreed to come forward as a Liberal candidate 
without even discussing it with or seeking an endorsement from the Association. 
However, a few months later during the 1886 general election, Childers used the 
Liberal Association as justification for his candidature, asking his constituents for 
                                                      
22 Burness, Strange Associations, 48. 
23 Burness, Strange Associations, 44–68. 
24 The Scotsman, 19 Jun. 1886, 11; 30 Jun. 1886, 8. 
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support and saying that the Liberal Associations ‘are fairly representative of the 
opinions of the great majority of the Liberal electors of South Edinburgh. And, 
therefore, I appear before you to-night as the accepted candidate of both divisions of 
the party which have hitherto acted through separate Associations; and it is on that 
basis that I ask you to return me again’.25 Instead of disregarding the Association, 
Childers was using the legitimacy of the Liberal Association’s endorsement to assert 
that he was the true Liberal in the race and that he deserved to have their vote just as 
the Radical candidates had done during the 1885 general election in Edinburgh. It 
was quite different circumstances as Childers pointed out he had been endorsed by 
two separate Liberal Associations representing different wings of the Liberal Party. 
The 1886 fight was not in the familiar manner of Radical versus Whig, but 
instead it was seemingly over a single question that ultimately required the members 
of the Party, both candidates and constituents, to address what it meant to be a 
Liberal. In the discourse of defining Liberalism in 1886 the Liberal Unionist 
candidates were accused of and attacked for abandoning the principles and party of 
Liberalism. Catriona Macdonald describes this fighting within the candidates’ 
campaign rhetoric in her study of Paisley politics. Parker Smith, the Liberal Unionist 
candidate in Paisley, was attacked for leaving the Liberal Party and was accused of 
being a Tory. Smith’s commitment to Liberalism was then questioned which led to 
the question of which candidates legitimately represented Liberalism.26 Macdonald 
concludes: 
The question of identity, the creation of new and the adaptation of old, was a 
critical question in the election of 1886. Liberalism had to be re-defined in 
opposition to its “bastard” offspring, as well as to a Conservatism, the 
emphasis of which had changed from Protector of the Faith to Protector of the 
Empire. Home Rule thus went beyond the re-alignment of policy to a re-
definition of Liberal identity.27 
 
This redefinition of Liberalism was fought out both in the local election campaigns 
and in the national context. The fight in both Paisley and Edinburgh was over who 
would carry on the city’s tradition of Liberalism. Edinburgh’s tradition of Liberalism 
was shared by both the Radicals and Whigs. From the First Reform Act to the mid-
                                                      
25 The Scotsman, 1 Jul. 1886, 5. 
26 Macdonald, The Radical Thread, 84–91.  
27 Macdonald, The Radical Thread, 91. 
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nineteenth century, Edinburgh was dominated by Whig politics. In 1865 Duncan 
McLaren, a Radical, was able to break the Whigs’ dominance over the city. McLaren 
remained an MP for Edinburgh until he retired in 1881 during which time the city 
was usually represented by both wings of the Liberal party.28 
   The same attacks used in the fight over defining Liberalism in Paisley were 
directed towards the Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh as well. The fight in 
Edinburgh also had its roots in the tradition of the city. Just as local traditions were 
significant during the 1885 election, they played an important role in the 1886 
elections. Liberalism and the defence of Liberalism became one of the main issues in 
Edinburgh during the election in 1886. Liberal candidates in Edinburgh used the 
defence of Liberalism as an attack against the Liberal Unionist candidates. There 
were other traditions of the city that were brought up during the election, but 
Liberalism was by far the most discussed and had the greatest effect on the elections 
in Edinburgh in an effort to assert which candidates had the legitimate claim to 
represent Liberalism and thus carry on the Liberal tradition of the city.  
 When three of the city’s four MPs voted against the Government on the Irish 
Bills, there was a cry that the city’s tradition of Liberal representation was under 
attack. This is evident in Dr Wallace’s reason for entering the race. Wallace asserted 
that ‘the most vital and cardinal principles of Liberalism were at stake, and so many 
persons were deserting from them’. He went on to comment on the current political 
state in Edinburgh in 1886: ‘When three out of its four representatives had turned 
their backs upon the party to which they belonged – (cheers) – he thought that as an 
old citizen of Edinburgh – (hear, hear) – he was in measure bound to do his humble 
best in what he regarded as a good and great cause’.29 As noted in chapter four, 
constituents in Edinburgh had a tradition of electing local men. Accordingly, Dr 
Wallace referred to his local connection to Edinburgh as an aside to the main cause 
of his entrance which he claimed to be the fight for the city’s tradition of Liberalism. 
With this reason, he placed himself within the tradition of the city by establishing 
that he was standing as a Liberal to fight for the continuation of Liberal 
representation for Edinburgh. This election cry was used by supporters of the 
                                                      
28 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1832–1885, 539–40; Hutchison, A Political History, 
162–3; Boase, ‘McLaren, Duncan’. 
29 The Scotsman, 17 Jun. 1886, 5–6. 
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candidates as well. Macpherson, Chairman of McEwen’s election committee, used 
the same sentiment in support of McEwen’s candidature when he said, ‘the most 
Liberal Government the country had ever seen was driven from power by the 
members for sixteen Liberal constituencies having voted with the Tory party, and 
that one of those sixteen members was the member for the Central Division of 
Edinburgh’. Macpherson was thus arguing that the main reason to support McEwen 
was because he was standing up for Liberalism. Not only were members of the 
Liberal Party behind the defeat of a Liberal Government, but they were also 
representing Edinburgh which tarnished its reputation as a Liberal stronghold.30 
 One of the main priorities of the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh was to 
project to the constituents that they were the true bearers of the flame of Liberalism 
because the Liberal Unionists had abandoned the party and aligned themselves with 
the Conservatives. In order to present this view to the constituents, the Liberal 
candidates questioned the Liberal Unionists’ commitment to Liberalism and attacked 
them for abandoning the Party. Some of the attacks of the Liberal candidates were 
subtle and suggestive such as the approach that Childers took against Purvis. 
Childers informed his constituents that ‘while regretting that he had to controvert the 
position taken up by one who until within the last few months belonged to the same 
party as himself, and who as a Liberal contested a seat at last election, he would 
behave towards him with perfect courtesy’. With this statement, Childers outlined 
Purvis’ abandonment of the Liberal Party and thus marked Purvis as no longer being 
a Liberal.31 Others, such as Mr Wallace, were very clear in their intent. Mr Wallace 
first introduced himself to his constituents through a letter in which he stated that he 
was standing in the division in the Liberal interest and that he was ‘in entire 
sympathy with the Liberal Party’ thus making it clear that he was a Liberal and 
completely stood with the Liberal Party. After establishing this, he was able to attack 
Buchanan’s commitment to Liberalism saying of Buchanan that ‘while still wearing 
the cloak of the party to which he professed to belong, [he] was willing to raise his 
hand against that party and destroy its influence, not only in that division but 
throughout the country’.32 Mr Wallace hoped that by casting Buchanan as standing 
                                                      
30 The Scotsman, 23 Jun. 1886, 8. 
31 The Scotsman, 23 Jun. 1886, 8. 
32 The Scotsman, 28 Jun. 1886, 1; 2 Jul. 1886, 6. 
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against the tide of Liberalism, the race might be shifted to one of party instead one of 
policy. Dr Wallace attacked Goschen’s commitment to Liberalism for abandoning 
the Party as well. Dr Wallace stated that one of the main reasons he entered the race 
was that ‘he did not consider, judging from Mr Goschen’s published opinions or his 
conduct, that he was a representative of Liberal opinion, more especially of advanced 
Liberal opinion; he was, in fact, merely a Tory in plain clothes’. Dr Wallace also 
tried to present himself as the only legitimate Liberal candidate in the race by 
claiming that ‘Mr Goschen was no longer the candidate of the Liberal party, nor the 
Gladstonian candidate; he was the candidate whose candidature was now viewed, not 
only with suspicion, but with conscientious and intense dislike, by the real Liberal 
party’.33 Dr Wallace presented himself as being on the side of Liberalism and 
Goschen as being on the side of Conservatism. He then placed the race on a grand 
scale: ‘Mr Goschen was certainly the ablest man among the Liberal seceders, and the 
contest in that division was that on which the eyes of the country would be fixed.’ 
With this, Dr Wallace presented the race as being about much more than just Irish 
Home Rule. He wanted the constituents to know that this race was to be looked at, 
because of Goschen’s stature, as an indicator of the future of Liberalism. Therefore, 
this race placed Edinburgh in the spotlight of the nation and consequently was 
representative of all of Edinburgh.34 
 The Liberal candidates’ main goal in pursuing the tactic of questioning the 
Liberal Unionists’ commitment to Liberalism was to try to present the election as 
Liberal versus Conservative instead of a fight between opposing Liberals for control 
of the Party. Once again, Dr Wallace’s comments on the election present this 
perfectly: 
...although certain members of their Liberal party were temporarily or 
permanently against them, their real opponents were the Tory party, with 
which these seceding Liberals had allied themselves. It had been attempted to 
be argued that a Tory character could not be given to these seceders, because 
their antecedents were so manifestly Liberal. All the same, however, they had 
gone in the way of the Tories, and while it might not seem strange that a few 
Liberals had mistaking the way of Liberalism, it would be a very strange 
thing indeed if the mass of the Tory party had mistaken the way of Toryism.35 
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34 The Scotsman, 22 Jun. 1886, 6. 
35 The Scotsman, 1 Jul. 1886, 5. 
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If the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh were successful and the constituents viewed 
the Liberal Unionists’ vote against the Irish Home Rule Bills as abandonment of the 
Liberal party, and ultimately a vote in support of the Conservatives, the Liberal 
Unionist candidates would have faced a challenge in securing support among the 
Liberal constituents who might have been against the Irish Bills. Whether or not the 
tactic worked, it had an effect on the election as all four of the Liberal Unionist 
candidates in Edinburgh scrambled to avoid being perceived as anti-Liberal. They 
each defended their commitment to Liberalism during the 1886 election campaigns. 
 The Liberal Unionist candidates defended themselves from this attack by 
denying claims that they had abandoned Liberalism and the Liberal party. Of the four 
Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh only Buchanan and Goschen had a sound 
parliamentary record. Wilson was an MP as well, but had only been elected in 
November and Purvis had previously stood for a seat, but failed to be returned to 
Parliament. Both Buchanan and Goschen stood by their parliamentary records to 
defend their commitment to Liberalism. Speaking to constituents, Buchanan ‘said 
that as far as his Liberalism was concerned, and his opinion and Parliamentary 
conduct, he had a record against him of the past five years which was open to every 
one in Edinburgh’.36 Goschen had a problem being viewed as somewhat anti-Liberal 
due to his parliamentary record, but he insisted that, other than his vote against the 
franchise extension, his record was a ‘clean one’.37 These candidates hoped that their 
past commitment to the Liberal Party and Liberalism would prove sufficient in 
persuading constituents who doubted their current commitment to Liberalism. Oddly, 
Wilson used his past commitment to Gladstone as an indication of his commitment to 
Liberalism even though it was his stance against Gladstone on the Irish Bills that 
brought people to question whether or not he was a committed Liberal. Wilson asked 
his constituents to remember that ‘he had been a follower of Mr Gladstone’s all his 
life’. He was trying to convey that it was only on this one issue that he differed from 
Gladstone. Wilson, who voted for the Irish Bills on the first reading, even described 
to the constituents the ‘great anxiety’ and difficulty he had voting against Gladstone 
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on the second reading.38 Of all the Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh, Purvis 
faced the most scrutiny over his commitment to Liberalism, most likely due to being 
the only Liberal Unionist candidate in Edinburgh that was not a sitting MP and thus 
not defending his seat. He was running against Childers who was the only MP in 
Edinburgh who had voted for the Irish Bills. Purvis assured his constituents that he 
was in Edinburgh as a Liberal and ‘nobody who knew anything about him could 
deny or could canvass his assertion that he was a perfectly good Liberal’. 
Furthermore, he gave his membership in the Reform Club and Eighty Club as 
credentials of his Liberalism.39 Still, Purvis had a difficult time conveying his 
commitment to Liberalism because he was an outsider coming in to defeat a sitting 
Liberal MP. 
 The Liberal Unionists’ claims that they were Liberals standing for Liberalism 
did not convince all of the Liberal constituents in Edinburgh as they were all heckled 
over their political identities during the election. Constituents at one meeting heckled 
Purvis when he began his response to a question with ‘as a Liberal’ which was met 
with shouts of ‘What?’ and laughter from the audience members.40 The other three 
Liberal Unionist candidates were all accused of being Tories by constituents shouting 
‘Tory’ or ‘Turncoat’ during their campaign speeches.41 This kind of public reaction 
not only hurt the Liberal Unionist campaign, but also their potential voters who 
might have been worried about facing the same sort of allegations of being anti-
Liberal. In an attempt to counter the labelling of Liberal Unionists and their 
supporters as being anti-Liberal, the Dean of Faculty of Advocates, Mr Mackintosh, 
spoke at a Purvis meeting: 
...Electors had only one question to ask themselves, “Is the candidate before 
me a unionist or a separatist?” (Cheers.) ... It was cowardice of the worst kind 
for a man – (cheers) – who had convictions upon this question of the hour to 
hesitate to act upon these convictions – (cheers) – because he was afraid of 
offending friends or loosening party ties, or of being called a Tory, or of 
being nick-named a seceder. He was not afraid of being called a seceder – 
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(cheers) – and he found himself in the company, amongst others, of Mr 
John Bright.42 
 
Mackintosh was trying to move the election away from party politics, as the Liberal 
candidates were trying to make it, and instead frame the debate solely on the Irish 
question. This is why John Bright, the MP for Birmingham Central and one of the 
leading Radicals since the 1860s, was mentioned.43 Bright’s main opposition to Irish 
Home Rule was the lack of protection of the Ulster minority and his opposition was 
pointed to by other seceding Liberals because his commitment to Liberalism was 
hard to question.44 The Liberal Unionists and their supporters hoped that by 
producing someone that the constituents did not question regarding his commitment 
to Liberalism and who was against the Irish Bills, their own commitment to 
Liberalism might no longer be questioned. 
 The Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh tried to convince the 
constituents that although they were standing against Gladstone on the lone issue of 
Irish Home Rule, they were still Liberals and the election was not about political 
parties, but instead it was about the Irish question. An example of this is Goschen’s 
claim that the ‘Irish question [did] not constitute one of the questions which separates 
parties, and that there are as strong representatives of Liberalism, advanced 
Liberalism, of Radicalism, on the side of the opposition to Her Majesty’s 
Government as there are in the ranks of their supporters’.45 The other three Liberal 
Unionist candidates in Edinburgh pointed this out to their constituents as well. The 
argument that there were many Liberals on both sides was used by the Liberal 
Unionists to defend their stance against Irish Home Rule by pointing to prominent 
Liberals who were also against the Irish Bills. Bright was the most often mentioned 
and was not only used as a prominent Liberal, but also as an indicator that Advanced 
Liberals were against Irish Home Rule too. Another prominent Liberal that was 
mentioned was Chamberlain whose Radicalism was clearly intended to gain support 
for the anti-Home Rule stance among the Radical constituents that could have 
resulted in their vote for the Liberal Unionist candidate. Hartington was brought up 
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by Purvis who declared his alliance to Hartington and said that he hoped he would 
gain control of the Government. The Liberal Unionist candidates hoped that the fact 
that these prominent Liberals were against Irish Home Rule would justify their own 
dissent from Gladstone and the Party.46 
 McLaren, brother-in-law of John Bright, could be used to support the Liberal 
Unionists’ claim of Liberal opposition to Irish Home Rule as well.47 McLaren was 
seen as ‘the people’s champion in the city as Gladstone was in the country as a 
whole’.48 McLaren resigned his position in the Edinburgh South Liberal Association 
in protest of its support of Irish Home Rule and said that he would ‘vote for the 
candidate against the Irish Parliament, whatever his other political opinions might be, 
whether Radical, Whig, or Tory’.49 Such a strong statement made it clear where 
McLaren stood on the issue, but it may have hurt the Liberal Unionist cause in 
Edinburgh because McLaren placed Irish Home Rule above the Liberal party instead 
of making support or opposition to the Irish question a non-issue based on one’s 
commitment to Liberalism as the Liberal Unionist candidates were trying to do. 
   The Liberal candidates in Edinburgh presented themselves as the true 
Liberals in the race. To convince the constituents that they were the true Liberals, 
they had to provide more evidence than simply not having abandoned the Party and 
Gladstone. They had to defend their stance on Irish Home Rule. For them to 
accurately define themselves as the true Liberals, their defence of the Irish question 
had to be based on Liberal principles. For this, the Liberal candidates turned to a core 
value of liberalism: democracy. 
 
Democracy and Irish Home Rule 
 Democracy was a core issue during the 1886 election. The Liberal candidates 
in Edinburgh not only used the concept of democracy as their explanation for 
supporting Irish Home Rule, but also as a testimony to why they were the true 
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Liberals in the race. In a recent book Biagini discusses the late-Victorian Liberal 
understanding of democracy:  
Like Chartism, popular liberalism had always been, above all, about 
democracy, and many of its spokesmen were not the least embarrassed by the 
clash between parliamentary and popular sovereignty which the Home Rule 
agitation engendered. Indeed, the radical understanding of freedom was 
rooted in what Skinner calls ‘neo-roman’ liberty. ‘Self-government’ implied 
more than a set of elected local authorities deriving their legitimacy from 
Bills passed by the imperial Parliament. It also implied that the legitimacy of 
Parliament itself depended on popular support and if the latter were to be 
permanently withdrawn, the former would collapse and government 
degenerate into despotism. This was the case in Ireland: the Union had to be 
amended because the overwhelming majority of the people rejected it.50 
 
This concept of democracy can be applied to the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh 
who argued that democracy was a core value of Liberalism. Since democracy was at 
the core of Liberalism, they believed that supporting Irish Home Rule validated their 
claim as the legitimate Liberals and thus as a continuation of the city’s political 
tradition. They took this view because the majority of the Irish people supported 
Home Rule and, according to democracy, the right lay with the people meaning that 
as Liberals they should support the people’s right. This argument was heavily 
supported by the passage of the Third Reform Act. The franchise was expanded by 
the Representation of the People Act of 1884, one part of the Third Reform Act 
which is detailed in chapter one. Most of the increases came from granting the same 
voting qualification of the burghs to the counties. The new measures in the Third 
Reform Act resulted in the majority of the male population being eligible to vote for 
the first time. With the new voting qualifications in place during the 1885 election, 
eighty-six Irish Parliamentary Party MPs were elected and they represented eighty-
five per cent of the Irish people. This enabled the Liberal candidates to argue that the 
majority of the population in Ireland supported Home Rule. 
 The Liberal candidates in Edinburgh used the franchise extension in their 
rhetoric in different ways. Childers expressed a view that the Irish had voted for Irish 
Home Rule during the 1885 election and that in the 1886 election the constituents 
‘[had] to decide the great question whether the Irish people, who have expressed by 
an overwhelming majority a desire to do so, shall be allowed themselves to 
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administer according to their own way, and through their own representatives, their 
own local affairs’.51 Dr Wallace supported this view as well, calling the 1885 
election ‘proof’ that the Irish people wanted Home Rule.52 Once it was established 
that the Irish electorate voted for Home Rule in the 1885 election, Dr Wallace placed 
their call for Home Rule into an argument within the ideology of Liberalism: 
The right of self-government having once been distinctly demanded by the 
Irish nation as a nation, they [Great Britain] could not at any time henceforth 
attempt rightfully to govern them. If they said they would continue to govern 
them, and they would govern them, that was an unrighteous and indefensible 
resolution. If they were Tories he could understand such an answer. But if 
they were Liberals they must be well aware there could be no righteous 
government without the consent of the governed. (Cheers.) Whoever 
governed any nation against its own consent was an oppressor and tyrant.53 
 
Dr Wallace was trying to legitimise the Irish call for Home Rule. The Irish had voted 
for MPs who supported Irish Home Rule and Liberals believed that the right to 
govern lay with the people.  
  Mr Wallace, the candidate in the West, used the franchise extension to both 
attack Goschen for his vote against the extension and to connect to Irish Home Rule 
the principle of democracy and legitimacy to govern: ‘He [Goschen] opposed the 
extension of the suffrage on the same ground on which he was opposing this measure 
[Irish Home Rule] to-day – that people of Great Britain were not to be entrusted with 
the management of their own concerns, but these were to be managed by men elected 
on an exalted political platform. Precisely the same arguments of unfitness of the 
working men to govern were used by him then as to-day’.54 This idea of connecting 
the Third Reform Act to Irish Home Rule was also used to attack some of the leading 
Liberal Unionists. The Liberals pointed out that the Liberal Unionists had supported 
the extension of the franchise, but after the election they did not want to grant the 
voters of Ireland what they expressed through their votes. McEwan used this in his 
characterisation of both Hartington and Chamberlain:  
The attitude of mind with which Lord Hartington and Mr Chamberlain – 
(hooting) – now regarded the Irish question must be entirely novel, as they 
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were parties last year to the extension of the franchise in Ireland, which gave 
the whole people the opportunity of expressing their wishes through their 
representatives. The Irish people at last election demanded Home Rule, and 
could the British people refuse such a legitimate demand made in a 
constitutional manner? (Cheers.) If they did they would set at defiance the 
cardinal doctrine of the Liberal creed, that the wishes of a free people, when 
constitutionally expressed, must be given effect to. (Cheers.) He hoped the 
result of the election would show that although statesmen, from whom better 
things might have been expected, had forgotten their principles, the great 
democracy had remained true, and he believed it would declare, in a way not 
to be misunderstood, that the legitimate demands of Ireland must be 
conceded. (Cheers.) Lord Hartington and Mr Chamberlain did not ignore the 
Irish demand, but they refused to meet it.55 
 
McEwan used the same arguments of supporting democracy that the other Liberal 
candidates in Edinburgh expressed in this attack as well by declaring that the Irish 
voted for Home Rule and that, as Liberals, they should support democracy and the 
demand of the people in granting them that right. 
  The Liberal idea of the people’s right to govern which the Liberal candidates 
used in the 1886 election to support the Irish demand for Home Rule, was supported 
by some of the constituents in the East district. In late June Goschen spoke to his 
constituents and questioned the rationale of the Irish demand for Home Rule: 
‘Because 86 members have been returned for Ireland, it is said that justice demands 
that we should grant what they ask’. He then asked if justice required Ireland to 
govern itself, why now and not five years ago to which someone in the audience 
shouted ‘franchise’. The outburst stopped Goschen who commented, ‘was it only 
when the people of Ireland had got the franchise? [...] Then justice depends – I want 
to pin this point – that justice did not appear till – a certain decision had been arrived 
at the Irish polling booths’.56 The Liberal candidates’ argument was not that justice 
depended on votes, but that justice could not be denied to a majority. 
 Buchanan also challenged the validity of the democracy claim. He questioned 
the idea that Ireland was entitled to Home Rule because it had elected eighty-five 
MPs that supported it saying that ‘it was contrary to the principle of the Constitution 
as it at present existed; and that the whole representatives of the United Kingdom and 
the whole electors, English, Scottish, and Irish, were expected to express and deliver 
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their opinions upon the general principles of legislation, and how far they think that 
any legislation that might be proposed would conduce to the common weal and 
welfare of the United Kingdom’.57 Buchanan argued that the foundation of their 
democracy encompassed the whole country and, therefore, Irish Home Rule should 
have been decided based on the wants of the whole country, not just Ireland. This 
argument does not deny the right of the people to govern, but denied that right to the 
individual nations that made up the United Kingdom without considering the wants 
of the United Kingdom as a whole. 
 Wilson directly challenged the Liberals’ perceived idea that the majority of 
the Irish supported Home Rule. He argued that, although the majority of the Irish 
MPs were members of the Irish Parliamentary Party, overall the party only received 
370,596 of the total 738,000 Irish electorate. This left 430,000 voters that did not 
support Irish Home Rule in Ireland. With this argument, Wilson was challenging and 
potentially damaging the Liberal candidates’ argument that the majority of the Irish 
supported Home Rule which was the reason that they as Liberals said they supported 
the measure. However, Wilson lost credibility on his support of democracy when he 
criticised the constituents of Ireland: 
But of the 370,000, nearly one-fourth were illiterate voters – they could 
neither read nor write. That left only 300,000 men who could read and write, 
who could believe intelligently in such matters, who recorded their votes for 
Mr Parnell’s party. Looking at the great issues involved, he asked if they 
could place upon equal grounds the judgement of men who can read the bills 
and consider them and that of the men who could not read one of them.58  
 
There is some truth to this claim. Hoppen estimated that in 1880 ‘as few as 3.5’ per 
cent of the Irish electorate was illiterate and the number of illiterate jumped to ‘more 
than a fifth’ with the franchise extension in 1884.59 Wilson was not the only 
contemporary who had this attitude towards the newly enfranchised as it was the 
same taken by opponents to the extension in 1884. Goschen, arguing against the 
extension to the franchise in 1884, said, ‘to give votes to agricultural labourers before 
they have the slightest experience of responsibility in local matters is a blunder’.60 
Lord Randolph Churchill, a leading Conservative at the time, characterised the Bill 
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as enfranchising ‘...more than a million of perfectly illiterate agricultural labourers, 
which further is obviously so dangerous and revolutionary that even a strong Liberal 
like Mr Goschen recoils from it with alarm’.61 Therefore, Wilson essentially placed 
himself in the same category, if not further to the right of Goschen, on the issue of 
franchise extension which, by that time in 1886, Goschen had himself admitted that 
the vote against the extension was a mistake on his part.62 
 The Liberal candidates in Edinburgh were able to shape to their benefit the 
primary question of the election presented to the constituents. The question of the 
election became much more than support or opposition to Irish Home Rule. Rather, it 
was which of the candidates would carry on the city’s tradition of Liberalism. The 
Liberals established that the Liberal Unionists had abandoned the Party by not 
supporting Gladstone and Irish Home Rule. They next defined their support of Irish 
Home Rule through democracy which was a core value of their understanding of 
Liberalism. Therefore, in supporting Irish Home Rule, they were claiming to be the 
true Liberals and their return to Parliament would have thus continued Edinburgh’s 
tradition of Liberalism.  
 
Fear and Irish Home Rule 
  Like the Liberals, the Liberal Unionist candidates used liberalism in 
defending their stance on Irish Home Rule as well, but their argument ultimately 
relied on fear. The argument that the passage of Irish Home Rule would be unfair to 
the Ulster Protestant ‘Loyal minority’ became a standard position for opposition to 
the Bills.63 George Boyce asserts that this argument was able to ‘tap into the English 
political tradition that emphasised the freedom of individuals under the law, and the 
absence of the kind of powerful state apparatus that could bear down heavily on 
citizens’.64 Biagini added to the critique, concluding that ‘Ulster stood for all that 
British popular liberalism had always espoused, including “independence”, 
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resourcefulness, honesty and determination’.65 Therefore, in opposing Irish Home 
Rule, they believed they were protecting minorities from the majority’s use of 
legitimate power to discriminate against them. Buchanan and Goschen both used this 
idea in an attempt to incite fear that the Protestant minority would be discriminated 
against by the Catholic majority. Buchanan conveyed that he was worried about the 
future treatment of ‘minorities’ – non Catholics – in Ireland if they were given Home 
Rule. He believed that the present Government ‘should devise a scheme which 
should provide protection from injustice for all classes of the community’.66 Goschen 
went further than just suggesting that the minorities might be treated poorly and 
predicted that the National League would discriminate against the ‘Loyal minority’ if 
Ireland was granted Home Rule. At one of his speeches to labourers, a worker in the 
crowd, who a reporter from The Scotsman described as ‘apparently an Irishman’, 
responded to Goschen’s claim that Gladstone said that the Protestant minority would 
be protected. Goschen responded that he would not support any Bill that did not state 
how they were to be protected.67 At another meeting he restated his fear for the 
‘minority’ if ‘Roman Catholics are to manage the affairs of the Protestants’. Goschen 
also spoke of the minority in Ulster: ‘They are men of Scottish and English descent; 
they are Presbyterians, and they look forward with the greatest dread to the whole of 
the Executive powers of the country being put into the hands of those whose 
antecedents they know’.68 Goschen was trying to incite a fear of Catholics and their 
supposed future treatment of Protestants if Home Rule was to pass. This was in the 
same parliamentary division where Costelloe was attacked for being Roman Catholic 
during the 1885 election; therefore, Goschen perhaps thought it would resonate with 
the constituents. 
  The Liberal Unionist approach of protecting minorities overlapped with 
bigotry and racism expressed towards the Irish Catholics. This is further 
demonstrated through the use of fear in their rhetoric opposing Irish Home Rule. The 
Liberal Unionists presented the question of Irish Home Rule to their constituents as 
leading to a separate and independent Ireland, thus weakening the supremacy of the 
Empire and flooding the job market in Britain with Irish immigrants. Buchanan used 
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the complaint that Irish Home Rule would hinder the supremacy of Parliament. He 
believed that if a separate Parliament was created, it would take authority away from 
the Imperial Parliament and consequently weaken its power.69 Buchanan may have 
taken this approach based on conversations with local Edinburgh politicians from his 
district. He spoke with three politicians including Bailie Anderson who had been the 
Chairman of the Western Division Liberal Association. They all addressed a desire 
for Ireland to be given control over its local affairs, but they were against 
establishing a new governmental body in Dublin separate from the Imperial 
Parliament.70 It is unknown whether these local politicians addressed the concern that 
the supremacy would be weakened by the second Parliament in Dublin, but 
Buchanan’s rhetoric would have resonated with their desire of opposing it. 
   Purvis also attempted to gain support against Irish Home Rule by inciting 
fear and prejudice. At a campaign speech he argued for equality, stating that he 
supported Home Rule for all the nations of the United Kingdom, but then he posed 
the question: ‘Why not give Home Rule to Scotland? (Cheers, and “We are not ready 
for it.”) The law-loving Scottish people not ready for it, and those Irish, whose 
historic record was for the last generation a black roll of crime–(hear, hear, cheers, 
and hisses)–they were ready for it!’.71 With this, Purvis characterised all Scots as 
obedient and all Irish as criminals. He then went on to claim that the Government 
would need extra defence on the West coast and an extra fleet in the Irish Sea 
because a self-governed Ireland would be hostile to Britain and they would have to 
be prepared to defend themselves against them.72 He was clearly stating that the Irish 
were criminals and could not be trusted to govern themselves hoping that the 
constituents would subscribe to this view and vote against giving them Irish Home 
Rule. Purvis was certainly not the first person in opposition to Irish Home Rule to 
make this argument. During the debates on the Bill in April, Lord Salisbury 
expressed the same reservations about the Irish in what Curtis describes as ‘racist 
overtones’.73 Prejudice towards the Irish and views that they were an inferior race 
were not uncommon in Victorian Britain. The Irish were often characterised as an 
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uncivilised, dangerous, ape-like race.74 De Nie contributes this view of the Irish to 
their lack of Britishness commenting that ‘in British eyes, the eternal Paddy was 
forever a Celt, a Catholic, and a peasant’.75 Due to this ‘otherness’, they were viewed 
as inferior to the British.  
 More than any other candidate in Edinburgh during the 1886 election, 
Goschen made use of the tactic of trying to scare his constituents into voting for him. 
He asserted that if Home Rule passed, a great number of Irish would come to 
England and Scotland to find work and flood the market. This was done in hope of 
scaring the labourers that they would have to compete with an influx of cheap labour. 
One worker, Mr Paterson, who countered a motion put forth in favour of Goschen, 
proclaimed, ‘He had got to say that Mr Goschen would not intimidate the men of 
Edinburgh or elsewhere by saying that Irishmen would come over and take up their 
position’. Upon the vote, disorder broke out and the chairman declared that the 
motion in favour of Goschen passed unanimously, although this was later changed to 
a majority. When Goschen thanked them for passing the motion there was 
interruption and cries of ‘nonsense’.76 Although Edinburgh had a tradition of being 
anti-Catholic, the tactic did not work for Goschen on this occasion. The failure of this 
fear to resonate with the local workers was likely due to the low numbers of Irish 
immigrants to Edinburgh. This tactic of scaring the local workers due to the potential 
loss of employment due to the increase of Irish immigrants was valid in some areas 
of Scotland where the Irish were seen as cheap labour that caused stagnation of 
wages. This view of the Irish was particularly strong in the West of Scotland due in 
large part to the high percentage of Irish immigrants that settled there. In the East of 
Scotland, Irish and Catholics were still discriminated against, but it was on a much 
smaller scale than in the West.77 
The Liberal Unionists’ opposition to Irish Home Rule based on the Liberal 
principle of protecting minorities was lessened by the rest of their rhetoric. Instead of 
standing up for minorities, they appeared to be anti-Irish and anti-Catholic. However, 
the protection of minorities was not their only approach to defend their opposition to 
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Irish Home Rule. The Liberal Unionists also opposed Irish Home Rule because of the 
proposed accompaniment of the Land Purchase Bill for the purpose of buying out the 
landlords in Ireland. 
 
The Land Purchase Bill 
 Irish Home Rule was certainly the main question of the 1886 general election 
in Scotland, including Edinburgh, as well as throughout the rest of the United 
Kingdom. Although Irish Home Rule was the main question in Edinburgh, the Land 
Purchase Bill, which was directly tied to Irish Home Rule, occupied a large portion 
of the election debate. The Edinburgh constituencies were not alone in the 
importance they placed on the Land Purchase Bill. In his article on the Land 
Purchase Bill, Graham D. Goodlad agrees with older studies of the Irish question, 
that little regard was given to the Land Purchase Bill within Parliament after the 
second reading. However, Goodlad asserts that this view of the Bill alone is short-
sighted and points to the significance placed on the Bill by candidates and 
constituents throughout the country and further indicates that it ‘was a source of 
heated controversy’.78 Hutchison also writes of the importance of the Bill and 
suggests that opposition to Irish Home Rule for many Radicals in Scotland rested 
upon their opposition to the Land Purchase Bill.79   
 The Land Purchase Bill was proposed to accompany Irish Home Rule to help 
the Irish tenants purchase small holdings which they would then be responsible to 
pay back over a forty-nine year period It would also free the Irish landlords from the 
burden of a ‘rebellious tenantry’.80 Biagini contends that Gladstone ‘disliked’ the 
Land Purchase Bill, but believed it, along with Irish Home Rule, was necessary ‘to 
prevent Irish secession by creating a stable social and constitutional system’.81 The 
reason for the Bill’s unpopularity among Liberal constituents was twofold: the 
amount of money to be spent and to whom the money would be given. First, the 
estimated cost to implement the Bill was very large – the amount was alleged to be 
anywhere from £50 to £150 million – and it was to be paid by the taxpayers of Great 
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Britain. Second, and likely more damaging, it was to be paid to landlords who did not 
generate sympathy from nor were much favoured by the general public.82 In 
Edinburgh, as elsewhere, the Land Purchase Bill was used by Liberal Unionists in an 
attempt to siphon off Liberal voters that would otherwise have had little problem 
supporting Liberal candidates and Irish Home Rule. The Liberal Unionist candidates 
standing in Edinburgh had the perfect opportunity to oppose the Land Purchase Bill 
based on Liberal principles since it was supposed to generously buy out Irish 
landlords with taxpayer money. However, instead of forming their argument against 
the Land Purchase Bill in this way, they all shared the same rhetoric of claiming that 
the burden of the purchase of land would have unfairly been placed upon the 
taxpayers of Great Britain due to the Irish being unable or unwilling to repay the 
money. Although the Liberal candidates claimed that the Bill was already dead, the 
Liberal Unionist candidates created doubt that it was dead in order to exploit the 
unpopularity of the Bill amongst Liberal constituents. The Liberal Unionists then 
raised speculation on the amount that it was to cost. Finally, they questioned the 
ability and willingness of the Irish to repay the money.  
 The Liberal Unionists tried to convince the constituents that the Land 
Purchase Bill was not dead and that it was a necessary inclusion for there to be any 
settlement of the Irish question. When Buchanan told his constituents that the 
election was to be decided on whether or not they believed Irish Home Rule was the 
best settlement for the problems in Ireland, he went on to inform them that the Land 
Purchase Bill was an ‘inseparable part of the scheme’.83 Goschen went further than 
just telling his constituents that the Land Purchase Bill was still part of Irish Home 
Rule. He tried to convince his constituents by rationalising that it would have to be 
part of the Government’s scheme because Gladstone had said that it was an 
‘obligation of honour’ to compensate the Irish landlords:  
I see no change in the situation which will justify an escape from that 
obligation of honour, and I confess I can quite understand many of the 
feelings which animate my opponents in this hall when they differ from many 
of my views; but I don’t think they need differ from me upon this, that when 
a great Minister says that there is an obligation of honour upon the people of 
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this country, he cannot lightly withdraw and I believe he will not lightly 
withdraw it.84  
 
Goschen’s rationalisation may seem simplistic, but it would have certainly raised 
doubt amongst the constituents. Purvis also used statements made by Gladstone to 
support the claim that the Land Purchase Bill was still alive in statements to his 
constituents. Purvis said, ‘As regarded the land question – as a great authority has 
told them, and he thought rightly told them – it was inseparably connected with such 
a measure as this, because it was a mere measure of justice, that they should not at 
any rate desert the law-loving and loyal of Ireland, and hand them over to the 
disloyal, without at any rate giving them some compensation’.85 He took some liberty 
with Gladstone’s statement by referring to the Irish supporters of Home Rule as 
‘disloyal’ and those against as ‘law-loving’, but his message was the same as 
Goschen’s: the Land Purchase Bill had to accompany Irish Home Rule because 
Gladstone said that it was a matter of honour and justice.  
  The opponents of the Land Purchase Bill were able to easily cast doubt on 
the cost of buying out the Irish Landlords due to the change in the estimate on the 
Government’s part. Gladstone’s initial estimate was more than double the revised 
amount of £50 million which he gave because of the public’s unfavourable opinion 
due in large part to the high cost.86 In order to exploit the unfavourable view of the 
cost, the Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh disputed Gladstone’s claim that 
the cost would be £50 million. At the beginning of the short campaign the cost of the 
Land Purchase Bill was disputed even among the Liberal Unionist candidates 
themselves. On 22 June Purivis, acknowledging Gladstone’s estimate, claimed that 
the amount would start at £50 million, but after the initial amount the cost was likely 
to increase by another £100 million making the total three times the cost predicted by 
the Government. Two days later Goschen also predicted that the amount would be 
higher than the Government estimated, but only double at £100 million. He then 
changed his mind on 29 June and came in line with Purvis’ estimate, saying that the 
Bill might cost as much as £150 million.87 The £150 million figure agreed upon by 
both Purvis and Goschen was almost the equivalent of doubling the entire budget of 
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the Government.88 The claim that the buyout would cost £150 million was not unique 
to the Liberal Unionists in Edinburgh. Cameron Corbett, a sitting MP in Glasgow, 
also made the claim in mid-June. Goodlad discusses the use of the £150 million 
figure throughout the country in material he deemed ‘Unionist propaganda’.89 This 
made an unpopular Bill seem outrageous to the public due to the huge increase in the 
cost to the taxpayers. 
  Once the Liberal Unionist candidates had argued that not only was the Land 
Purchase Bill alive, but also that it would cost three times the amount the 
Government had claimed, they stressed the enormous burden placed on the taxpayers 
and created doubt that the money would be repaid by questioning the willingness and 
ability of the Irish to do so. Goschen aroused suspicion on the ability of the Irish 
being able to manage their economic affairs without the aid of the United Kingdom: 
I have heard a high authority state that it is expected that Ireland will be able 
to save, and that she will be able to govern herself more cheaply than she has 
been governed. I doubt it very much, because I do not think that either the 
critics or the friends of Ireland have ever fastened upon her the epithet that 
Irishmen were extremely economical. (Laughter.) They are generous, they are 
open-handed, and open-hearted too – (laughter).90  
 
Therefore, by virtue of being Irish alone, the likelihood of them being able to repay 
the loan for the purchase of land and the other costs of the proposed new 
Government would have been too great in Goschen’s opinion. 
 Buchanan also attacked the Land Purchase Bill because he believed that the 
Irish might not be able to repay the loan. His reasoning was slightly different from 
Goschen’s as he placed the doubt not with the proposed Irish Government, but rather 
with the Irish tenants. In the proposed Bill the tenants were to repay the cost of their 
holding to the Irish Government through fixed instalments over forty-nine years. 
Buchanan warned that a decrease in the price of produce would leave the tenants 
unable to afford their repayments over time. Buchanan then varied greatly from the 
idea of the inability of the Irish to repay and warned that by placing the British 
taxpayers as the landlord to the Irish tenants, it would create ‘disharmony’ between 
them as ‘the British Government would be described by the agitators as an alien and 
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foreign country’. He expressed concern that this might instigate the Irish tenants to 
stop the repayments since they were going to the British Government.91 Whether or 
not the Irish might have been unable or unwilling to repay the loan in the future, 
Buchanan’s goal was the same: to create a concern that the constituents as British 
taxpayers might be left with the cost. 
 During one of his speeches, Purvis wrapped the whole basis of the election on 
this one aspect of the Land Purchase Bill. He asked ‘upon what security’ was the 
money lent to buy out the Irish landlords to rely before immediately providing an 
answer: ‘It was on Irish security. (“Why not?”) They were to judge for themselves 
whether Irish security was good or not’. Even though he said that the constituents 
were to ultimately make the decision, he certainly hoped to help them to decide. He 
continued by questioning the ‘security’ and the credibility of the Irish based on pure 
speculation: 
If they were under the impression that the Irish tenants would pay a Saxon 
Government what they had refused for generations to pay to their Irish 
landlords, then they should make up their minds to lend the money if they 
thought it a very good security. But if they thought that it was no security 
worthy a business man’s consideration, than he hoped they would make up 
their minds to reject the Home Rule Bill and the Government that suggested 
it.92  
 
Purvis bypassed the argument that the Irish may not be able to repay the money and 
instead predicted that they would simply refuse to do so. Wilson also bypassed the 
argument of the Irish being unable to pay and proposed that the Irish tenants might 
refuse to pay which would leave the Government with only two options: ‘either to 
thin them out, to crush them – (a voice, “Coercion”) – or take the price they would 
give.’ Wilson went on to say, ‘No good Irishman would ask the bill to pass; no 
Scotsman or Englishman loving Ireland would ask the bill to pass’.93 Of course, both 
of Wilson’s options were unsatisfactory, but he placed a new dimension to the fear of 
the Irish not repaying the loan thus leaving the British taxpayer to pay the bill by 
suggesting that the poor Irish tenants might be placed in danger by the Bill that was 
meant to help them. 
                                                      
91 The Scotsman, 1 Jul. 1886, 5; 5 Jul. 1886, 8. 
92 The Scotsman, 28 Jun. 1886, 8. 
93 The Scotsman, 1 Jul. 1886 6. 
 213 
 The Liberal Unionist attack on Irish Home Rule by its association with the 
Land Purchase Bill was diminished by the position the Liberal candidates took on it. 
Although all four of the Liberals shared the same position on the Land Purchase Bill, 
surprisingly, none of them actually supported it either. Whether the Liberal Unionist 
candidates had successfully tapped into the general feeling on the Land Purchase Bill 
or had pushed the debate towards their argument, it appears that their campaign 
against the Bill was successful because the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh shared 
some of the same concerns about the Bill as the Liberal Unionists professed. The 
Liberal candidates supported the principle of the Bill, but not the specifics of Bill 
itself. The main reasons for their opposition to the Bill was its cost to taxpayers and 
the amount of money going to landlords, even though they disputed the £150 million 
amount that the Liberal Unionists claimed the Bill would ultimately cost. 
 Mr Wallace, the Liberal candidate in the West Division, took up the Liberal 
Unionist complaint about the security of the loan.94 He did not speculate on any 
reason why the Irish might not be able or willing to repay the loan, but he insinuated 
that there needed to be a higher security to ease the fear amongst the constituents. In 
contrast, both Dr Wallace and Childers fought against the claim that the Bill was 
backed by bad security. According to them the security of the loan was good because 
it was not dependent upon the Irish tenants alone as it was backed by the entire 
revenue of the proposed Government of Ireland.95 Childers had to be worried about 
the idea that it was a bad security because he was a Cabinet Minister and had recently 
been the Chancellor of the Exchequer. His motivation in defending the security may 
have been to avoid an attack for supporting the Bill, but he had discussed the matter 
with Gladstone in March and called for the security of Irish revenue to be 
implemented.96 Despite Childers’ defence of the security of the loan, he still found 
fault with the Land Purchase Bill. He held that the initial amount proposed was too 
great. Even though he rejected the figure that the Liberal Unionists had been 
projecting by saying that the Bill had only allowed for the use of £50 million to buy 
out the landlords, he went on to reject the sum of £50 to £100 million being used for 
the purchase saying that it was ‘entirely out of the question, and I can in no 
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circumstance support it.’ In his view, even though the security of the loan would 
have been great, he was against the Bill because the Government’s own revised 
projection of £50 million was too high. Dr Wallace also disputed the Liberal 
Unionists’ alleged cost of the Bill and accused them of trying to incite fear amongst 
the constituents. Dr Wallace said, ‘the Tory Whig camp were further tying to frighten 
the electors about the Land Purchase Bill. They were continually telling them that if 
they returned Mr Gladstone to power, they would as a matter of necessity be saddled 
with taxation that could only be represented by £150,000,000.’97 
 Both McEwan and Dr Wallace opposed the Land Purchase Bill because they 
felt it was too generous to the Irish landlords. McEwan believed that the Bill had 
been ‘framed for the ostensible purpose of conciliating the Irish land lords, and 
consequently the terms offered were greater than the necessity of the position seemed 
to require’.98 Dr Wallace said that he would not support a Land Purchase Bill if it 
‘was to be a bill for the benefiting of the Irish landlords’. Instead of attacking the 
amount of money being called for in the Bill as excessive on its own, McEwan and 
Dr Wallace took a sound liberal argument in specifically attacking the amount to buy 
out the landlords as excessive. This should have played well with the Liberal 
constituents that had an unfavourable view of the landlords. Despite stating that they 
were opposed to the Land Purchase Bill and pointing out faults with the Bill, all four 
of the Liberal candidates expressed their support of the principle of the Bill. They all 
proclaimed that they favoured the idea of Parliament helping the Irish tenants 
purchase land.99 Dr Wallace sums up the reason why the Liberal candidates 
supported the principle of the Bill saying that he ‘would never look upon a Land 
Purchase Bill for the benefit of Irish Landlords with favour, but he could not see why 
they should turn a deaf ear to a request from the Irish peasantry. That was a totally 
different matter from a demand made by the Irish landlords’.100  
 The Liberal candidates tried to avoid the criticism associated with the Land 
Purchase Bill by proclaiming that they were against it, but at the same time they still 
supported the principle of the Bill and, more importantly, still supported Gladstone. 
Their main defence was to announce that the Land Purchase Bill was dead or that the 
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Bill was not tied in any way to Irish Home Rule. Although the Liberal candidates in 
Edinburgh were not the first to use this tactic and may have just been following 
Gladstone’s lead, they certainly embraced the idea. Goodlad marks Gladstone’s 
speech in Edinburgh on 21 June as a change in the presentation of the Land Purchase 
Bill to the public and points to Gladstone’s effort being followed by other Liberals.101 
While this is true of many of the Liberal candidates in Edinburgh, Childers spoke out 
the day before Gladstone’s speech. Speaking to his constituents, Childers 
proclaimed, ‘the proposal itself is dead: the linking of that proposal to the Irish 
Government proposal is dead’.102 Over the next couple of weeks the rest of the 
Liberal candidates in Edinburgh followed Childers’ and Gladstone’s lead. Dr 
Wallace told his constituents in the East division that the Land Purchase Bill was 
dead and that it was no longer part of Irish Home Rule. Mr Wallace disputed the 
claim that the two Irish Bills were dependent upon one another. In the Central 
division McEwan insisted that time had run out on the proposed Land Purchase 
Bill.103 The Liberal candidates in Edinburgh wanted the constituents to feel that 
voting for them only demonstrated a support of Irish Home Rule and not of the Land 
Purchase Bill. Dr Wallace demonstrated this when he said, ‘It was an entire mistake 
to say that no one could vote for the Irish Government Bill without also voting for 
the Land Purchase Bill, which was no longer before the country. Its merits had no 
relevancy whatever with the Home Rule Bill. Mr Gladstone had thrown the Irish 
Land Purchase Bill overboard’.104 Dr Wallace not only defended himself against the 
Liberal Unionists, but he also used Gladstone, the Edinburgh Liberal candidates’ best 
weapon to do so. 
 
 Gladstone’s influence 
 Gladstone’s image as a great Liberal statesman was employed in Edinburgh 
by both supporters of the Liberal candidates and those candidates themselves in an 
attempt to gather support amongst the Liberal constituents. As discussed in chapter 
four, Gladstone had a great following and was well-liked and admired in Edinburgh. 
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The way in which Liberal candidates and their supporters referred to Gladstone and 
used his name varied. There were two approaches taken to boost the Liberal 
candidates’ campaign prospects. The first tactic was simple association with 
Gladstone; by mentioning him and a candidate together, for example, as if to say that 
Gladstone favours the candidate. The second tactic portrayed Gladstone as a victim 
of abandonment by some Liberals and that the candidate was supporting him in an 
attempt to right a wrong. Gladstone’s influence was also used in Edinburgh by 
Gladstone himself. He was concerned with the representation of the whole 
Midlothian area which comprised of his county seat of Midlothian, the four 
Edinburgh constituencies and the Leith district of burghs seat. He was quite involved 
with the elections in Leith and Edinburgh during 1886. He used his popularity to try 
to influence the constituents in Edinburgh to vote for parliamentary candidates that 
were favourable to Irish Home Rule and thus favourable to himself. Gladstone also 
tried to influence parliamentary candidates to stand in Edinburgh and he even forced 
a candidate to withdraw from the election in Leith.105 
 The tactic of associating Gladstone with the candidate was used by the 
supporters of the Liberal candidates as well as the candidates themselves. The 
Chairman at an election meeting for Childers relayed to the crowd that they were 
‘highly privileged’ to have Childers as a candidate and complained that ‘some 
Liberals’ did not support ‘Gladstone’s Irish Bills’. In conjunction with this, he 
praised Gladstone for his ‘inspiration’ in dealing with the Irish question and told the 
constituents that Gladstone ‘had always tried to win them over, not by force, but by 
justice and love’.106 At a meeting of Mr Wallace’s, the Chairman summarised a 
telegram that expressed the joy that Gladstone took in Mr Wallace’s entrance to the 
race because it gave the constituents the opportunity to express through voting 
whether they supported the Government Bills.107 The Chairs at these election 
meetings were relaying to the constituents that their candidate stood with Gladstone 
in supporting his scheme for Ireland or were even favoured by him.  
 Some of the candidates took it upon themselves to bind their candidacy to 
Gladstone. McEwan used Gladstone’s actual image to guarantee that the constituents 
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would relate Gladstone to him. Portraits of Gladstone were passed out to constituents 
along with polling cards encouraging them to vote for McEwan.108 Of the four 
campaigns, Dr Wallace used Gladstone’s influence the most, essentially wrapping his 
campaign around Gladstone. Dr Wallace presented himself to the constituents as 
being completely committed to Gladstone: ‘in the present crisis of things, he was out 
and out, heart and soul, with Gladstone – not only with respect to the great question 
of the present hour, but also in respect to all the vital and essential questions of 
Liberalism’. Dr Wallace went even further than just associating Gladstone to himself 
and his candidacy when he presented Gladstone as having been abandoned by some 
of the Liberals. He assured the constituents that, unlike Goschen, he would stand by 
Gladstone and the party.109  
Associating oneself with Gladstone was not a new strategy in the 1886 
election. Childers listed Gladstone’s popularity in Edinburgh as one reasons he 
thought he might win the 1886 by-election for the South district in Edinburgh: ‘“Mr. 
Gladstone’s name goes a long way at Edinburgh, and I am looked up on as his âme 
damnée”’.110 Parliamentary candidates had also used Gladstone’s popularity outside 
of Edinburgh. Purvis was one such candidate and his opponent, Childers, used this 
against him. Childers accused Purvis of betraying Gladstone by trying to depreciate 
his reputation in the previous election in 1885: ‘When he [Purvis] contested 
Berkshire nothing was too strong in praise of Mr Gladstone. (Cheers.) After all, 
however, consistency in these matters was a little out of fashion – (laughter)’.111 
Childers spoke of Purvis’ betrayal of Gladstone to the constituents because during 
the previous election he had used Gladstone’s popularity to his advantage. However, 
during the 1886 election he was not only trying to distance himself from Gladstone, 
but he was also attempting to undermine Gladstone’s standing with the constituents. 
 This approach of presenting Gladstone as having been abandoned or attacked 
by the Liberal Unionists was also deployed by the other two Liberal candidates in 
Edinburgh. McEwan presented Gladstone as standing for Liberalism and pushing 
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further against tyranny. He praised Gladstone’s ‘integrity’ for staying true to the 
Liberal principle of the people’s right to govern themselves. Referring to Liberal 
Unionists, McEwan said, ‘they knew now that if only a mere Liberal in name had 
been at the head of the Government, Liberal principles would have been disregarded, 
and the demand of the Irish people ignored’.112 This was a further testament to 
Gladstone because he stood by Liberal principles and had been abandoned by some 
who called themselves Liberals for doing so.113 Mr Wallace and his supporters took 
the view of Gladstone having been abandoned for standing by Liberal principles as 
well. Mr Wallace pleaded with his constituents to support Gladstone asking:  
...if they were willing that he whose whole life had been give to his country 
should have his last days darkened by the shadow of defeat. He believed 
that Scotland would give a loud and unanimous no – (cheers) – and he 
would ask the electors of that division to let his voice join with the voice of 
those who would enable their great leader to crown his last days with his 
greatest achievement of bringing about a reconciliation of two long-divided 
peoples. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)114  
 
Mr Wallace was appealing to Gladstone’s popularity and the idea that this could be 
his last election in an attempt to gain the support of the constituents based on their 
loyalty to Gladstone. Councillor Mackintosh, a local town councillor, in putting forth 
Mr Wallace’s candidature said, ‘now was the time, when Mr Gladstone’s back was to 
the wall, that every true Liberal should show his sympathy with him, and genuine 
adhesion to his principles. (Cheers.)’ Mackintosh was arguing that they should 
support Mr Wallace in order to show their support for Gladstone.115 
 The Liberal candidates and their supporters were not the only ones to ask for 
the constituents to support Gladstone by defeating the Liberal Unionists because 
Gladstone did so as well. This was not Gladstone’s first involvement in Edinburgh 
politics. Since he had become the MP for Midlothian in 1880, he had taken a vested 
interest in Edinburgh. Gladstone gave several of his Midlothian campaign speeches 
in the city and was greeted as a hero by the locals at these speeches. During the 1885 
election Gladstone refrained from endorsing any candidates as there were multiple 
Liberals running for the same seat. He did, however, impart his disapproval to other 
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Liberals who were interfering with races in Edinburgh.116 Gladstone’s stance on the 
disestablishment question, and in particular his great speech in Edinburgh on the 
subject, had a profound impact on the constituents and candidates in Edinburgh 
during that election.117 
  Gladstone’s interest went beyond merely giving political speeches. He was 
behind the restoration of Edinburgh’s Mercat Cross which he even paid for 
himself.118 He petitioned the Town Council to restore the Mercat Cross in the spring 
of 1885. Gladstone, writing to the Town Council, said that he was pursuing the 
restoration ‘as your historic city is the capital of Midlothian no less than of the 
Kingdom of Scotland, I earnestly desire, in the character of the representative of the 
county, to leave behind me this small but visible record of grateful acknowledgment 
and sincere affection, in a form closely associated with local and with national 
tradition’.119 He wanted to bring Edinburgh and Midlothian national distinction. The 
Mercat Cross was unveiled in late November 1885. A writer for The Scotsman 
described the events of the day and estimated that there were between 70,000 and 
80,000 people present, including Gladstone who gave a speech and presented the 
Mercat Cross to the city as a gift. Although the restored Mercat Cross was the reason 
for the event, it was similar to Gladstone’s other visits to the city. As the writer in 
The Scotsman described, ‘Mr Gladstone himself of course was the chief attraction of 
the day’.120   
 During the 1886 general election Gladstone’s involvement in the city’s 
politics was much greater. This can be attributed to the political situation which was 
much different from 1885. Unlike the 1885 election in which the rival Liberals were 
running against one another although they were both still under the ‘umbrella’ of the 
Liberal party, the dispute over Irish Home Rule brought open hostility to the Liberal 
Party from the Liberal Unionists.121 The act of party abandonment enabled Gladstone 
to openly intervene in the elections. One election in which Gladstone intervened in 
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the Edinburgh area was the Leith district of burghs which was made up of the urban 
areas outside of Edinburgh in Midlothian including Leith, Portobello, and 
Musselburgh. It appears that Gladstone was concerned with the whole Midlothian 
area and wanted MPs that supported him to represent all the constituencies within the 
area. Late in the 1886 campaign no one had come forward to stand against the sitting 
MP for Leith, William Jacks, which led Gladstone to agree to stand for that seat even 
though he was unopposed in Midlothian.122 According to Alistair Cooke, Gladstone’s 
entrance into the Leith contest was ‘ideological’. Gladstone wanted to insure that the 
constituents had the opportunity to express their desire on Irish Home Rule by being 
able to vote for a pro-Home Rule candidate.123  
 Gladstone also intervened in Edinburgh when he outlined his desire for 
Edinburgh during his speech in the Music Hall on 21 June 1886: 
There has been, gentlemen, a Liberal secession much stronger, undoubtedly, 
than we could have desired – (hear, hear) – in the House of Commons, but 
that succession represented something more than one-fourth of the Liberal 
party, leaving to us, who call ourselves the Liberal party – (loud cheers) – 
nearly three-fourths of the whole. Well, now, gentlemen, I want you to 
compare that state of things – not the most satisfactory in the world – with the 
state of things in Edinburgh. In Edinburgh there is a division into three-
fourths and one-fourth, but the one-fourth is with the Liberal party, and the 
three-fourths are with the seceders. (Cheers and hiss.) It is a matter of interest, 
gentlemen, to consider – and perhaps you may say, ‘You are the county 
member. You have nothing to do with it,’ but I cannot help it. It is a matter of 
interest, that I cannot avoid, even to me to consider whether that state of 
things is to continue. (‘No’.) I hope it is not impertinence, but I cannot help 
suspecting that the capital of Scotland will make stout and sturdy effort in 
order to set right the state of things. (Loud cheers.) Edinburgh has been 
accustomed – (interruption) – to lead in the van of Liberal politics – (cheers) 
– and has not been accustomed to find here members among the obstructers 
of national justice – (oh, oh) – and national welfare. (Loud cheers.)124 
 
This speech is a clear example of Gladstone using his position as a candidate for 
Midlothian to influence Edinburgh constituents. Even though Gladstone was giving a 
Midlothian election speech, he revealed his concern with the state of Edinburgh’s 
MPs and appealed to the constituents of Edinburgh to support him in defending 
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Liberalism against the ‘succeeders’. Gladstone tried to influence the Edinburgh 
electors in two ways: he asked them to help him and he addressed the tradition of 
Edinburgh as being ‘the van of Liberal politics’.125  
 Gladstone also used this speech to single out Goschen as the MP in 
Edinburgh that he most wanted removed from Parliament telling the audience, ‘It is 
not for me, gentlemen, to enter upon the cases of particular districts and particular 
contests, but there is one contest in actual progress, and one gentlemen whose great 
distinction requires that I should name him. That is the case of East Edinburgh, and 
the gentlemen whom I name is Mr Goschen’.126 He personally attacked Goschen, 
citing Goschen’s role as a leader of the Liberal opposition as the reason he believed 
the constituents of East Edinburgh should vote him out. Gladstone pointed to 
Goschen’s involvement in raising funds among the wealthy to run Liberal Unionist 
candidates against Liberal candidates in as many races as he could: ‘I do not think it 
consorts with the spirit of Liberalism – (hear, hear) – to hold a great meeting for the 
purpose of creating a long purse in order to create Parliamentary contests – 
Parliamentary contests that would otherwise not exist’.127 This helps explain 
Gladstone’s involvement in the Leith election as well. If he believed that the Liberal 
Unionists were forcing elections, he would have been justified in forcing one as well. 
Gladstone also questioned Goschen’s commitment to Liberalism, a tactic that all the 
Liberal candidates in Edinburgh used in an attempt to discredit their opponents:  
Mr Goschen would be a most admirable candidate, as far as I can judge, with 
incomparable claims for a Tory constituency. (Cheers.) He is an undoubted 
Liberal in his own belief – (laughter) – in his own most sincere belief, but it is 
somewhat unfortunate that, being a man of the greatest talent and an 
undoubted Liberal, his energies for years and years past have been mainly 
directed towards stopping the purposes of Liberalism. (Cheers.) For years 
together he conscientiously opposed that extension of the franchise – (hear, 
hear) – which, gentlemen, as you recollect, was a matter of great difficulty to 
accomplish, and was very nearly costing the country the anxieties of a 
dissolution. All this it was hoped at the last election was over. Mr Goschen in 
his proceedings sincerely professed the creed of Liberalism. It was most 
unfortunate that when his past time had been occupied in resisting an 
extension of the franchise, his future time was from the very commencement 
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to be occupied again in resisting the purpose of the great bulk of the Liberal 
party. 128 
 
This speech of Gladstone’s was a major attack on Goschen and had the potential to 
influence many constituents. The content of the speech went beyond the audience 
and readers of newspapers because Goschen’s opposition used this attack by 
Gladstone to their advantage and placed a portion of the speech in a pamphlet titled 
‘Mr Gladstone on Mr Goschen’. This is, therefore, another example of local 
constituents using Gladstone and Liberalism to attack the Liberal Unionist candidates 
in Edinburgh. 
 Besides actively campaigning against Goschen’s candidature in Edinburgh, 
Gladstone also tried to recruit a prominent Liberal to stand against him. Gladstone 
tried to persuade Henry Campbell-Bannerman to leave his relatively safe seat in the 
Stirling burghs to run against Goschen in East Edinburgh. Campbell-Bannerman had 
represented Stirling Burghs since 1868 and had risen to be a high-ranking Liberal 
serving in Gladstone’s Cabinet.129 Campbell-Bannerman was wary of the idea and 
believed that Goschen’s organisation in Edinburgh was too strong to overcome in 
such a short time.130 He refused the move, writing Gladstone that there was no reason 
why a Liberal should not contest Goschen, but he believed that they should not be as 
prominent as himself to avoid bringing more attention to what could be a 
‘humiliating defeat’.131 In Gladstone’s letter to Campbell-Bannerman trying to 
persuade him to stand against Goschen, he encompasses the Edinburgh districts 
within his own of Midlothian writing, ‘we could make a great Midlothian affair of 
it’.132 If he viewed them as part of the same political area, this may also explain his 
concern with the Edinburgh and Leith districts. Besides this, Edinburgh, as the 
capital of Liberal Scotland was extremely important to Gladstone’s legitimacy over 
the party. The fact that three of the four MPs had been against him, not counting the 
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Leith burghs, was a challenge to his authority. For Gladstone to be able to claim that 
he and his supporters were the true voice of Liberals in Scotland, he needed to hold 
the capital. Regardless of his reasons, Gladstone was certainly involved and 
concerned with Edinburgh’s elections. 
 
The results  
At first the results of the 1886 election in Edinburgh appear to be a great 
victory for Gladstone and the Liberal party. There was a great turnaround amongst 
the city’s MPs regarding Irish Home Rule. After the second reading of the Irish 
Home Rule Bill, three of the city’s MPs were opposed while only one supported the 
Bill. After the 1886 election that ratio flipped, with three MPs supporting Irish Home 
Rule and only one remaining in opposition. Moreover, Hutchison points out the 
significance that the sitting MPs had on determining the outcome of the race. There 
were twenty-five Liberals standing for their current seat and all were returned except 
two. The standing Liberal Unionists won thirteen of their nineteen elections. 
Hutchison concludes that many constituents had not decided their own stance on the 
Irish question and gave their sitting MP ‘the benefit of the doubt’.133 
 
Table 6.2: 1886 Election Results in Edinburgh134 
District Candidate Party Votes Received 
Central McEwan Liberal 3,760 
 Wilson Liberal Unionist 2,236 
East Dr. Wallace Liberal 3,694 
 Goschen Liberal Unionist 2,253 
South Childers Liberal 3,778 
 Purvis Liberal Unionist 2,191 
West Buchanan Liberal Unionist 3,083 
 Mr Wallace Liberal 2,393 
 
As seen in the above table, Edinburgh does not fall into this trend. The constituents 
in Edinburgh returned two incumbent MPs and voted two out of their seats. The two 
incumbent MPs voted out, Goschen and Wilson, constituted one-third of the total 
incumbent Liberal Unionist MPs not returned in Scotland. 
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Gladstone certainly viewed the Edinburgh results as a victory, writing to 
Holmes Ivory after the election, ‘I need hardly tell you how cordially I rejoice that 
the capital of dear old Scotland has shaken off her chains & once more spoken with a 
voice the sound of which will ring throughout the land on behalf of justice peace & 
union with Ireland’.135 Holmes Ivory also viewed this as a major victory, writing to 
Gladstone on the same day:  
I cannot tell you with what happiness and delight I write you this morning the 
most satisfactory result here. Buchanan’s seat was hopeless from the first, if 
the Tories polled their full strength, which has been concentrated on that 
Division, but Mr Wallace has made a good fight & a reputation here. But 
what are we to say sufficiently in praise of the east Division’s Mr Wallace. 
The result then has surpassed our fondest expectations. McEwan’s majority is 
also eminently satisfactory.136 
 
By far the biggest upset and most satisfying election in Edinburgh for Gladstone was 
the defeat of Goschen. Gladstone’s election agent in Midlothian, Campbell, wrote 
him to give him the news, ‘You would be much gratified to find that Mr. Goschen 
has been pretty accurately gauged by the Scottish constituency which elected him in 
November’.137 Campbell also informed Gladstone that The Scotsman credited his 
‘personal influence’ as the cause of the election result.138 The Scotsman clearly laid 
the outcome of the election with Gladstone with such statements as these: ‘Mr. 
Gladstone’s influence has carried the day in Eastern and Central Edinburgh. The 
Unionist cause is beaten in both those Divisions, and beaten badly’ and ‘Mr 
Gladstone’s visit to Edinburgh has made a great change in the opinion of the main 
body of the electors. It is the simple truth that, a month ago, five-sixths of the people 
in Edinburgh were against the Bills of the Government’.139 Informing Gladstone that 
he believed that he was justified in intervening in the Edinburgh elections, Campbell 
said, ‘If you were convinced in your own mind of the justice & right of your cause & 
if you had (as they now admit) some considerable influence with the Electors of 
Edinburgh, you would have incurred a far greater responsibility if holding the 
                                                      
135 BL, Gladstone Papers, MSS. 44498, f. 146, Gladstone to Holmes Ivory, 6 Jul. 1886, copy of a 
telegram. 
136 BL, Gladstone Papers, MSS. 44498, f. 147, Holmes Ivory to Gladstone, 6 Jul. 1886. 
137 BL, Gladstone Papers, MSS. 44116, f. 117, Campbell to Gladstone, 6 Jul. 1886. 
138 BL, Gladstone Papers, MSS. 44116, f. 119, Campbell to Gladstone, 7 Jul. 1886. 
139 BL, Gladstone Papers, MSS. 44116, f. 119, Campbell to Gladstone, 7 Jul. 1886, two enclosed 
clippings from The Scotsman, both dated 7 Jul. 1886 
 225 
opinions you did. You had for a moment hesitated to give free & decided expression 
to that opinion’.140 
 The Edinburgh Evening News, which was slanted more towards the advanced 
side of the Liberal party, also credited Gladstone’s involvement in Edinburgh and 
Leith for the victory and viewed the election as restoring Edinburgh to the Liberal 
cause: 
Edinburgh has responded nobly to the call of Mr Gladstone. She has cast Mr 
Goschen into political outer darkness, where to-day there is weeping and 
wailing and gnashing of teeth. She has sent Mr Wilson to keep company with 
his fellow-shuffler, Mr Jacks; and she would have brought Mr Buchanan’s 
paralytic career to a like inglorious close had his opponent been earlier in the 
field. Next to the support given to Mr Gladstone, is the testimony of the 
elections to the sound Liberalism of the city. [...] By the vote of Monday, 
Edinburgh has been saved from misrepresentation in the forthcoming 
Parliament, except in the case of Mr Buchanan, who has kept his seat by a 
majority small enough to make him fear and tremble. With that exception, the 
city has decided for Mr Gladstone in tones clear and ringing – tones which 
will be heard above the political clamour, will be echoed over the country, 
and will inspire with new ardour those who, in the face of terrible odds, are 
fighting the battle of Democracy and progress.141 
 
This view of the 1886 election is not necessarily wrong, especially for the short term. 
With two of the three Liberal Unionist MPs being defeated, one of them Goschen, it 
seems like a great victory for the Liberals. However, the biggest change to Edinburgh 
was that for the first time since 1832, the city was not wholly represented by 
Liberals. Buchanan’s victory in the West broke more than fifty years of Liberal 
domination in the city. Lawrence suggested no political party was able to dominate a 
city’s politics after the Third Reform Act and, despite the Liberals in Edinburgh 
holding on to their power in 1885, they lost their hold on the city in 1886.142 
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 This thesis analyses the effects that the Third Reform Act and the Irish Home 
Rule debate had on the politics of Edinburgh. Additionally, it asks whether the 
constituents’ primary political concern was with local or national politics. This study 
also uncovers one of the main issues for both the constituents and the candidates 
which was the concept of democracy. The Third Reform Act drastically affected the 
politics of Edinburgh. It was due to the breakup of the city into four single 
parliamentary districts that the wedge in the Liberal party was brought to the surface 
of the politics of the city. Although the Whigs and Radicals in Edinburgh did not 
operate an official compromise to run both a Whig and Radical together as most 
other double member burghs had done before the Third Reform Act, they maintained 
a relatively stable local Liberal party. With the establishment of the new 
parliamentary districts created by the Third Reform Act an atmosphere of aggression 
between the Radicals and Whigs ensued over which group would control the new 
local associations in these new districts. This led to the legitimacy of the new 
associations being questioned. The loss of legitimacy led to the breakup of the local 
liberal associations. This split in the local party lea to the establishment of new 
opposing local Liberal associations in three of the districts. These associations were 
largely based on ideological stance of the members. However, this change on its own 
was not enough to alter the traditional political character of the city. It was not until 
the introduction of Irish Home Rule and the ensuing breakup of the national Liberal 
party that the city’s traditional political character changed. The city that was once 
dominated by the Liberal party allowed another party in thus changing the political 
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character of Edinburgh when a Liberal Unionist was elected in the West district of 
the city in the 1886 election. Throughout this politically tumultuous period the 
Liberals were engaged in a bitter internal dispute nationally and the 1885 and 1886 
elections were dominated by national questions. Moreover, Edinburgh was often on 
the national stage due to Gladstone standing for Midlothian and campaigning in 
Edinburgh. All of this required the constituents to concern themselves with national 
politics, therefore, their votes were pulled by both national and traditional local 
forces. Many of the issues  discussed in this thesis relate to the concept of democracy 
including the Third Reform Act, the caucus and the questions of disestablishment, 
local licensing and Irish Home Rule. In debating these issues the constituents and the 
candidates used the idea of democracy to both defend and support their positions. 
 
Effects of the Third Reform Act and the Irish Home Rule debate 
 Politics in Edinburgh, as in much of the rest of urban Scotland, had been 
dominated by the Liberal party from 1832 to the Third Reform Act. The closest a 
non-Liberal candidate came to being elected an MP for Edinburgh came in the 1835 
election and he was still more than one thousand votes from a second place finish.1 
However, with the results of the 1886 election, the Liberals no longer maintained 
complete dominance of the city. Although three of Edinburgh’s new parliamentary 
districts – the Central, East and South – elected Liberal MPs to represent them, the 
West district voted to change its political allegiance from the Liberal party, opting 
instead for a Liberal Unionist candidate. This broke from Edinburgh’s political 
tradition and changed its political identity by establishing new identities for the four 
parliamentary districts set up through the reforms of the Third Reform Act. However, 
it should be pointed out that the Liberal Unionists were still claiming to be Liberals 
at this time. By November 1886 they had established a separate party organisation 
from the Liberals throughout the country and subsequently ran in opposition to 
them.2 This, coupled with their diverging opinions on political questions, resulted in 
a distinct political identity. 
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 Throughout the rest of the Victorian and Edwardian eras the four 
parliamentary districts were represented, for the most part, by the same political party 
that they elected to represent them in the 1886 election.3 This too came to an end 
when the electorate was once again changed by the Fourth Reform Act enacted in 
1918. The Scottish electorate grew to over two million with the enfranchisement of 
all adult males over the age of twenty-one and most females over the age of thirty. 
Edinburgh also gained one additional seat raising its total to five which initiated 
another restructuring of its parliamentary seats.4 All of these changes led to another 
alteration of the political makeup of the city. From the 1886 election through to the 
enactment of the Fourth Reform Act, the West parliamentary division of Edinburgh 
was mainly held by the Liberal Unionists. Liberal Unionists won every general 
election from 1886 to December 1910 with the lone exception of an 1888 by-election 
which they lost.5 The by-election was held because Buchanan, who was elected in 
the 1886 general election as a Liberal Unionist, rejoined the Liberals. Buchanan 
believed that he had betrayed Gladstone and felt that he could no longer continue to 
do so.6 Buchanan’s opponent in the by-election was Thomas Raleigh, who had stood 
for the South Edinburgh district as a Radical in 1885. Raleigh had been defeated by 
Sir George Harrison in the 1885 election, a loss which he blamed on Conservative 
support of Harrison. In the 1888 by-election Buchanan, running  once again as a  
Liberal, won narrowly by forty-six votes. Liberal representation of the West district 
ceased again six years later when Buchanan lost to a Liberal Unionist in the 1892 
general election by more than five hundred votes.7 
 The other three parliamentary districts in Edinburgh returned Liberals the 
majority of the time. In all of the elections held on the Third Reform Act 
qualification, both the Central and East districts were represented solely by Liberal 
MPs and the constituents in the South district elected Liberals in every election 
except the 1895 and 1900 elections.8 Both of these elections were landslide victories 
nationally for the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives. In Scotland the Liberal 
                                                      
3 See appendices 1–4 for a list of election results from 1885 through to Dec. 1910. 
4 Cameron, Impaled upon a Thistle, 30–1; F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British Parliamentary Election 
Results, 1918–1949, (London, 1977), 580–84. 
5 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 497–500. 
6 Millar, ‘Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn’; Hutchison, A Political History, 165. 
7 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 497–500. 
8 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 497–500. 
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Unionists’ and Conservatives’ combined number of MPs broke thirty for the first 
time in the 1895 election and in the 1900 election they returned thirty-eight MPs, 
four more than the Liberals.9 However, the Liberal Unionists in Edinburgh won each 
of these close elections by only around one hundred votes.10 During the 1900 election 
the Central district Liberals barely fought off the candidature of Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle who stood as a Liberal Unionist. However, even he could not break the Liberal 
hold on the district in an election that elsewhere was very favourable to Liberal 
Unionists and Conservatives.  
 Despite the loss of the West district, Edinburgh was still regarded as a Liberal 
stronghold in Scotland from 1886 until the Fourth Reform Act was implemented in 
1918. This is explained in two ways: first, three of its four MPs were still Liberal; 
and, second, compared to Glasgow, it was a Liberal stronghold. Between the Third 
and Fourth Reform Acts, Liberals never represented more than fifty-seven per cent of 
Glasgow. In both of the late-Victorian era election victories for the Liberal Unionists 
and Conservatives, the Glasgow Liberals suffered heavy losses. In the 1895 election 
the Liberals held on to only two seats, while in the 1900 election, no Liberal was 
elected in Glasgow. Conversely, Edinburgh’s Liberal representation never dropped 
below fifty per cent and it was only that low as a result of the elections in 1895 and 
1900. For the remainder of the period, Edinburgh was seventy-five per cent Liberal.11 
 Although Edinburgh Liberals managed to keep the city a Liberal stronghold 
after the breakup of the party over the Irish Home Rule debate in 1886, it should not 
be seen as a ‘triumph of party’.12 Chapter two reveals that the local parties could 
dictate who the nominee of the Association was, but that did not ensure that 
candidate a victory. Moreover, as discussed in chapter five, the breakdown of the 
local parties and their failure to reorganise further demonstrates the limitations of the 
local Liberal party in Edinburgh. However, the failure of the party does not 
necessarily negate the rise of a ‘nationalisation’ of the political debate which could 
                                                      
9 I. G. C. Hutchison, Scottish Politics in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 2001), 1–11; Burness, 
Strange Associations, 106–61. 
10 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 497–500. The election in 1895 was won 
by 97 votes and in 1900 it was won by 111 votes. 
11 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 497–500; Burness, Strange Associations, 
214. 
12 Hanham, Elections and Party Management; Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and 
Rosebery. 
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account for the reason the majority of Edinburgh constituents stayed loyal to the 
Liberal party.13 If it had been due to their interest in Irish Home Rule, it may support 
the importance of and the rise of national politics. Alternatively, if the reason was 
more localised, it may perhaps support the ‘politics of place’.14 
 
Liberalism: national versus local 
 In a recent article, Luke Blaxill argued that the revisionist view that 
constituents in late-Victorian politics were more concerned with ‘politics of place’ 
than with national politics was not necessarily the case as he demonstrates through a 
case study of Ipswich.15 At first, this argument appears to be valid in Edinburgh as 
well. In the 1885 election the candidates’ local connections to Edinburgh were an 
important factor in their selection which was clear through their campaign rhetoric, 
and while there were some mention of the candidates’ local connections during the 
1886 election, it was not as prevalent as it had been in 1885. The Edinburgh 
constituents, as discussed in chapter four, had traditionally valued experience as well 
as local connection in their double-member constituency prior to the Third Reform 
Act. The city often elected one well-known MP and one local MP such as well-
known English MP and Queen’s Council Samuel D. Waddy and Scotsman Thomas 
Ryburn Buchanan who were elected in by-elections just prior to the Third Reform 
Act. Due to common choice of candidates, one could argue that the constituents were 
already committed to national politics; however, the reason the constituents wanted 
experienced, well-known men to represent them was due to the prestige and national 
attention that they would bring to Edinburgh, not because they cared about national 
politics more than local politics.  
 The 1886 election, however, was certainly dominated by the Irish Home Rule 
debate which was definitely a major issue in national politics. Two of Edinburgh’s 
sitting MPs, Goschen and Wilson, were defeated in the election. Wilson and the 
newly elected McEwen were both local to Edinburgh, so their local connections 
should not have been an issue in their race. Goschen, a political celebrity whose 1885 
                                                      
13 Lawrence, Party, State and Society, 96–7; Luke Blaxill, ‘Electioneering, the Third Reform Act, and 
political change in the 1880s*’, Parliamentary History, 30 (2011), 343–373. 
14 Lawrence, Speaking for the People. 
15 Blaxill, ‘Electioneering’, 343–373. 
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victory was a landslide, was defeated by a local, Dr. Wallace, by a similarly large 
margin. Dr. Wallace’s victory was not based on his local connection, although it was 
pointed out as an asset of his during the election. Dr Wallace’s local connection was 
not his main rhetoric and the issue did not even occupy much of his time. Instead, he 
focused on Liberalism and Goschen’s perceived abandonment of Liberalism. The 
rhetoric of defending Liberalism was also the main theme for the other three Liberal 
candidates that supported Irish Home Rule in Edinburgh. This focus on party 
orientation could be viewed as a shift away from local politics in favour of national 
politics.  
 However, Liberalism was at the core of Edinburgh’s political tradition and it 
was this established political tradition that was fought for during the 1886 election. 
Macdonald described the progressive tradition of Paisley’s politics as having been 
coveted by and redefined by both the Liberal and Liberal Unionist candidates in the 
1886 election. It was through the local constituents’ perceived tradition of Liberalism 
that they interpreted the contemporary debate on Irish Home Rule.16 Macdonald’s 
analysis of the local debate over Irish Home Rule is valid in Edinburgh as well. 
Edinburgh’s tradition of Liberalism was placed at the centre of the debate. Both the 
Liberal and Liberal Unionist candidates in Edinburgh focussed their campaign 
rhetoric on Irish Home Rule around local understandings of Liberalism. The Liberal 
candidates that supported Irish Home Rule defined their opponents as having 
abandoned the Liberal party. The fact that the Liberal Unionist candidates were 
aligned with the Conservatives in opposition to Gladstone and Irish Home Rule, 
which had been introduced by a Liberal Government, and in parts of the country 
Liberal Unionists had established a new political party organisation, seemed to 
support their claim. With this in mind, it is likely that the constituents were more 
concerned with local politics and their desire to hold onto their political tradition of 
Liberalism than they were concerned with national trends. The problem for them is 
that Edinburgh’s local politics had been drawn into this debate over liberalism by 
national politics such as the introduction of Irish Home Rule and the split of the 
Liberal party. Even though the majority of the constituents were likely fighting for 
                                                      
16 Macdonald, The Radical Thread, 84–91. 
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their local perception of liberalism, they were ultimately doing so on the national 
stage and were definitely influenced by national politicians like Gladstone. 
  
The concept of democracy 
 The idea of democracy was an important aspect of late-Victorian British 
politics. According to Biagini, democracy was an ‘all-embracing issue for popular 
liberals’.17 Democracy was an important part of the political issues in late-Victorian 
Edinburgh polities as well. The political elite and the constituents had varying 
conceptions of democracy and not just between the two, but also amongst 
themselves. Defining what democracy entailed and how it was used by 
contemporaries to legitimise their argument was the source of much of the discourse 
which is covered in this thesis. Obviously, the Third Reform Act dealt with 
democracy by expanding the franchise to include a majority of the adult male 
population for the first time. This adjusted the voter qualification in the counties to 
mirror that of the burghs which greatly expanded the amount of voters in the country. 
The main franchise was still based on household qualification, but, when the 
Government adjusted the representation to the Imperial Parliament, the number of 
MPs was based on the overall population of the constituency, not the number of 
voters.18 This might have seemed logical, but it essentially defined democracy on two 
different aspects.  
 The controversy, discussed in chapter one, that arose in Edinburgh with the 
redistribution of seats that followed the franchise extension was based upon 
democracy. The constituents of St. Leonard’s ward protested against the division of 
their ward due to the impact this would have had on their voting power. Splitting 
their ward significantly diminished their voting power when compared to the other 
wards and thus limited their influence. This affected them in two ways. First, the 
number of delegates that a ward received to make up the district’s Liberal association 
was based on population and thus cutting their population by splitting the ward 
diminished their power in the association. Second, their constituents were split 
between two parliamentary districts thus splitting their votes between the two. The 
controversies that arose amongst the Liberals in the formation of the local Liberal 
                                                      
17 Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform, 16. 
18 See chapter one for an overview. 
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associations and their endorsement of candidates is covered in both chapters two and 
five. The controversy of party politics and the caucus was not unique to Edinburgh. 
This conflict amongst Liberals was all about the concept of democracy. The Liberals 
that voted in the leadership of the associations viewed it as a democratic means of 
combining their voting power. However, the Liberals that disagreed with their 
political stance on issues and preference on candidates viewed the association as an 
undemocratic machine that tried to force its political will upon the constituents under 
the guise of a democratic organisation.  
 The structural mechanics of the parliamentary districts and the Liberal 
associations was not the only issue to cause a controversy regarding democracy. 
Democracy played an important role in the questions of disestablishment, local 
licensing and Irish Home Rule as well. The concept of democracy was used by both 
the supporters and opponents of disestablishment to support their stances. The 
supporters claimed that, because the majority of the population in Scotland did not 
attend the Church of Scotland, it should not be an established Church. They were 
using this as a claim that the majority did not support the Church of Scotland. The 
opponents used the same basic argument about the percentage of the population to 
oppose disestablishment. They pointed out that the majority of Churchgoers in 
Scotland were Presbyterian and shared the same faith as the Church of Scotland, 
therefore, the faith should be established. The local licensing argument was based on 
the idea that the local population should be able to decide whether or not they wanted 
to allow the sale of alcohol in their local communities. All of the candidates in 
Edinburgh except one claimed that they supported the locals having that right; 
however, there was a dispute over which locals should have that right. Some were in 
favour of complete democracy where all inhabitants in the local community would 
have a say on the issue while others were in favour of a restricted vote based on the 
parliamentary voting requirements. The issue of democracy and Irish Home Rule has 
been discussed in chapter six. This conflict was not a dispute on the people’s right to 
choose in a democracy, but on which people in the democracy should have the right 
to choose. The supporters of Irish Home Rule argued that it was the Irish that had the 
right to say who should govern them while the opponents claimed that it should be 
the whole of the United Kingdom. 
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 This thesis helps to nuance our understanding of the complexities of late-
Victorian British politics. It reveals how the local constituencies of Edinburgh dealt 
with the changes brought about by the Third Reform Act and how the constituents 
responded to the conflict within the Liberal party as well as the shattering of the 
Liberal party which took place upon the introduction of the Irish Home Rule debate. 
It also sheds light on the national and local influences that the constituents’ vote was 
pulled between and how they responded to them as well as the discourse regarding 
the various ideas of democracy amongst the contemporaries. All of this helps analyse 






Appendix 1: Edinburgh’s Central District Election Results1 
Election Year Candidate Party Votes Per cent 
1885 
J. Wilson Ind. Liberal 2,930 41.9 
J. H. Renton Liberal 1,683 24.1 
Hon. J. S. Napier Conservative 1,606 23.0 
A. W. Black Ind. Liberal 770 11.0 
1886 
W. McEwan Liberal 3,760 62.7 
J. Wilson Liberal Unionist 2,236 37.3 
1892 
W. McEwan Liberal 3,733 63 
A. K. Connell Liberal Unionist 1,758 29.7 
J. Wilson SSF&SUTCLP 434 7.3 
1895 W. McEwan Liberal Unopposed 
1900 
G. M. Brown Liberal 3,028 55.2 
Dr. A. Conan Doyle Liberal Unionist 2,459 44.8 
1906 
C. E. Price Liberal 3,935 67.9 
J. D. G. Walker Liberal Unionist 1,857 32.1 
1910 (Jan.) 
C. E. Price Liberal 3,965 66.7 
D. A. Scott Liberal Unionist 1,980 33.3 
1910 (Dec.) 
C. E. Price Liberal 3,771 65.9 
















                                                      
1 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 497. 
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Appendix 2: Edinburgh’s East District Election Results 2 
Election Year Candidate Party Votes Per cent 
1885 
Rt. Hon. G. J. Goschen Ind. Liberal 4,337 69.2 
B. F. C. Costelloe Liberal 1,929 30.8 
1886 
R. Wallace Liberal 3,694 62.1 
Rt. Hon. G. J. Goschen Liberal Unionist 2,253 37.9 
1892 
R. Wallace Liberal 3,969 58.6 
R. W. M. Fullarton Liberal Unionist 2,809 41.4 
1895 
R. Wallace Liberal 3,499 53.4 
H. G. Younger Liberal Unionist 3,050 46.6 
1899* 
G. McCrae Liberal 4,891 62.3 
H. G. Younger Liberal Unionist 2,961 37.7 
1900 
G. McCrae Liberal 4,461 58.5 
R. Scott-Brown Liberal Unionist 3,170 41.5 
1906 
G. McCrae Liberal 6,606 73.1 
Dr. R. Dawson Liberal Unionist 2,432 26.9 
1909* 
J. P. Gibson Liberal 4,527 52.7 
P. J. Ford Liberal Unionist 4,069 47.3 
1910 (Jan.) 
Sir J. P. Gibson, Bt. Liberal 6,760 61.3 
P. J. Ford Liberal Unionist 4,273 38.7 
1910 (Dec.) 
Sir J. P. Gibson, Bt. Liberal 6,436 63.0 
R. M. Cameron Conservative 3,782 37.0 
1912* 
J. M. Hogge Liberal 5,064 55.0 
















                                                      
2 Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885–1918, 498. *denotes a by-election 
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Appendix 3: Edinburgh’s South District Election Results 3 
Election Year Candidate Party Votes Per cent 
1885 
Sir G. Harrison Ind. Liberal 4,273 59.8 
T. Raleigh Liberal 2,874 40.2 
1886 (Jan.)* 
Rt. Hon. H. C. E. Childers Liberal 4,029 70.0 
Master of Polwarth Conservative 1,730 30.0 
1886 (Feb.)* Rt. Hon. H. C. E. Childers Liberal Unopposed 
1886 
Rt. Hon. H. C. E. Childers Liberal 3,778 63.3 
R. Purvis Liberal Unionist 2,191 36.7 
1892 
H. W. Paul Liberal 4,692 52.4 
L. McIver Liberal Unionist 4,261 47.6 
1895 
R. Cox Liberal Unionist 4,802 50.5 
H. W. Paul Liberal 4,705 49.5 
1899* 
A. Dewar Liberal 5,820 53.8 
A. G. Wauchope Conservative 4,989 46.2 
1900 
Sir A. N. Agnew, Bt. Liberal Unionist 5,766 50.5 
A. Dewar Liberal 5,655 49.5 
1906 
A. Dewar Liberal 8,945 63.8 
W. C. Smith Liberal Unionist 5,085 36.2 
1909* 
A. Dewar Liberal 8,185 54.0 
H. B. Cox Liberal Unionist 6,964 46.0 
1910 (Jan.) 
A. Dewar Liberal 10,235 56.4 
H. B. Cox Liberal Unionist 7,901 43.6 
1910 (Apr.)* 
C. H. Lyell Liberal 8,694 57.7 
R. G. C. Glyn Conservative 6,367 42.3 
1910 (Dec.) 
C. H. Lyell Liberal 9,576 54.5 
C. de B. Murray Conservative 7,986 45.5 
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Appendix 4: Edinburgh’s West District Election Results 4 
Election Year Candidate Party Votes Per cent 
1885 
T. R. Buchanan Liberal 3,800 59.1 
G. A. Jamieson Conservative 2,625 40.9 
1886  
T. R. Buchanan Liberal Unionist 3,083 56.3 
R. Wallace Liberal 2,393 43.7 
1888* 
T. R. Buchanan Liberal 3,294 50.4 
T. Raleigh Liberal Unionist 3,248 49.6 
1892 
Viscount Wolmer Liberal Unionist 3,728 53.7 
T. R. Buchanan Liberal 3,216 46.3 
1895 (May)* 
L. McIver Liberal Unionist 3,783 55.2 
Master  of Elibank Liberal 3,075 44.8 
1895 L. McIver Liberal Unionist Unopposed 
1900 
Sir L. McIver, Bt. Liberal Unionist 4,180 61.2 
E. A. Adam Liberal 2,645 38.8 
1906 
Sir L. McIver, Bt. Liberal Unionist 3,949 52.0 
Rt. Hon. L. H. Courtney Liberal 3,643 48.0 
1909* J. A. Clyde Liberal Unionist Unopposed 
1910 (Jan.) 
J. A. Clyde Liberal Unionist 4,683 52.5 
C. H. Lyell Liberal 4,233 47.5 
1910 (Dec.) 
J. A. Clyde Liberal Unionist 4,952 53.8 
Prof. J. H. Morgan Liberal 4,252 46.2 
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